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Abstract
Inequality rose rapidly in the run up to the 1929 stock market crash and the
2007 financial crisis. Both crises precipitated long and deep recessions. This
paper seeks to determine if there is any deeper relationship between inequal-
ity and financial stability. The work presents an empirical investigation of
the topic and theoretical model of how such a relationship could exist. My
original contribution to the literature is threefold: (1) the empirical detection
of a small interaction between economic inequality and propensity to finan-
cial crises, (2) the presentation of a novel measure of financial stability using
principal component analysis and its interaction with economic inequality,
and (3) the presentation of a novel theoretical model that demonstrates a
possible mechanism by which inequality may reduce financial stability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
So distribution should undo excess, and each man have enough.
[King Lear, Act 4, Scene 1]
–William Shakespeare
Within the last five years the study of financial crises has once again
gained significant popularity in the mainstream media and academic circles.
The near collapse of the banking system has raised familiar, but fundamen-
tal questions for economists about the way in which the financial system is
organised. Although this is not the fundamental question raised by this re-
search, it has a strong bearing on the motivation behind it. While financial
crises are certainly inconvenient to those affected by them, there is a mount-
ing body of work to suggest that there are real and significant costs involved.
The cost of a crisis is found to be of the order of 63% of real per capita GDP
(Boyd et al., 2005). This work aims to answer the simple question: How does
economic inequality affect the stability of the financial system?
Much attention has already been paid to the effect of inequality on eco-
nomic growth with a general consensus that inequality negatively impacts
growth (Aghion and Williamson, 1999). However, this is not a universal
finding and some research finds the converse to be true. Forbes (2000) ar-
gues that the differing results are due to improved data and methods of
analysis, but this is still a contentious position.
Work has been undertaken to identify the effects of financial crises on
inequality. Papers such as Halac et al. (2004) and Baldacci et al. (2002)
demonstrate that economic inequality is usually increased by financial crises.
The reverse relationship has also been posited, with no lesser proponents
than Rajan (2011) and Krugman (2010), suggesting that there seems to be
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some correlation between large financial crises and levels of inequality. The
core aim of this research is to determine if this is a mere coincidence or a more
structural relationship. The observation behind this hypothesis is shown in
figure 1.1, which shows the proportion of income taken by the top 1% of
earners in the USA over the last century. We can see two distinct peaks, just
before the Great Depression and the 2007 financial crisis.
Figure 1.1: US top 1% income share over the twentieth century, (Facundo
et al., 2012)
The link between economic inequality and financial stability is not anec-
dotally obvious. Comparing countries regarded as having high inequality 1
and those with more equality 2 it is not immediately obvious which has the
greater propensity to financial crises. This is especially true when one turns
to banking crises; most of the world has experienced a banking crisis of some
sort over the last 25 years. Moreover, differences in governmental responses
to unravelling crises can mask the true depth of the crisis making it difficult
to measure the underlying severity.
Chapter 3 will look at this relationship in more detail and show that high
inequality does appear to increase the propensity towards financial crisis. I
first use a logit model to show that the probability of a country experiencing a
financial crisis in 2007 was higher if that country had a higher Gini coefficient.
I then show that this result can be generalised to other crises, however, these
results are not statistically robust. Finally, in chapter 3, I use a principal
1 For example US, UK and Portugal
2 For example Japan and Scandinavia
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component decomposition to look more closely at the role inequality played
in the 2007 financial crisis.
My empirical results are contrary to the findings of Bordo and Meissner
(2012), who did not find such a relationship. I argue that we cannot rule
out a weak relationship despite the dominance of other factors, because of
the sparse data on inequality. My work also contributes a relatively novel
approach to measuring financial stability, and uses this measure to analyse
possible causes of crises.
It is appropriate at this point to ask how inequality may affect the proba-
bility of a crisis and to propose some transmission mechanism whereby greater
inequality reduces stability. Krugman (2010) suggests that rising inequality
is related to political polarisation. The result is that the wealthy have undue
political influence, which causes suboptimal policy and financial fragility. In
this vein, Landier and Plantin (2011) present a theoretical model of how such
political interaction could occur. However, this thesis will propose a purer
microeconomic mechanism model of how inequality reduces stability.
Economic inequality could have several effects on the stability of the
financial system. One scenario is where inequality does not directly cause a
financial crisis but serves to deepen what could be small shocks.
Consider an extreme example in which a large proportion of the pop-
ulation are engaged in menial and low paid work while the remainder are
disproportionately wealthy. In this extreme country, the poor are all but
unable to participate in any financial markets:
• They have bank accounts but little stock holding or insurance,
• They will be limited in their ability to obtain credit, and
• They will own a very small fraction of assets.
Conversely the rich would be responsible for investing nearly all of the coun-
try’s wealth; they are responsible for diversification, choice of assets and
obtaining credit.
The poor are then wholly dependent on the rich making good choices
so that the country becomes wealthier. This may be at odds with a purely
self-interested agenda e.g. extracting rents may be more profitable than
investing in productive enterprise. In the event that the rich take undue
risks, fail to diversify their investments or borrow money irresponsibly then
the entire country could suffer. A small shock in financial markets may then
be amplified.
This economy does not look familiar from a developed western perspec-
tive, where there is much greater engagement with the financial system. It
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is true that in the USA the wealthy do account for a large proportion of
wealth, the top 5% of earners account for 50% of output (Wolff, 2010). How-
ever, over one quarter of US citizens directly own some stock (Haliassos and
Bertaut, 1995), nearly three quarters participate in some sort of insurance
(Chen et al., 2001) and less than 10% of the population is unbanked (Rhine
et al., 2006). Within this context the extreme narrative presented above does
not seem to work and instead we must look for a subtler story.
Consider an economy where financial market participation is relatively
high, however, there is significant disparity between high and low incomes.
The young generally have lower incomes which increase over time, but the
final level of income could be very much higher (in the event one becomes
CEO), or relatively low, (one remains a teaching assistant).
Each agent in the economy engages in lifetime consumption smoothing.
They borrow when they have low incomes and save when they have high
incomes. In general, an agent starting out with a low income will borrow
based on the expectation that their income will rise. The level of borrowing
will be determined by their preference structure: rate of time preference,
marginal utility of consumption and risk aversion. An increase at the top
end of the income distribution (the density or level) will not necessarily cause
an increase in the expected level of future income and risk aversion is likely
to cancel out any desire for increased borrowing.
In the case where defaults are permitted, including bankruptcy provisions
in the UK and the USA, higher income inequality will lead to an increased
propensity to borrowing and therefore greater financial instability. If defaults
are permitted at non zero consumption then the agent will be inclined to
borrow more because they do not lose as much consumption in the lowest
realisations of income. That is to say agents form expectations about future
consumption levels which discount some future low income states.
Chapter 4 will show how this defaults based mechanism propagates through
an economy to increase financial instability. The mode of transmission pro-
posed has the same result to that of Kumhof and Rancie`re (2010), however,
here the mechanism is somewhat simpler. While the mechanism may be more
intuitive I am forced to use models of non-commitment, which are somewhat
less analytically tractable. This model is novel and represents an original
contribution to the literature.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
At this juncture, however, the impact on the broader economy and financial
markets of the problems in the subprime market seems likely to be contained.
– Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, Congressional testimony, March, 2007
Chapters 3 to 4 will look at the relationship between economic inequality
and financial crises. However, before establishing an empirical relationship
or theoretical mechanism it is important to establish what is meant by: (1)
financial crisis and (2) economic inequality. In this chapter, the literature
will be reviewed around these two concepts and the terms defined for the
purposes of this research.
2.1 Financial Crises
There exists a great wealth of literature on financial crises, principally be-
cause no two crises are the same and so are studied under various cate-
gorisations. Here, I will use two taxonomies to discuss crisis: (1) by the
manifestation, whether a crisis affects banks, currencies and so on; and (2)
how the crisis originates, the three generations of crisis.
It is prudent to note that very few crises happen in isolation and no cause
is pure. Quite often crises will occur simultaneously in several countries and
markets, including banking, currency and asset markets. Furthermore, an
individual crisis can reflect components of all three generations. It is therefore
important to think about these events in broad terms.
2. Literature Review 16
2.1.1 Manifestations of crises
The term ‘financial crisis’ is broadly taken to mean the sudden and un-
expected change in the value of one or more assets that results in some
distribution to the normal business of finance. This is by no means a new
phenomenon, in the words of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) there have been
“Eight Centuries of Financial Foll”. However, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
also note that even as early as the Byzantine Empire currencies were rapidly
debased to reduce levels of sovereign debt.
Even in its early development, the complex nature of any financial sys-
tem results in inherent instability. Banks are by definition unstable, they
lend money over the long term in mortgages and promise depositors repay-
ment on demand. Rulers and then governments find themselves conflicted
between sovereign, or even divine independence, and the fixed nature of debt
contracts. Herding behaviour has been seen in every asset market from Dutch
Tuplip bulbs (Garber, 2001) to Collateralized Debt Obligations (Mason and
Rosner, 2007).
The financial system has evolved a mind boggling array of assets and
interactions. However, the base of the financial system is still the currency;
banks are the principle intermediaries and the majority of assets are still
held in stocks of companies and property. This section will look at various
events which can be considered financial crises. However, the remainder of
this paper will be primarily concerned with banking crises, and so this will
be the focus of discussion.
Currency Crises
The academic literature on financial crises is historically centred around the
study of the sudden changes in exchange rate positions. The unwinding of
currency regimens in the 1990s provided the first case where detailed data
available for robust empirical study.
These crises are typically defined as the collapse of a fixed peg exchange
rate; for example the collapse of the European Monetary System (EMS), the
Mexican (Tequila) Crisis, and the Asian Flu after the collapse of the Bhat.
The primary reason for this identification is the fact that such events are
often dramatic and as such the crisis is easier to identify.
However, the moment the revaluation occurs is not the beginning of the
crisis. Currency crises are often defined in terms of speculative pressure;
several numerical definitions have been proposed based around the level of
international reserves of a country, changes in the exchange rates and interest
rates, see for example Eichengreen et al. (1996) or Kaminsky et al. (1998).
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Defining a crisis robustly will be further discussed in Section 2.1.3.
Currency crises are often the result of international asymmetry, e.g. bal-
ance of payments or sovereign debt (Krugman, 1979). However, crises can
also ensue because of an inappropriate peg, due to misjudged competitiveness
or political desire to portray an economy as stronger than it really is. This is
particularly pertinent to Greece’s position in the Euro crisis, 1 Pisani-Ferry
(2012).
Banking Crises
The business of banking is vital to modern financial systems; fundamentally
they are vehicles of risk sharing and maturity transformation, taking deposits
and making loans. In most developed economies banks provide payment
clearing systems and therefore, have a pivotal role in promoting financial
stability. There is a fundamental problem in the business model of banks in
that they take short term deposits and issue long term loans, so clearly care
must be taken to ensure that provision is made to meet depositors demands
for liquidity.
Several models have been proposed to demonstrate why banking crises
can occur. In isolation a bank can experience a ‘run i.e. the point where
depositors demand for liquidity is greater than a banks’ liquid assets. In the
event that the bank is able to meet demand by selling illiquid assets, albeit
at a loss, they are said to be insolvent; in the event that claims on a bank
outweigh the proceeds of the sale of assets, the bank is said to be bankrupt.
The seminal work in this area was by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) who
demonstrated how bank runs occur and under certain circumstances may be
useful. However, they also noted that when deposit insurance is introduced
a more optimal solution can be reached. Allen and Gale (1998) were the
next protagonists who demonstrated, in 1998 and 2000, that when banks
hold claims against each other a systematic failure can occur, dependent on
the topology of said claims. These models could easily be adapted to the
situations where a significant proportion of bank deposits are owned by a
small proportion of the population. Hence being an obvious place to begin
a theoretical analysis of the crises involving wealth disparity.
It can be argued that bank runs pose a real and present danger to any
economy (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In their model, Diamond and Dy-
bvig (1983) consider two groups of consumers who maximise their utility
withdrawing funds at two different times. The bank invests in a produc-
1 Greece is maintaining parity between its currency and the rest of the Eurozone, which
is, to all intents and purposes, a currency peg.
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tive asset that returns R > 1 units of consumption at the later time or, if
liquidated early, will return 1 consumption unit. They consider several pos-
sible outcomes of risk sharing problems under which depositors are repaid
on a first come first served basis. They conclude that under the provision of
deposit insurance a more optimal solution can be reached.
Allen and Gale (1998) go on to expand this basic model by considering the
same two groups with early and late consumer preference, giving banks the
option to hold either liquid short term assets returning 1 unit of consumption
at the early date (cash), or an illiquid asset returning R units of consumption
at the later date. In the event that a demand is made against the bank for
withdrawals greater than the amount of liquid asset holdings, the available
funds are divided equally among all depositors. By considering possible ratios
of consumers being early or late they discuss possible optimal allocations for
the bank, and use this equilibrium model to demonstrate circumstances under
which external agencies should intervene to support a failing bank.
Further to considering individual banks, the model proposed by Allen
and Gale can be used to analyse several connected banks (Allen and Gale,
2000). In this case, banks are able to make deposits with each other, this
allows for excess liquidity demands in a single bank to be met by those banks
that have excessive liquidity. Given what is described as a ‘complete market’,
the result is that the banks independently are more stable, however, when
not all banks are connected, an excess demand for liquidity in one region
precipitates through the banking system and can result in a more profound
systemic failure.
This represents one of the first examples of contagious behaviour, which
is to say that the same model can be applied to banks in different regions
or even countries. Allen and Gale (2000) not only demonstrate the potential
for contagion, but also that within a finite incomplete network of banks the
bankruptcy of one bank will result in all other banks suffering a similar fate.
Demirg-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) test several indicators of banking
crises, including a broad range of macroeconomic fundamentals and features
of the regulatory environment. They find countries with weak fundamentals
are more likely to experience banking failures; in particular, low growth com-
bined with high inflation or high real interest rates cause problems. They
also find that the provision of explicit deposit insurance creates moral hazard;
rewarding banks for taking irresponsible risks.
Individual banks fail on a fairly regular basis, often to be bought out
by a stronger competitor. The more interesting type of banking crisis is
systematic banking failure, in which many banks in the same country face
similar difficulties (Demirg-Kunt and Detragiache, 2011). Examples include
the American Savings and Loan Crisis, the Argentine and Chilean Crises
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of the mid Eighties, the Japanese Crisis, the Scandinavian Crises and more
recently the US Sub-Prime Crisis (Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012).
It is interesting to think of the recent events in the UK in the context
of individual versus systematic banking failure. The collapse of Northern
Rock was probably the result of panic, and certainly changed the way mar-
kets perceived risk, but the collapse of Lehman Brothers brought the entire
banking system to the brink of failure. Were it not for capital injections from
governments it is difficult to see how any bank could have survived.
Asset Prices
There are many examples of financial crises caused by the rapid depreciation
of asset prices, for example (i) in stock prices the 1929 Wall Street Crash, the
1987 Crash, the Dot-Com bubble or (ii) in the house prices the US in 2007,
the UK in the early 1990s or Spain in the late 1990s. Once again such crises
are considered in three generations: (i) the idea that assets are fundamentally
over priced; (ii) investors believe assets are over priced and sell en masse even
if it is a fundamentally ex ante irrational action; (iii) prices in one market
falling cause mass liquidation across other markets.
Much has been postulated about the presence of so-called ‘asset price
bubbles’. A bubble is said to occur when the price of an asset departs sig-
nificantly from its underlying value. For example, in the run up to the 2000
Dot-Com crash the S&P500 was trading with a price to earnings ratio of over
40 (Datastream, 2012) compared to historic averages of between 10 and 20
(Shiller, 1987). While Shiller (1987) may describe this as ‘irrational exuber-
ance’, there is also an argument that bubbles may be wholly rational (Diba
and Grossman, 1988).
The basic model for stock market crashes begins with the idea of over-
optimistic investors inflating prices beyond their fundamental value; the logic
suggests that eventually investors will realise their mistake and prices will
adjust. Shiller (1987) comments on surveys of investors undertaken in the
wake of the 1987 Wall Street and Japanese Crashes, he notes that most
investors felt that assets were over priced but could not offer any explanation
as to why this might have been the case.
There are as many theories of stock price collapse as there are securities
traded on those markets. For example, Cass and Shell (1983) suggest that
belief in sun spots can result in the unstable equilibrium.
It also proves interesting to look at house price movements, especially in
the context of the current crisis and the recession of the early 1990s. There
is an increasing literature developing around house prices, and especially
the role of monetary policy on residential house prices. For example, Aoki
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(2003) looks at the role of such policy and house prices in the consumer credit
market.
2.1.2 Generations of Crises
The crisis literature also breaks down the causes of a crisis into three genera-
tions. These are not exclusive categorisations but provide a taxonomy under
which to consider the events running up to a crisis.
1st Generation: Fundamentals Crisis
A ‘Fundamentals’ crisis is the simplest form of financial crisis. For example,
a government with a fixed exchange rate peg pursues an expansionary fiscal
policy resulting in downward pressure on the currency and drain on the
central bank’s foreign reserves (Krugman, 1979). Fundamental indicators
will predominantly include macroeconomic fundamentals e.g. international
reserves, real interest rates, current account, imports, exports, money supply
and unemployment. The crisis occurs as a result of the crossing of a threshold
where fiscal/monetary policy becomes clearly unsustainable.
More generally, this is a crisis that should happen; that is to say that bad
or misguided management, external shocks or malice result in unsustainable
fundamentals and so the crisis unfolds. This type of crisis seems to explain the
propagation of crises in Latin America in the 1970’s (Flood and Marion, 1998;
Dornbusch et al., 1995). However, there is no obvious reason for expectations
to change rapidly in the cases of the collapse of the ERM or in the Asian
Crisis. Also, in the case of the ERM collapse there was not a significant
reduction in output that would be expected after a fundamentals based crisis
(Dornbusch et al., 1995). Resolutions for these inconsistencies are provided
by the remaining two generations.
2nd Generation: Self-fulfilling Prophecy
Second generation crises are predominantly the result of the literature on
multiple equilibria by Obstfeld (1986). Such crises are referred to as self ful-
filling prophecies. If speculators believe a peg is going to change imminently
they may take positions to protect against, or benefit from that change. This
position can then drive collapse, even if the country has good macroeconomic
fundamentals (Eichengreen et al., 1996).
2. Literature Review 21
3rd Generation: Contagion
This is defined as the spread of a crisis from a different country or market.
This type of crisis is widely cited in the media (Economist, 2011), but less
clearly defined academically. There is not a well-defined academic consensus
on the role of contagion in financial crises, however, discussion of crises often
involve the semantics of contagion:
The Asian Flu began with continued attacks on Thailand . . . Within
days, speculators had attacked Malaysia, the Philippines and Indone-
sia. . . then the crises spread across the Pacific to Chile and Brazil. (?,
3)
Several modes of transmission have been suggested, for example Kyle and
Xiong (2007) suggest that liquidity constraints on certain traders may cause
spill over from different markets.
Contagion is often defined simply as a clustering effect (Eichengreen et al.,
1996); that is, a crisis is more likely to occur if a crisis has already occurred
elsewhere in the world. They find an increase in the probability of a crisis
to occur after another crisis when macroeconomic fundamentals have been
controlled for, however, this study only considers developed markets. It
is also noteworthy that a year earlier Eichengreen et al. (1995) used the
same data set to demonstrate the significance of the effects of several of the
variables used as control variables in predicting currency crises.
In recent years, the definition of contagion that was adopted by Eichen-
green et al. (1996) has dropped slightly out of favour, and to be replaced by
the stricter definition of Forbes and Rigobon (2002). While the idea of us-
ing increased correlation after a major event as an indication of contagion is
not new, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) demonstrate how heteroskedasticity in
market returns can cause biases in such measurements. For example, periods
of high volatility may precipitate more than one crisis and this may look like
a correlation between crises, when in reality it is a common cause.
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) then consider three stock market crises, many
related to, or associated with a currency crisis: The 1997 East Asian Crisis,
the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis and the 1987 U.S. Stock Market Crash. In
these three cases, they demonstrated how conventional, biased, correlation
measures would seem to suggest the presence of contagion and how using the
heteroskedasticity adjustment eliminates this evidence. They do however
take care to note that they do find evidence of interdependence between
markets and that this is present in both crisis and tranquil periods.
This work was not met with magnanimous support, for example Favero
and Giavazzi (2002) note that while the adjustment for heteroskedasticity
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is worthwhile Forbes and Rigobon (2002) did not attempt to control for
common shocks or in fact try to model for a normal interaction. As such
they criticise the definition of contagion used by Forbes and Rigobon (2002),
suggesting that contagion is in the change in co-movements during a crisis
due to the creation of new mechanisms to transmit interconnections. This
can of course be compared directly to Eichengreen et al. (1996) compensating
for macroeconomic similarities.
Furthermore, Chiang et al. (2007) dig deeper into the ideas proposed by
Forbes and Rigobon (2002), noting that their method ignores the problems of
missing variables. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) do in fact provide an appendix
on this topic and conclude that the heteroskedasticity correction is not as
accurate under the presence of missing variables. Chiang et al. (2007) also
consider problems involved in modelling the dynamic nature of the cross
market correlation by using a multivariate GARCH Model in order to capture
the time varying nature of the correlation matrix and to avoid the arbitrary
allocation of crisis and tranquil periods.
This discussion serves to highlight the importance of controlling for other
effects aside from that which is being studied. Chapter 3 will make extensive
use of the methods outlined by Eichengreen et al. (1996).
2.1.3 Defining a Crisis
So far we have discussed types of crisis in terms of the markets that they
affect and the three generations of crisis. However, ‘crisis’ is much more of a
human word than a technical word, as it suggests something both scary and
out of the ordinary. Hence why it is often used in the press to evoke a strong
emotional response. Therefore, in each case, one must be careful to note
that the definition will contain a certain element of subjectivity. To have any
rigour, the word ‘crisis’ must be interpreted to mean a significant statistical
departure from ‘normal’ market conditions. This will be important when
interpreting empirical results to test the sensitivity to these assumptions by
varying any numerical definitions.
Therefore, the first step in defining a crisis must be to measure some
variables related to the crisis, then to ascertain its ‘normal’ behaviour, and
to identify instances in history where it is not behaving normally. This
measurement will depend very much on the type of crisis being observed,
and we must appeal to theory to give a guide as to which variables may be
affected. Thus, for example, in the case of currency crises, Eichengreen et al.
(1996) use the following definitions:
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EMPi,t = [(α∆ei,t) + (β∆(ii,t − iG,t))− (γ(∆ri,t −∆rG,t))] (2.1)
EMPi,t = Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) in country i at time t
ei,t = Price of a DM in i’s currency at time t
ii,t = Interest rate in country i at time t
ri,t = Foreign reserves held by country i at time t
α, β, γ = Weights
This definition is used to study the collapse of the ERM and therefore the
variables are taken relative to the Deutsch Mark. The rationale behind the
proposed measurement is that the crisis is the result of speculative pressure,
with the markets betting against the currency. The result of this pressure,
in the form of selling off assets denominated in the given currency, will be
to reduce the value of that currency. Moreover, if the monetary authority
attempts to protect the currency, by either raising rates or selling reserves,
this will also be detected even if the currency does not change in value.
A variable crisis is then defined such that;
Crisisi,t =
{
1 EMPi,t > 1.5σEMP + µEMP ,
0 otherwise.
(2.2)
We may be tempted to think of this as over complicating the question,
a currency crisis is surely easy to identify as it results in devaluation of the
currency. However, this is not always the case, in the event that a government
or monetary authority successfully defends the currency we cannot say that
a crisis did not occur. Eichengreen et al. (1996) use this definition to identify
various crisis episodes on which to do analysis. They then go on to test the
sensitivity of their results to a change in the weights within the EMP and the
condition that a crisis occurs when the EMP deviates 1.5 standard deviations
from the long-term mean. They find it does not affect the conclusions of the
paper.
Kaminsky et al. (1998) provides a broad overview of 25 empirical studies
considering possible indicators of currency crises/speculative pressure and
agrees with Eichengreen et al. (1996), in all but the inclusion of interest
rates as a measure of speculative pressure. The motivation for this is that in
considering developing countries, one must bear in mind restrictions on the
market defining interest rates.
In the case of banking crises, it is difficult to be as precise. A well cap-
italised system may experience large defaults but still survive. Conversely,
2. Literature Review 24
panic may cause the system to fail. High interest rates may increase profit
or cause instability, or a broadly capitalised system may suffer significant
external shocks and fail despite the appearance of ex ante stability. For each
variable that could define a banking crisis measure there is an example of a
crisis that does not fit the measure. Generally, one must turn to case study
evidence. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) make the following definition:
We mark a banking crisis by two types of events: (1) bank runs that
lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or
more financial institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, the closure,
merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important
financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of
a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2011, p. 1680)
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) also emphasise the distinction between sys-
temic failure and financial instability. For example, they would not take the
collapse of Northern Rock in the UK to be the start of the ‘banking crisis’ as
it only affected one institution. This example serves to demonstrate the key
drawback in this events-driven definition, namely that the timing of events
may make the timing of the ‘crisis’ difficult to pinpoint. It is easy to see how
in the case of the UK recently, the crisis began in mid 2007 but the ‘crisis
event’, using the above definition, would be the capital injection into Lloyds
Banking Group and RBS in 2008. Equally, events can make crises seem to
start too early when the worst is much later; one could look to Ireland in the
recent past as an example (Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012).
In this paper the overall stability of the financial system is the primary
concern and therefore we must restrict the study to systemic crises. As
defined:
under our definition, in a systemic banking crisis, a country’s corporate
and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial
institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on
time. As a result, non-performing loans increase sharply and all or most
of the aggregate banking system capital is exhausted. This situation may
be accompanied by depressed asset prices (such as equity and real estate
prices) on the heels of run-ups before the crisis, sharp increases in real
interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital flows. In some
cases, the crisis is triggered by depositor runs on banks, though in most
cases it is a general realization that systemically important financial
institutions are in distress Laeven and Valencia (2008, p. 5)
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The above mentioned papers, Laeven and Valencia (2008), Reinhart and
Rogoff (2011), and Bordo et al. (2001), present comprehensive databases of
banking crises over the last century. Each of these databases are based on
assessing evidence case by case and therefore, there is some level of subjectiv-
ity involved in the definition. Atkinson and Morelli (2011a) suggests taking
a majoritarian view of the above three databases, defining a crises to have
happened/begun if at least two of the studies agree. While this method is
at least conclusive, given caveats for the various periods studied, it would
appear somewhat ad hoc.
The first two sections of empirical work presented below will use this
majoritarian definition of a crisis. However, the final section will present a
different method drawing from studies of dynamic factor analysis.
2.2 Inequality
Inequality is a much discussed, little understood and highly contested concept
in modern economics, even before one brings into question fairness, rights
and politics. However, there is a growing consensus that inequality matters.
In the pop-economics field, the Spirit Level (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010)
opened the recent debate claiming inequality damages many social outcomes.
The popularist political debate rumbles on, but the academic questions are
no closer to a solution.
It is important to first decide what inequality actually means. Intuitively,
inequality is the difference between the rich and poor in a given society. How-
ever we are immediately confronted by the question of wealth vs. income.
The former would perhaps seem more appropriate for a discussion on finan-
cial stability. It is, after all, wealth rather than income that makes up the
majority of bank deposits. However, data on wealth inequality is even more
sparse than that on income; moreover, wealth may not be liquid and there-
fore hard to value, for example the ‘cash poor’ land owner. It is also noted
that one may wish to think in terms of family or households and, in the ideal
case, total lifetime economic resources.
The question is then how to incorporate inequality into a well defined
econometric model, ideally we would like a single numerical measure of in-
equality. The most common numerical measure of inequality is the Gini
coefficient, which takes the values in the interval [0, 1] with 0 being perfect
equality and 1 being perfect inequality. The numerical value is usually cal-
culated with reference to the Lorenz curve. Hence, for the distribution Ψy
the function L(x) is the proportion of households with income less than or
equal to Ψ−1(x) where x ∈ [0, 1]:
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L(x) =
Ψ−1(x)∫
−∞
ydΨy
∞∫
−∞
ydΨy
(2.3)
It is useful to note that L(Ψ(yj)) is increasing and convex.
Figure 2.1: Example of Gini coefficient calculation from Lorenz Curve
(Reidpath, 2009)
If income was distributed with perfect equality, the curve L would be a
straight line at 45o. Then intuitively the Gini coefficient is the ratio of the
areas under the 45o line and the area between the 45o and the Lorenz curve.
In Figure 2.1 this would the ratio A/(A+B) or analytically it is given by:
G = 1− 2
1∫
0
L(X)dX (2.4)
= 1− 1
µ
ymax∫
ymin
(1−Ψ(y))2dy (2.5)
However, as Atkinson and Morelli (2011a) ask, ‘Which part of the parade
should we be watching?’ Gini is a measure of overall dispersion, but there
is some evidence that this value does not capture all of the changes that are
occurring.
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Figure 2.2: Relative size of top income shares indexed at 100 in 1917
Figure 2.2 shows that significant changes are occurring in different parts
of the distribution and not all of these can be accounted for by a single
measure. Specifically, we see that in the latter half of the twentieth century
the share taken by the top 1% rose faster than that taken by the top 5%
or 10%. It will therefore be useful to consider other measures if they are
available. Two principal sources will be used:
1. The World Incomes Inequality Database, which systematically pools
research on income distribution (WIDER, 2008). The database covers
159 countries with time series varying over the last century and ranks
observations by the quality of the source.
2. The World Top Incomes Database is a relatively new source created for
the purposes of researching the effect of income distribution (Facundo
et al., 2012). The creators set out to create a source which is comparable
across time and countries based on the best available data. However,
the data is still predominantly based on tax statistics and therefore
subject to the below mentioned issues. This database focuses on actual
shares of income rather than simply Gini coefficients, although it is
limited to 23 countries.
Both data sources rely heavily on information based on the analysis of
individual studies of government tax receipts. Such sources are often criti-
cised as they are collected for an administrative rather than scientific purpose
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and are subject to bias because of tax evasion or avoidance (Atkinson and
Brandolini, 2001). However, given the sparsity of data, it is not prudent to
discard too much data and instead, we must be careful about over stating
the strength of any results.
There are further problems in using Gini type measures of inequality,
the first obvious question is ’Inequality of what?’ Generally speaking this
thesis discusses inequality of income, however, some would argue that in-
equality of consumption is, in many ways, more important. These quantities
do not necessarily move together, as Krueger and Perri (2006) demonstrate,
rising income inequality does not necessarily imply rising consumption in-
equality. This is in part due to changes in patterns of borrowing and saving,
which provides an interesting narrative for the theoretical aspect of this work.
Moving beyond mere measurement, Sen (1973) began a strand of literature
that goes further to question what inequality really means. That is to say
that a discussion based purely on measurements of money missed out the
social and political disenfranchisements that may be more important than
spending power. While such issues are very important, this study requires a
quantitative measurement and therefore we will use the most widely available
measure, that is the Gini coefficient.
Chapter 3
Empirical Investigation
God does not care about our mathematical difficulties. He integrates empir-
ically.
–Albert Einstein quoted in Ishaq (2005)
3.1 Introduction
The literature review has provided an overview of current discussions in the
area of inequality and financial stability. It is clear that some relationship
may exist, but the nature of this relationship remains hard to pin down. This
chapter will aim to look at the best available data and answer two simple
empirical questions:
• Are the financial systems of countries with greater inequality less struc-
turally sound than those with more equality?
• Have countries with higher inequality suffered more financial crises than
those with higher equality?
The exposition that follows will demonstrate that these questions are not
straightforward. To begin with, the term ‘crisis’ is vague and inequality is
badly measured, which is compounded by the fact that the data is sparse in
some areas; therefore careful treatment is required. For these reasons, among
others, relatively novel approaches are used. These methods are not new but
they are not often applied to economics in this way.
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Two methods are presented that demonstrate that we cannot rule out
inequality as a risk factor for financial crises. We begin by looking at the
most recent crisis and try to explain the cross-sectional experience in terms
of macroeconomic variables using a logistic regression. We find that neither
conventional predictors nor inequality provided significant ex ante warning
of the crisis. The next section looks at a broader selection of crises, again
using logistic regression, but now in a panel data setting. Here we find some
evidence that high inequality may be a risk factor for some types of crises.
The logistic regressions both rely on macroeconomic data, as control vari-
ables, and the Gini coefficient, as a measure of inequality. Both sets of data
are incomplete. To make the best use of data I employ a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo imputation on the macroeconomic dataset. However, for the Gini co-
efficient data set I show that it is sufficient to employ a simpler interpolation
strategy.
The second method looks at how we define crises and financial stability.
Here we demonstrate that a principal component decomposition of various
indicators provides a good measure of financial stability. We show that the
factors associated with financial fragility are well predicted by measures of
inequality. Moreover, we show that by using this decomposition we are able
to attribute a channel through which inequality may affect financial stability.
Neither method presented establishes, with certainty, that economic in-
equality causes financial crises, however, it is shown that there does appear
to be some relationship and that higher inequality seems to increase the
likelihood of a crisis.
This chapter will proceed as follows:
3.2 Data Used
3.4 A Logistic regression approach
• The 2007 Crisis: A brief introductory study
• Panel Data Study: Looking at a wide range of indicators over time
3.5 Measuring financial stability: PCA Analysis
3.2 Data
This section will address issues around choice of data for empirical study.
The first problem to address is that of missing data; we will present a robust
imputation method using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (Geyer, 1992). This
method will be applied to a data set based on the International Monetary
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Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) (International Mone-
tary Fund, 2012) and the Penn World Tables (Alan Heston and Aten, 2012).
The next problem to deal with is that of defining what exactly is meant by
the word ‘crisis’, here we will propose two options: (1) taking the definitions
from the literature (2) applying a principal component analysis to the IMF
Financial Soundness Indicators dataset (Fund, 2012). The former will be
discussed in this section while the latter can be found in Section 3.5.
Finally this section will further discuss the issues around measuring in-
equality and will propose that, while not ideal, the Gini coefficient is the best
measure of inequality. Moreover, it will be proposed that we can make best
use of the available data by treating Gini as constant over time.
3.2.1 Macroeconomic Data and Justification of Imputation
The methods proposed in this work will both make extensive use of macroe-
conomic data. Data will be taken from the International Monetary Fund’s
(IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) (International Monetary Fund,
2012) and Penn World Tables (Alan Heston and Aten, 2012). In each case,
the source that has the greatest amount of available data is used for each se-
ries. The maximum possible sample from 1949 to 2012 across all 216 countries
in the IFS/Penn World Tables gives a total maximum of 13,608 observations.
Table 3.1 shows the overall availability of the relevant data. Data sources for
the Gini coefficient are discussed in the previous section.
However, of the 2064 observations of the Gini coefficient only 331 points
also have the other variables available; details of the exact sample are given
in Appendix A.3. However, there are 1760 observations for which at most 3
points are missing. This is an ideal situation in which to employ Multiple
Imputation (MI), a process by which we systematically account for missing
data.
As discussed in Section 2.1.3, data on crises will be taken from Laeven &
Valencia (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) and Bordo et al (2001). For the
purposes of quantification of crises, we will use information from the IMF’s
Global Financial Stability Report. For this reason, countries are limited to
those covered by the Stability Report. This is a total of 97 countries broken
down as per Table A.14. It is also worth noting that this selection also
accounts for more than 85% of Global Output and 70% of global population
in 20061.
1 Data Taken from the IMF IFS.
3. Empirical Investigation 32
Table 3.1: Availability of Data
Variable Missing Values Observations
Gini 11,544 2,064
Top 5% Share 12,836 772
Top 0.5% Share 12,688 920
Top 0.1% Share 12,710 898
Top 1% Share 12,680 928
Pareto-Lorenz Coefficient 12,609 999
GDP 5,541 8,067
CPI 5,541 8,067
REER 12,932 676
Fx 4,348 9,260
Long Rates 11,565 2,043
Short Rates 10,926 2,682
Unemployment 11,048 2,560
Gov Cons 5,541 8,067
Current Account 8,459 5,149
Fiscal Pos 10,268 3,340
Equities 11,845 1,763
population 3,108 10,500
Trade Balance 3,353 10,255
Reserves/M2 10,583 3,025
Imputation
The process of imputation is often seen as controversial, but is a natural
extension of the principle that where possible, we should not discard data
unnecessarily. This method should not be seen as interpolation, instead it
should be seen as a statistically robust aid to estimation when dealing with
missing data. The basic principle states that given a set of incomplete data
it may be possible to generate several sets of complete data. If the new data
generated has the correct characteristics we may be able to draw inference
about the analysis performed across all sets of data.
It was established by Rubin (1987) that Multiple Imputation (MI) yields
valid inference if:
1. The Imputation is valid, specifically drawn from a Bayesian Posterior
predictive distribution
2. The complete-data analysis is statistically valid in the absence of miss-
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ing data
The second point (2) must be assumed in order to proceed, but this
is a general assumption about the validity of econometrics. However, one
must be careful to ensure the first condition is satisfied. For example, it is
not sufficient to simply generate random points that match moments of the
distribution of observed data. In this work I use a generalised Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (Schafer, 1997), details of the algorithm are
given in the following section (3.2.1).
The series for GDP, CPI, Foreign Exchange Rate, Imports and Reserves
are complete and population, while not analysed in the model, is also com-
plete. The other series are given a multivariate normal prior, then condi-
tioned by MCMC on observed data and regressions against other complete
and incomplete variables using a pseudo Estimation Maximisation (EM)Algorithm.
The result should be sets of data consistent with both the statistical prop-
erties of the imputed variables and the structural properties of the observed
data.
Generally a small number of imputations are required, usually less than
3-6 (Schafer, 1997). However, given the relatively high proportions of some
missing variables, 50 imputations are generated and convergence of results is
shown. It is interesting to note that the MI method is effectively a simulation
based maximum likelihood (ML) method (Enders and Bandalos, 2001). It
should, in principle, be possible to devise an appropriate ML estimator for
the model parameters given the missing data. However, this would be both
time consuming and unnecessary, given the ease at which MI can be used.
Implementation and Markov Chain Monte Carlo
We begin by defining that a matrix, X, contains some observed data, XObs,
and some missing data, XMis. We assume that the data is missing at random
in the sense of Rubin (1987). To understand what this means, we define a
function Ii as an indicator which is 0 for missing values and 1 for observed
values. Following Little and Rubin (2002), missing completely at random
can then be defined in terms of the conditional distributions of the indicator
function, that is to say:
P (I|X) = P (I|XObs, XMis) (3.1)
= P (I) (3.2)
However, this condition is stronger than we strictly require for the MCMC
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algorithm to give acceptable results (Rubin, 1987). Instead it is enough to
require that P (I|X) = P (I|XObs) equivalent to Rubin’s (1987) missing at
random condition. We assume that the missing data is drawn from a multi-
variate normal distribution N(µi,Σi), we have a normal prior in a Bayesian
sense. The aim is then to estimate the missing values of variables such that
the imputed variables are consistent with the statistical distribution of the
observed data; given our prior. That is to say, we know the observed param-
eter estimates θˆi = (µˆi, Σˆi), and this should form our initial ‘guess’ of the
true complete data distribution2.
We can then define the MCMC algorithm as follows:
1. Imputation Step: Draw a random set of XMis from the distribution
X
(t)
Mis ∼ P (XMis|XObs, θ(t−1))
2. Update Step: Update the distribution θ(t) ∼ P (XMis|XObs, X(t))
The stream of θ(t) then forms a Markov Chain, which converges to a pos-
terior distribution suitable for the imputation. The distribution will then be
proper in the sense of Rubin(1987), an appropriate Bayesian representation
of the space of parameters.
The implementation used in this work, from the MI routine in STATA 11,
accepts additional parameters in θ; in this way we use other readily available
data to help condition the distribution of missing data. For our purposes, we
use GDP and Population in addition to the main macroeconomic variables.
Combining Imputations
The imputations can be combined as follows, if the parameter Qˆi is estimated
for i ∈ N imputations the best estimate of Q¯ is given by the simple mean:
Q¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Qˆi (3.3)
The variance, V of this estimate must then be taken as the sum of the
between-imputations variance, B, and the within-imputation variance U :
V = U¯ + (1 +
1
N
)B (3.4)
2 It is important to note that the complete data parameters, θ would be those given all
observed and unobserved data. This is of course our best estimate of the ‘true’ population
parameters
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Where:
U¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Uˆi (3.5)
B =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(Qˆi − Q¯)2 (3.6)
Where Uˆi are the set of parameter variance estimates obtained from the
individual imputation regressions. This variance can then be used in place of
the variance estimate from the individual regression equations for t-statistics
and other statistical tests.
3.2.2 Measuring Inequality
The literature review (Section 2.2) highlighted problems associated with mea-
suring inequality and it is sensible, at this point, to look more closely at the
statistical properties of the Gini coefficient. The countries covered by the
databases can be found in Appendix A.3, along with descriptive statistics by
country. It is useful to note that for Gini coefficients, using the best avail-
able data from both sources, the cross-sectional variation between countries
is higher than the variation over time, summarised in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Statistical Longitudinal Properties of Gini Coefficients
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
All 38.6 10.9 15.9 79.5 N = 1151
Between 9.98 19.1 63.7 n = 128
Within 5.48 19.1 63.8 T = 8.99
Table 3.2 gives the statistical properties of the sample of Gini coefficients
quoted as a percentage (out of 100 rather than out of 1). The number of
points (N), countries (n) and average length of time series (T) is also shown.
We can see that the standard deviation between countries is higher than that
within each country. This does not conclusively show that variation across
time is less significant than variation between countries as it does not prove it
statistically. Simple ANOVA analysis reveals that means of the countries are
significantly different from each other, which also implies it is the variation
between countries rather than over time that matters.
One would ideally form a panel of data with time series for each country,
however, the average period covered is 1967-2000, but the average length
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of a continuous time series is only 9 years. Moreover, 47 countries have no
continuous time points and only 10 have more than 25 years. A more detailed
break down of the lengths of time series available is given in Appendix A.2.
To combat the problem of short time series we will make use of the fact
that Gini is a relatively stable measure. While this makes it difficult to
analyse dynamic effects it also means I am able to extrapolate data easily. I
test the hypothesis in two parts: (1) that there is no time trend and (2) that
the value of the Gini coefficient is highly persistent. To test a time trend we
take the regression equations as:
Git = β0i + β1it+ ti (3.7)
In equation (3.7) I write the Gini coefficient, Git, of country i at time t
as the sum of country specific constant, time trend β1i and stochastic error
term ti. Appendix A.4 gives the results of these regressions for each country
in the sample. In this table we see that in all cases the time trend is not
significant at the 5 % level, with a critical t-value of 1.96.
We can then jointly test the hypothesis that the time trend is zero over
all regressions.
I also run an ancillary pooled regression holding β0i, β1i and both constant
over countries. I find that it is not possible to assume the intercept terms, β0i,
are the same over countries but it is also not possible to reject the hypothesis
that all of the slope coefficients are equal to zero.
The absence of a time trend does not by itself suggest that the values are
stable, for that we need to determine if the best predictor of a future Gini
coefficient is the current level. To show this we use the following specification
for the regression equation:
Git = β0i + β1iGit−1 + ti (3.8)
Equation (3.8) will allow us to test if the process for the evolution of a
Gini coefficient follows a random walk. Furthermore, Appendix A.5 shows
the result of this regression. We find that there is insufficient evidence to
suggest that the coefficient of any Git−1 is not equal to 1.
3.3 Relationship between borrowing spread and Gini
Coefficient
In the core model presented in the following chapter I establish a mechanism
by which inequality can produce a higher borrowing spread. It is there-
3. Empirical Investigation 37
fore useful to establish a link, albeit weak, between the Gini coefficient and
borrowing spread. I first note that across my full panel of data there is a
small, 5%, correlation between these two values. This suggests that if any
theoretical relationship is found it is unlikely to be strong.
3.4 Logistic regression in predicting crises
This section will provide two methods to analyse the ability of inequality
to predict the probability of a crisis. Both methods will use the logistic
regression, a standard in the literature on banking crisis (Laeven & Valencia,
2012). Following the literature of Eichengreen et al. (1995), we define a
regression equation:
Crisisi,t = λI(L)i,t + i,t (3.9)
where λ are the coefficients of the regression to the estimated and i,t are
appropriately defined shocks. The questions are then: how to estimate this
regression; the functional form of I and; what components should be present
in the state vector Li,t? Following Demirg-Kunt and Detragiache (2000),
this regression is estimated using a logistic form often used in studies of
banking problems. The logistic regression assumes that the probability of a
crisis given the extant conditions, pi(Li,t) is given by the identity in equation
(3.10).
pi(Li,t) =
1
e−βLit + 1
(3.10)
It is important to note that because some countries do not suffer crises,
and therefore record all zeros in the crisis variable, it is not possible to use the
between groups estimator in a panel data logit context. Therefore, we must
use a Random Effects model, but this presents some problems in analysis
and must be treated carefully. In this case, we change our specification to
decompose the error, i,t = wi + µit such that:
wi∼N(0, σ2w)
µi∼N(0, σ2µ)
(3.11)
Using the Random Effect model with a logistic form produces a consis-
tent estimate for coefficients, however, estimates are not necessarily efficient
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(Maddala, 1987). Specifically, in the multinomial logistic distribution all
correlations between groups are constrained to be one half. This problem is
dealt with using robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009); in the procedure
outlined below I use the Huber Sandwich Estimator (Freedman, 2006).
3.4.1 Inequality and the 2007 Financial Crisis
The most obvious starting place for analysis of crises in financial markets is
in the study of the recent past. While it could be argued that results are
only applicable to a very specific event, one can also argue that the structure
of the current banking market is more similar to the 2007 Crisis than, say,
to the Scandinavian or Japanese Crises of the 1990s. For example the value
of the Credit Default Swap market has increased nearly 100 fold in 10 years
(ISDA, 2012). This sort of innovation has significantly impacted on the
overall stability of the financial system and mechanisms by which shocks are
transmitted and macroeconomic variables interact. It is therefore pertinent,
when asking questions about what may happen in the future, to look closely
at more recent events.
I will therefore perform the following regression:
Crisisi = λI(L)i + i (3.12)
Where Crisisi takes a value of 1 if a banking crisis is reported after 2007
and 0 otherwise. In this case only Laeven & Valencia (2012) report the
most recent crises and so I use their definition. The vector I(L)i contains
macroeconomic variables along with the Gini coefficient. Moreover, the rel-
ative stability of Gini coefficients means that we do not necessarily need to
have the most recent Gini coefficient data in order to estimate the current
value. Instead, the most recent observation of the specific Gini is used for all
countries.
The other macroeconomic variables used in I(L)i are discussed in more
detail in the following section. However, they are chosen to be broadly con-
sistent with the extant literature.
Method
To simplify the analysis for this section I rely on countries with complete
data for 2006. this covers all developed and many emerging markets. These
countries are listed in Appendix A.3. I then use the macroeconomic variables
listed in Table 3.6 as predictors of the the variable Crisisi, which takes the
value of 1 for any country which experienced a crisis after 2007. I then use
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a very simple logistic regression based on maximum likelihood estimation. I
use the R package logit for this purpose.
Results
From Table 3.3 we can see that in the 2007 crisis countries with a higher Gini
coefficient were more likely to suffer financial crises than those with lower.
We must also note that none of the predictors are significant, however, Gini
seems to be closer to being significant than the other factors. This in itself is
interesting as it suggests that the likelihood of being caught up in the recent
crisis was not dependent on macroeconomic conditions prior to the crisis.
Table 3.3: Logit Regression of Crisis
Coef. Std. Err. t P > t [95% Conf. Interval]
gini 0.289 0.188 1.530 0.126 -0.081 0.659
dgdp 52.419 43.800 1.200 0.232 -33.780 138.617
fx -6.683 38.717 -0.170 0.863 -82.847 69.480
cpi -16.885 37.873 -0.450 0.656 -91.396 57.627
reer 0.019 0.111 0.170 0.866 -0.199 0.237
shortr 14.069 96.679 0.150 0.885 -177.161 205.298
curr 0.000 0.000 -0.020 0.986 -0.001 0.001
imp 0.000 0.000 -0.660 0.506 0.000 0.000
exports 0.000 0.000 0.460 0.644 0.000 0.000
shares -0.007 0.065 -0.100 0.917 -0.135 0.122
dm2 -0.006 0.204 -0.030 0.975 -0.410 0.397
cons 1.953 14.488 0.130 0.893 -26.587 30.493
Strictly speaking the result presented above does not show significance
of the Gini coefficient at the accepted 5% level or even 10% level. However,
given that it is the most significant predictor I argue that we cannot simply
discard this factor. Moreover, recent research in statistics has suggested that
the t-test may not be the most appropriate way of measuring the impact of
a specific variable. 3
The 2007 crisis will be considered in more detail in Section 3.4.
3 Instead a Bayesian formulation is currently proposed as more appropriate (Kruschke,
2012), which emphasises the importance of priors in conditioning statistical tests. In this
case selecting a gamma prior on the distribution of errors yields significant coefficients,
but this method is both contentious and open to abuse so is not presented rigorously.
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3.4.2 A Panel Data Study
Given that a relationship seems to exist for the 2007 financial crisis, the
question remains as to the generality of the result. Looking at a wider sample
of data, taking all countries in the WIIDR/World Top Income databases an
obvious first step is look at the correlations between crises and inequality
(WIDER, 2008; Facundo et al., 2012).
To give the broadest possible base, the crises determined in Laeven and
Valencia (2008) will be used to define a crisis variable Crisisji,t for country
i, in time t and variety j. Once again using the Laeven and Valencia (2008),
categorisations Banking (j = B), Currency (j = C) and Sovereign Debt
(j = S) crises will be considered along with Any Crisis (j = A), a summary
definition is given in Table 3.4. Then, the first sense check is to look at simple
correlations between the variables. This is presented in Table 3.5. The Gini
coefficient is taken from the WIIDR data set and the other measures of
inequality are taken from the World Top Income Database.
Table 3.4: Definitions of crises
Type Definition
A systemic banking crises as defined in Section 2.1.3
Banking i.e. a significant number of banks experience runs and/or
the government has intervened to prevent such runs
Currency Nominal depreciation of at least 30% which is at least
10% faster than previous year
Sovereign Sovereign default or restructure
Any At least one of the above crises
Table 3.5: Correlation of Crisis with Measures of Inequality
Banking Currency Soverign Debt Any
Gini 2.98% 8.59% 4.95% 9.36%
Top 5% Share 2.03% -0.99% 4.24% 2.22%
Top 1% Share 4.98% 1.58% 5.03% 5.95%
Top 0.5% Share 6.34% 0.21% 4.93% 6.15%
Top 0.1% Share 6.47% 0.15% 3.30% 5.54%
Pareto Lorenz -8.45% -2.34% -1.98% -8.03%
It is interesting to note that the correlation with banking crises is increas-
ing in the marginality of the income share. The correlation between banking
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crises and income share is higher for the Top 0.1 % of incomes than the Top
5%. While the Gini coefficient and Pareto Lorenz (P-L) coefficient apply
to different samples and are not wholly comparable, it is still interesting to
note that Gini seems to be more strongly correlated with Currency Crises
and P-L with Banking. The possible explanation of this could be that Gini
measures the broad income dispersion, whereas P-L is more of a measure of
concentration in the high shares. This is encouraging given the hypothesis
of this research.
Empirical Method
These simple correlations may not be enough to demonstrate the link that
we are interested in and so, as per the literature of Eichengreen et al (1996),
we define a regression equation:
Crisisi,t = λI(L)i,t + i,t (3.13)
In equation (3.13) we see that observations are not only identified by a
country index, i, but also by a time index, t. This panel of data is not
balanced and so we must be careful to apply robust standard errors to the
estimates. The macroeconomic control variables to be included can be found
in Table 3.6. Indicators found to be significant by Demirg-Kunt and Detra-
giache (2000) are noted.
Table 3.6: Determinants of Banking Crises and Expected Result
Variable Significant Explanation Expected Relationship
GDP Yes State of Macro Economy Negative
Short Rate Yes Financial Liberalisation Positive
Inflation Yes Economics Management Positive
M2/Reserves Yes Financial Stability Positive
Fiscal Surplus/Deficit No Ability of Government to Intervene Negative
Long Rates NA Exceptions/Refinancing Negative
REER NA International Competitiveness Positive
XS Equity Returns NA Expectations Negative
Unemployment NA Various Positive
Trade Balance NA International Stability Negative
A change in GDP is generally taken to be an indicator of macroeconomic
stability and confidence in the economy; a growing economy would be less
likely to experience a crisis. The nominal short rate, could have many effects
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on the stability of the financial system, but in this case it is being used
as a proxy for refinancing costs on banks’ balance sheets. The higher the
short rate the more difficult it is for banks to obtain refinancing. Inflation
gives a general indication on the stability of the economy and how well it is
being managed. Finally, the Government Budget Position encompasses the
ability of a government to assist, if needed, along with effective governance
of government finances.
The value of M2/Reserves indicates the relative strength of the govern-
ment in international money markets; how well able they are to defend the
currency if the need arises.
In addition I consider variables not included by Demirg-Kunt and Detra-
giache (2000), but consistent with the literature on financial crises. Spreading
the possible net as wide as possible strengthens the analysis given that includ-
ing variables does not reduce power but missing out variables can result in
bias. Long rates are included to capture expectations about the future econ-
omy along with long-term effects on banks’ balance sheets. Excess Equity
Returns also capture expectations about the future whereas Trade Balance
and Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) should capture relative interna-
tional competitiveness.
Given that we are looking for ex ante predictors of crises and that the
macroeconomic situation will be altered after the onset of a crisis I use the
lagged values of the explanatory variables. The results are, therefore, indi-
cators of which factors determined the probability of a crisis in the following
year.
Results
Each type of crisis is estimated separately along with the combined variable.
All models apart from the Sovereign Debt, are found to be significant and
the Random Effects specification is found to be appropriate. 4 Gini appears
to be a good predictor of Currency Crises and also, the overall crisis variable
but does not predict Banking Crises well. In each case, the sign of the Gini
Coefficient in the model is positive and therefore, it would seem that inequal-
ity does increase the probability of a crisis, although this is not statistically
robust.
4 This is a not a trivial test, the models are estimated on the sample of countries
who experience at least one crisis using both fixed and random effects and the result is
compared using a Hausman Test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). This does not in fact
lead us to the conclusion that the model specified is appropriate for the entire sample but
does suggest that proceeding in this way should be valid.
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Table 3.7: Random Effects Model of Various Crises With Gini Measure (Standard
Errors in italics
Banking Currency Sovereign Any
Gini coefficient 0.0079 0.0156 0.0158 0.0106
0.0095 0.0079 0.0127 0.0064
L. GDP -3.3713 -3.1793 -2.1036 -2.9981
1.5059 1.2553 1.9832 0.9809
L. D. GDP 1.3334 2.5551 0.4856 1.7822
1.0820 0.8213 1.4269 0.6901
L CPI -0.2457 0.2068 -0.1989 0.2269
0.3660 0.3791 0.4627 0.3127
L. Short Rate -0.1306 0.6071 1.0837 0.4560
3.0178 2.1762 2.9237 1.8648
L. FX 0.4567 0.4824 0.6552 0.5883
0.1784 0.1609 0.1943 0.1273
L. Unemployment -0.0034 0.0029 0.0121 0.0021
0.0218 0.0190 0.0272 0.0137
L. Government Cons -1.0747 0.6047 -1.1532 -0.3719
0.8264 0.6454 0.9469 0.5388
L. Equity Returns -7.38E-04 -1.06E-03 7.28E-04 -6.23E-04
3.00E-03 2.32E-03 3.03E-03 1.93E-03
L. Fiscal Position -2.53E-08 -1.79E-10 3.30E-08 -1.23E-09
4.42E-08 3.54E-08 5.17E-08 2.99E-08
L. Trade Balance -3.15E-06 4.65E-07 1.86E-06 -2.06E-06
1.16E-06 2.48E-06 4.36E-06 1.23E-06
L. Cash -2.05E-06 -3.17E-06 3.74E-06 -1.03E-06
1.06E-05 8.71E-06 1.12E-05 6.77E-06
L. Spread 0.0027 0.0035 -0.0028 0.0022
0.0113 0.0087 0.0112 0.0072
F-Test 2.21 2.35 0.87 3.54
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Looking at the Banking Crisis regression first, only lagged Inflation, the
lagged Exchange Rate and lagged change in GDP are significant. High infla-
tion will reduce incentives to hold deposits and so can reduce capital avail-
able to banks, hence appearing with a positive sign. Whereas, falling GDP
can result in an increased rate of loan delinquency, hence, change in GDP
appears in the regression with a negative sign. The positive sign on the ex-
change rate coefficient can be explained in terms of the Asian Crisis, where
foreign denominated liabilities became unsustainably expensive due to cur-
rency movements.
Currency crises seem to be well predicted by a similar set of variables,
although Gini and contemporaneous inflation, also become important. Price
instability will certainly have a negative impact on the valuations of a cur-
rency and therefore, it is unsurprising that CPI plays a significant role in
currency crises.
While the other variables are not significant in either regression, it is
useful to look at the sign anyway. Given the imputation strategy, it is not
unusual to see low t-values. High unemployment seems to be associated with
crises and again this is intuitive. High unemployment may result in increased
loan delinquency and may be the result of an overvalued currency and a lack
of international competitiveness.
Table 3.8: Odds Ratio for the Gini Regressions
Banking Currency Sovereign Any Crisis
gini1 1.003 1.045 1.023 1.023
ldgdp 0.107 0.913 0.485 0.213
lcpi 4.287 12.322 1.039 5.809
lshortr 0.416 0.363 1.638 1.533
dgdp 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.000
cpi 3.457 0.009 1.212 0.096
fx 4.467 7.030 2.002 3.873
unemp 1.044 1.007 0.990 1.010
govcons 2.260 0.182 0.207 0.714
curr 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
shares 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.999
fiscpos 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
cash 0.992 1.007 0.999 0.997
Table 3.8 shows the Odds Ratios for the various models. This measure
tells us the relative importance of given values in predicting the probability of
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a crisis. Due to the nonlinearity of this model this information is not easily
inferred from the raw coefficients. Looking again at only the significant
coefficients we see that lag of CPI and the exchange rate have the greatest
impact on the probability of a crisis. The odds ratio of the Gini coefficient
is only slightly greater than 1, suggesting a change in its value has only a
slight change on the probability of a crisis. The effect is certainly less than
the other macro variables, however, it was still significant in the Currency
and All Crisis regressions and therefore we cannot discount the idea that
increased inequality increases the likelihood of experiencing a crisis.
The tables in Appendix A.7 are included for completeness. It uses the
Pareto measure rather than the Gini measure of inequality for the same set
of regressions as above. In this case, it can be seen that the Pareto measure is
not a good predictor of any of the crises and instead, we see Unemployment
and Government consumption becoming significant. This result may suggest
that the overall distribution of incomes is important in determining crises but
not the higher incomes. It would also seem that Government Consumption
is redistributive and a significant driver of inequality is unemployment.
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3.5 A more robust measure of stability
So far we have discussed relatively subjective measures of financial crises and
it would seem desirable to have a more robust approach. We are more inter-
ested in financial stability and this is a topic the IMF regularly reports on in
the International Financial Stability Report (FSR) (Datastream, 2012). This
report has only collated data since 2005, but includes measures of delinquent
loans, bank equity/capital and certain types of exposure. These measures are
very closely aligned with the measures used to define ‘crises’ in case study
approaches. Therefore, the question is, which of these measures is truly
important to financial stability?
It is likely that justification for inclusion of all indicators would be found.
However the aim is then to regress inequality against a variable defining
financial stability. With more than 20 indicators to choose from picking those
that are most important is not obvious. A list of variables can be found in
table 3.11. This section will present a method of reducing the dimensionality
of the problem and will then look at how the Gini coefficient interacts with
these factors.
Reducing the dimensionality of the problem has clear advantages and
so the obvious method is Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is a
well established method of looking at high dimension data and picking out
factors that account for the greatest variation across the data set. In this
context each ‘factor’ or component is a linear sum of the variables and we
must determine what weights to assign in this sum to maximise the variance
of the factor.
3.5.1 Calculating Principal Components
The usual definition of PCA would take a normalised, mean zero, matrix
of data X with rows representing observations and columns representing
variables and form the covariance matrix XXT. The weights are then the
eigenvectors of the covariance matrix, usually found by single value decom-
position (SVD). There will be as many principal components as there are
columns in X (variables) and it is usual to label them in decreasing order of
variance, that is PCA-1 will have the highest variance. At this stage, the ac-
tual loadings can be considered and a real-world interpretation of the factors
given.
However, within the FSR, there are missing data points which means
that we are unable to directly apply the SVD approach, instead we will
combine the PCA specification with an Expectation Maximisation (EM) al-
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gorithm. The EM algorithm is often used when data is incomplete to find the
Maximum Likelihood5 estimation of model parameters. In this way partial
observations are not wholly discounted and so we are able to take advantage
of all available data.
To facilitate this analysis, we must first adopt a slightly different specifi-
cation of the principal component problem, taken from Grung and Manneo
(1998). Instead of posing the problem in terms of decomposition, we pose
the problem in terms of the re-composition. In other words defining the com-
ponents to give the data when summed appropriately. Consider a M × N
matrix X, after performing the PCA decomposition, we wish to find the set
of coefficients t and principal components p (scores), such that the remainder∑
rTi ri is minimised in:
xTi =
∑
tikp
T
k + r
T
i (3.14)
As discussed the widely known method used to find these p, is to choose
a set of orthogonal pk in order of variance. However, in the case where there
are missing data we cannot simply compute the product XXT and therefore
we cannot perform a single value decomposition. Instead, I pose the problem
in terms of a least squares minimisation. That is we aim to find the set of
weights and components that minimises F where:
F =
∑
ij
(xijT −
∑
k
tikpjk)
2 (3.15)
Here, F, is the sum of squared errors between the data xij and the implied
data
∑
k tikpjk. We also note that both ti and pj are chosen to be orthogonal.
The method of calculating the principal components is given in Appendix
A.1 summarising the exposition by Grung and Manneo (1998). The stages
of calculation are, at a high level:
1. Define the problem in terms of known data
2. Calculate the first component
3. Use iteratively to find the further components
5 Strictly speaking this is a pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation as no likelihood
function is given explicitly.
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The outlined procedure adopts a least squares approach to the problem.
For complete data this process and an appropriate orthogonality procedure
guarantees a unique representation. However, in the case where some data
are missing, this is not guaranteed. In fact, there are likely to be many local
minima of the function. The implementation I use here applies a robust
Bayesian formulation as per Ilin and Raiko (2008). See Appendix A.1 for
further details. I used the implementation from the R-Package pca-methods.
3.5.2 Discussing principal components
Table 3.9 gives the basic statistical properties of the first eight principal
components calculated using the least squares with Bayesian updating.
Table 3.9: Summary of Principal Components
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 PC 6 PC 7 PC 8
Average -0.016 0.011 0.035 0.010 -0.015 0.013 0.000 -0.013
St. Dev. 0.859 0.840 0.733 0.767 0.632 0.603 0.605 0.584
Correl w/ Crisis -0.064 0.089 -0.219 -0.014 0.041 0.038 -0.084 0.119
A
ve
ra
ge
2005 -0.084 -0.060 0.208 -0.093 -0.070 0.002 0.099 -0.098
2006 -0.097 -0.052 0.237 -0.121 -0.097 -0.042 0.056 -0.073
2007 -0.045 -0.136 0.198 -0.019 -0.004 -0.040 0.079 -0.069
2008 0.057 0.012 0.007 0.032 0.104 0.040 -0.027 0.092
2009 -0.005 0.159 -0.017 0.145 -0.090 0.026 -0.041 0.026
2010 0.027 0.152 -0.091 0.073 -0.040 0.101 -0.067 0.010
2011 0.110 -0.012 -0.532 0.142 0.153 0.062 -0.194 0.072
C
or
re
la
ti
on
PC 1 1.000 0.027 0.056 -0.038 0.011 -0.007 -0.098 -0.032
PC 2 0.027 1.000 -0.053 -0.019 -0.048 0.155 -0.031 0.025
PC 3 0.056 -0.053 1.000 0.011 -0.075 0.007 0.064 -0.293
PC 4 -0.038 -0.019 0.011 1.000 -0.031 0.030 -0.013 0.000
PC 5 0.011 -0.048 -0.075 -0.031 1.000 -0.038 -0.026 0.101
PC 6 -0.007 0.155 0.007 0.030 -0.038 1.000 0.005 -0.042
PC 7 -0.098 -0.031 0.064 -0.013 -0.026 0.005 1.000 -0.077
PC 8 -0.032 0.025 -0.293 0.000 0.101 -0.042 -0.077 1.000
3.5.3 Interpreting the PCs
The principal component decomposition of the Financial Stability indicators
yields some interesting results. Of the 17 variables reported in the IMF IFS,
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we are only able to reduce the number of variables by half. Table 3.10 gives
the contribution to variance of each factor. We can see that the first two
components are similarly weighted (20%) and the following five components
have approximately half this weight. This means there are potentially eight
factors of interest, that is eight factors that explain the variation in the 17
variables.
Table 3.10: Proportion of Variance Accounted For by Each Principal Component
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10
Contribution to Variance 0.236 0.191 0.113 0.117 0.108 0.089 0.091 0.055 0 0
Cumulative 0.236 0.426 0.540 0.657 0.765 0.854 0.945 1.000 1.00 1.00
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.11. For each princi-
pal component, there is an equivalent set of weights applied to each of the
variables. Interpreting the first eight components is not a trivial task and
we must be careful not to introduce too much subjectivity. However, it is
useful to develop a taxonomy for dealing with the factors. Therefore, we will
describe the first three factors as follows:
1. Capital adequacy: Increasing in capital to assets and decreasing in
exposure to financial derivative, this factor should be increasing in fi-
nancial stability
2. Income factors: Decreasing in cost of capital and increasing in Non-
Performing Loans, also accounts for sensitivity to foreign liabilities,
this factor has an unclear relationship to stability
3. Financial Risk: Increasing in Capital and Return on Assets, decreasing
in Deposits to Loans, Interest Margin and Capital to Risk Weighted
Assets, this factor should be increasing in financial stability
4. Large Risks: PC8 is also interesting as it is increasing the proportion of
capital taken with large exposures (large loans to a single entity) and
negative with the return on assets. This would seem to be a measure
of the extent to which the banks’ risk is concentrated.
Tables 3.12 helps us further pin down the meaning of the factors by
looking at the correlation between the factors and various macroeconomic
variables. The variables presented are chosen to be broadly consistent with
other work presented earlier in this chapter; not all variables will be directly
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referenced but the set is chosen to provide a baseline for comparison. We
can then look at the factors in macroeconomic terms:
1. Capital adequacy: Positively related to a strong macro position, for
example, decreasing in CPI and increasing in Imports, GDP and Fiscal
position. However, Unemployment and Exports are anomalous.
2. Income factors: Decreasing in the Long Rate, Fiscal Position and
Changes in Money Supply suggesting this factor is negatively corre-
lated with macroeconomic stability.
3. Financial Risk: Increasing in GDP, CPI, REER, Current Account, and
Share price and decreasing in Trade, this factor seems predominantly
concerned with the strength of the domestic economy.
Table 3.11: Principal Component Weightings
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8
Change in Capital 0.07 0.07 0.26 0.06 -0.01 -0.26 0.09 0.58
Capital to Assets 0.72 0.28 0.14 0.12 -0.05 0.07 -0.13 -0.07
Deposit To Loans 0.17 -0.03 -0.43 0.08 0.22 -0.02 0.48 -0.06
Proportion of Foreign Liabilities 0.34 0.5 0.11 0.25 -0.09 -0.36 0.33 0.03
Foreign Loans to Total Loans 0.31 0.5 0.18 0.25 -0.13 -0.3 0.34 0.03
Financial Derivatives to Capital -0.54 -0.4 -0.09 0.23 0.04 -0.45 0.7 -0.14
LiabFinDerivtoCap -0.55 -0.41 -0.08 0.23 0.03 -0.43 0.71 -0.15
Interest Margin to Gross Income 0.06 -0.11 -0.28 -0.11 -0.75 -0.1 -0.04 -0.02
Large Exposure to Capital 0.14 -0.06 0 -0.02 -0.02 0.37 0.16 0.55
Liquid Assets to Short Term Liab 0.07 -0.29 0.04 -0.04 -0.27 0.59 0.26 -0.07
Liquid Assets Ratio 0.17 -0.18 -0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.46 0.57 0.06
Non Interest Expend to Gross Income 0.07 -0.1 -0.26 -0.07 -0.78 -0.09 0 0.03
Nonperforming Loans to Capital -0.01 0.6 -0.04 -0.45 0.07 0.12 0 0.07
Nonperforming to Total Loans -0.16 0.71 -0.04 -0.26 -0.08 0.16 0.08 -0.05
Regulatory Capital to RWA6 0.78 0.11 -0.25 0.13 0.1 0.04 -0.02 -0.01
T1 Capital to RWA 0.75 0.1 -0.29 0.16 0.13 0.03 0.05 -0.02
Return on Assets 0.12 -0.21 0.63 -0.02 -0.15 0.01 0.13 -0.34
Return on Equity 0.43 -0.29 0.04 -0.58 0.1 -0.17 0.02 0
3.5.4 Relationships to Crises
We must now ask how well these factors are able to identify a ‘crisis’. For this
we use the standard Laeven & Valencia (2012) database of crises to define
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Table 3.12: Correlations between the first eight principal components of financial
stability and macroeconomic variables
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8
Change in GDP 1.77% -3.15% 9.54% -0.03% 4.94% -4.55% -0.80% 0.27%
Lag Change in GDP -1.82% -4.64% 7.30% -0.40% -2.06% -2.66% -2.62% -3.13%
CPI -6.25% -6.49% 1.90% -2.75% -7.82% -2.57% -0.88% 4.28%
Lag Change in GDP -3.10% -3.49% 6.96% 0.57% 0.97% 5.10% -5.93% 3.18%
REER 5.25% 2.57% 13.17% 3.94% -10.29% -1.89% 5.32% -10.91%
Imports -0.40% 9.39% -9.31% -7.02% -3.25% 14.85% 3.35% 1.92%
FX 6.31% 2.09% 2.05% 3.76% 6.65% 1.50% 1.66% -6.61%
Lag Change in GDP 4.27% -1.68% 0.93% -1.92% -2.51% -6.28% 2.05% 0.65%
International Reserve 3.53% 3.01% -6.31% -0.21% 1.78% 11.54% 1.44% -4.66%
Change in Int Reserve 2.68% -4.90% 5.47% 0.44% -2.23% 1.13% -0.21% 2.91%
Long Rate 0.73% -16.73% -4.47% -4.98% 9.67% 7.74% -2.07% -6.62%
Short Rate 5.00% -7.22% 6.16% -7.75% 1.86% -3.48% -3.76% -1.30%
Unemployment 6.65% -5.69% -3.09% -3.44% 9.60% 0.02% -3.28% 5.48%
Government Consumption -0.49% -2.81% -1.09% 0.27% -0.80% -1.96% -0.63% -1.23%
Current Account 0.52% 1.99% 9.81% -5.26% -0.69% -7.18% 4.79% -0.04%
Fiscal Deficit (Surplus) 3.21% -14.66% 3.42% 8.75% 2.04% -5.72% -0.93% -2.55%
Exports -4.99% 7.17% -7.68% -5.06% -3.75% 9.37% 5.88% 3.78%
Shares 0.93% 0.10% 16.95% 7.31% 4.81% -5.03% -0.72% -1.66%
Change in Money Supply -2.86% -15.19% -0.99% -8.54% 9.93% -11.21% -0.02% 8.87%
a logical variable where 1 means a country is thought to have experienced a
crisis and 0 means they did not. I then use the logistic regression discussed
in the earlier sections of this empirical work to estimate the crisis variable
based on the factors PC1 to PC8.
The results of this regression are given in Table 3.13. It can be seen
that all but three of the components are significant at the 5 % level. More-
over, a Wald test confirmed that these values are not jointly significant.7 As
predicted PC1, PC3 and PC7 are decreasing in the probability of a crisis
whereas PC2 and PC8 are increasing.8
Finally, it is also reasonable to ask to what extent the principal component
factors explain the severity of a crisis, that is to say, if two countries are
experiencing a financial crisis and one has a lower PC1 is that crisis more
7 A test statistic of 1.4 along with three degrees of freedom gives a probability of 0.71
that the values are all equal to zero (Buse, 1982).
8 In this regression I use pooled data, alternative specifications of the regression applying
country and time dummies was rejected using Wald Tests.
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Table 3.13: Logistic Regression of Principal Components on Crisis Dummy
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>—z—)
(Intercept) -2.217 0.158 -14.064 0.000
PC1 -0.253 0.130 -1.949 0.051
PC2 0.421 0.135 3.121 0.002
PC3 -1.506 0.241 -6.243 0.000
PC4 0.043 0.161 0.269 0.788
PC5 0.263 0.228 1.152 0.249
PC6 0.057 0.182 0.313 0.755
PC7 -0.547 0.178 -3.073 0.002
PC8 0.749 0.206 3.641 0.000
severe? To answer this question we took the Laeven & Valencia (2012) data
for GDP loss in a three year window after the crisis and regressed it against
the principal components in the first year of the crisis. I find that PC1 and
8 are both good predictors of the cost of crises. See Appendix A.8 for details
of regression coefficients.
3.5.5 Categorising Crises
I will now consider what other information the principal components can give
us about specific crises. This is done by looking at the principal component
which is most extreme for a given observation. The aim is to find which
principal component characterises each crisis. We begin by calculating a
standardised measure of how extreme a given observation is, in this case we
calculate (xi− µi)σ−2i . Table 3.14 details which PC was largest and smallest
for each country experiencing a crisis in 2007-2011.
We can see that in 2008 nearly one third of crises were characterised by
low values of PC 1, 3 and 7 each. It is also interesting to note that the
proportion of countries with low PC 1 and 7 shrinks by a factor of one fifth
by 2012, factor 3 is still the most common low factor. This seems to suggest
that, while capital adequacy has improved, financial risks are still prevalent.
Finally we can see that high values of PC 6 and 8 seem to be associated with
crisis conditions. This analysis concurs with our previous interpretation of
the principal components.
I now consider how the principal components differ between countries
that have experienced crises and those that have not; this table is presented
in appendix A.8. It can be seen that PC1 and 3 are lower for countries that
experience crises and 8 higher.
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Table 3.14: Categorising crises using PCA
Low Tail Extreme High Tail Extreme
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Austria 3 7 7 6 6 6 6 5
Belgium 6 3 7 8 2 4
Denmark 7 1 6 3 5 8 8 7
France 1 7 7 8 6 8
Germany 7 7 7 2 4 2 6 6
Greece 7 5 2 8 6 6 8 6
Hungary 5 5 3 5 6 6 6 6
Iceland 4 2
Ireland 4 7 5 5 2 8 2 1
Italy 6 7 4 7 8 2 2 8
Kazakhstan 7 3 3 7 8 5 7 5
Latvia 3 7 1 3 5 1 6 5
Luxembourg 3 5 5 3 6 2 2 6
Netherlands 3 6 4 3 2 8 5 5
Nigeria 7 1
Portugal 6 3 6 3 7 7 2 6
Russia 1 6 6 6 7 8 7 7
Slovenia 1 3 1 3 3 4 7 6
Spain 1 4 4 4 6 2 2 2
Sweden 7 6 1 1 5 3 6 8
Switzerland 1 1 7 7 8 5 5 5
UK 2 3 6 6 6 4 1 5 5 5
Ukraine 6 1 3 3 8 5 7 1
USA 2 2 6 6 3 4 4 4 5 5
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3.5.6 Borrowing Spread
Borrowing spread9 is an important component of financial stability. This
measure will be used extensively in the theoretical chapter. The wedge be-
tween borrowing and lending costs represents a market failure. This results
in a limit to risk sharing. Borrowing spread is not directly measured within
the IMF FSR and therefore, it is useful to ascertain how well the principal
component decomposition explains this spread.
Table 3.15: PCA a predictor of borrowing spread
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>—t—)
(Intercept) 6.5688 0.2821 23.28 0.0000
PC1 -0.4166 0.3172 -1.31 0.1898
PC2 0.5410 0.3488 1.55 0.1217
PC3 0.9170 0.4790 1.91 0.0562
PC4 -0.9415 0.3463 -2.72 0.0068
PC5 -0.4380 0.3822 -1.15 0.2525
PC6 0.2295 0.5204 0.44 0.6595
PC7 -0.5843 0.6236 -0.94 0.3494
PC8 1.0194 0.6763 1.51 0.1325
Only PC4 is significant at the 5% level and negatively correlated with
borrowing spread, although PC3 is very close but with a positive correlation.
This would suggest that in the 2007 crisis a high borrowing premium was
not associated with an increased chance of a crisis. This is contrary to the
literature which suggests that borrowing premium is a good indicator of
financial fragility (Gertler et al., 2007; Haramillo et al., 1996).
3.5.7 Inequality and the Principal Components
Table 3.16 shows regressions of the Gini coefficient against each principal
component. We see that Gini is a good predictor of PC1, PC3 and PC8. The
coefficients are all less than or equal to 0.01 but still positive and significant.
We have already established that PC1 and PC3 are negatively correlated
with the probability of a crisis and PC8 positively.
The PC8 relationship would seem to suggest that a crisis due to the con-
centration of banking risks may be exacerbated by high inequality. Whereas,
the PC1 and PC3 relationships would seem to suggest a crisis due to more
broad capital depletion is less likely to be associated with high inequality.
9 Taken from Bank (2012)
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Table 3.16: Gini as a predictors of the first eight principal components
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 PC 6 PC 7 PC 8
(Intercept) −0.07∗ 0.04 −0.05 0.01 −0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
gini 0.00∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that we cannot rule out the possibility that
inequality is related to financial crises. I have shown that there may exist a
relationship in which increased levels of inequality increase the likelihood of
a crisis. Countries with high inequality before 2007 seem to have been more
likely to suffer crises after the Credit Crunch.
I also show that inequality seems to be associated with a concentration
of risks in the financial sector. We have not tested the reasons for this but
it is possible that the concentration of wealth motivates banks to take larger
single risks.
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A.1 PCA with Missing Values
As in the earlier discussion we begin with the definition:
F =
∑
ij
(xijT −
∑
k
tikpjk)
2 (A.1)
Here F is the sum of square errors between the data xij and the implied
data
∑
k tikpjk, we also note that both ti and pj are chosen to be orthogo-
nal. The missing components of the X must be removed from the objective
function and, following (Grung and Manneo, 1998), we change notation such
that Y is the full matrix and X is the known part. We then define the trans-
form C such that xij = cijyij implying that cij = 0 if yij is unknown and 1
otherwise. This leads to a specification in terms of the known matrix:
F =
∑
ij
cij(yij −
∑
k
tikpjk)
2 (A.2)
=
∑
ij
(Xij −
∑
k
tikcijpjk)
2 (A.3)
The PC decomposition is then found by minimising the function F over
the space of {pjk} ⊗ {tik}. For the first principal component Christofferson
(1970) derives the minima of this function by differentiating with respect to
ti and pj, this gives closed form solutions for the first principal component
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and weights p1, t1.
Then, if say pjk were known then we could define A
i
jk = cijpjk and thus
we would have:
F(i) =
∑
j
(Xij −
∑
k
tikA
(i)
jk )
2 (A.4)
Therefore we could write the solution for t(i) as:
t(i) = x(i)A(i)(A(i)
T
A(i))−1 (A.5)
Now if we instead knew {tik} we could write Bjik = tikcij then:
F(j) =
∑
j
(Xij −
∑
k
B
(j)
ik pjk)
2 (A.6)
Then once again we define:
p(j)
T
= (B(j)
T
B(j))−1B(j)x(j) (A.7)
This process can be applied iteratively to find the complete set of com-
ponents. In itself this is not sufficient information to uniquely define the
components and in application we create a distribution of components which
is bootstrapped to produce a Markov Chain. This chain is then used to find
the mean value of the missing values given the available data.
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A.2 Length of Time Series for Gini Coefficients
Table A.1: Length of Time Series for Gini
Length Countries<= Countries>=
1 47
5 96 66
10 112 47
15 128 32
20 139 19
25 143 10
A.3 Countries in Sample Gini Values
Table A.2: Gini Coefficient Summary
Obs Start End Mean Gini StdDev G Mean Pareto StdDev P
Albania 3 1996 2004 29.49 1.52
Algeria 2 1988 1995 37.65 3.18
Argentina 15 1992 2006 48.69 2.94 1.68 0.12
Armenia 10 1994 2006 45.67 9.74
Australia 53 1951 2004 32.64 4.70 2.58 0.44
Austria 20 1970 2006 27.10 3.27
Bangladesh 12 1973 2005 36.24 3.56
Barbados 9 1970 1981 35.08 5.71
Belarus 12 1995 2006 30.27 3.95
Belgium 22 1969 2006 30.73 6.12
Benin 1 2003 2003 36.48
Bolivia 13 1968 2004 54.29 4.77
Botswana 2 1986 1994 44.55 4.45
Brazil 31 1958 2005 58.58 3.04
Bulgaria 17 1990 2006 33.02 6.55
Burkina Faso 4 1994 2003 58.10 21.76
Burundi 2 1992 1998 37.56 6.02
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Table A.3: Gini Coefficient Summary Part 2
Obs Start End Mean Gini StdDev G Mean Pareto StdDev P
Cambodia 4 1994 2004 45.13 2.76
Cameroon 3 1983 2001 47.92 3.55
Canada 33 1951 2000 30.80 2.97 2.28 0.33
Chile 33 1964 2003 52.05 4.47
Colombia 29 1960 2004 53.49 5.73
Costa Rica 27 1961 2006 47.70 2.26
Croatia 8 1991 2005 29.03 4.07
Cyprus 5 1966 2006 29.18 1.75
Czech Rep. 14 1993 2006 25.90 1.44
Denmark 38 1952 2006 32.82 7.98 3.32 0.20
Djibouti 2 1996 2002 44.70 5.37
Dominican Rep. 17 1969 2006 49.51 2.50
Ecuador 14 1965 2006 55.14 9.58
Egypt 11 1958 2004 38.04 6.87
El Salvador 14 1977 2004 50.86 4.14
Estonia 15 1992 2006 35.42 1.81
Ethiopia 4 1981 2000 40.65 11.52
Fiji 4 1968 1991 42.94 0.79
Finland 28 1952 2006 26.11 6.30
France 23 1956 2006 33.26 7.27 2.40 0.15
Gabon 4 1968 1994 56.90 8.85
Georgia 5 1997 2005 47.24 3.86
Germany 37 1960 2006 30.13 6.06 1.67 0.09
Ghana 7 1987 1999 44.00 8.20
Greece 30 1957 2006 38.70 4.95
Guatemala 9 1966 2004 51.72 8.64
Guinea 2 1991 1994 62.95 11.10
Guinea-Bissau 2 1991 1994 50.00 8.06
Guyana 3 1956 1999 46.70 6.43
Haiti 1 2000 2000 50.90
Honduras 17 1968 2006 55.35 2.70
Hungary 22 1984 2006 26.03 3.52
Iceland 3 2004 2006 25.00 1.00
India 38 1951 2004 34.99 5.89 1.90 0.25
Indonesia 17 1964 2005 36.23 6.90 1.37 0.07
Ireland 15 1973 2006 33.32 3.34 2.23 0.41
Israel 14 1954 2001 37.39 6.36
Italy 32 1967 2006 35.84 3.49 2.45 0.20
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Table A.4: Gini Coefficient Summary Part 3
Obs Start End Mean Gini StdDev G Mean Pareto StdDev P
Jamaica 19 1958 2004 47.96 9.10
Japan 34 1954 1998 33.27 4.67 2.69 0.27
Jordan 8 1973 2003 38.22 4.02
Kazakhstan 6 1996 2006 40.10 7.44
Kenya 10 1967 1999 59.97 10.26
Korea, Republic of 22 1961 2004 34.46 4.29
Kyrgyz Republic 13 1994 2006 46.07 6.42
Latvia 13 1994 2006 33.84 3.18
Lesotho 5 1986 1999 60.58 5.70
Liberia 1 1974 1974 43.00
Lithuania 13 1994 2006 33.95 1.63
Luxembourg 15 1985 2006 26.12 2.87
Macedonia, FYR 14 1993 2006 29.44 5.30
Madagascar 6 1962 2001 44.73 3.43
Malawi 7 1969 2004 52.39 8.18
Malaysia 15 1958 2004 48.36 4.26
Mali 3 1989 2001 49.90 20.17
Malta 3 2000 2006 28.67 1.15
Mauritania 7 1987 2000 55.83 17.11
Mauritius 6 1975 2001 38.43 2.30 2.27 0.38
Mexico 19 1956 2005 52.77 4.24
Moldova 14 1993 2006 38.77 3.19
Mongolia 4 1995 2002 33.62 8.01
Morocco 11 1955 1999 48.62 7.81
Mozambique 2 1996 2002 43.35 5.58
Namibia 1 1993 1993 73.90
Nepal 5 1976 2004 45.81 9.29
Netherlands 27 1952 2006 30.98 5.40 3.22 0.44
New Zealand 41 1954 2004 47.05 13.14 2.78 0.38
Nicaragua 4 1993 2005 54.47 1.57
Niger 3 1992 1995 46.20 8.95
Nigeria 13 1959 2003 45.96 9.43
Norway 30 1957 2006 27.39 4.27 2.34 0.66
Pakistan 24 1963 2005 34.42 4.03
Panama 20 1960 2004 52.63 6.69
Papua New Guinea 1 1996 1996 50.40
Paraguay 11 1983 2005 53.52 6.44
Peru 19 1961 2005 51.29 7.11
Philippines 12 1957 2003 48.06 2.91
Poland 27 1980 2006 28.66 5.36
Portugal 14 1973 2006 36.36 2.55 2.92 0.32
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Table A.5: Gini Coefficient Summary Part 4
Obs Start End Mean Gini StdDev G Mean Pareto StdDev P
Romania 18 1989 2006 30.75 4.73
Russian Federation 13 1992 2006 43.61 4.67
Rwanda 2 1984 2000 37.16 11.69
Senegal 5 1970 2001 46.27 14.48
Seychelles 1 1978 1978 46.00
Sierra Leone 5 1967 2003 52.62 9.51
Singapore 30 1966 2000 44.50 3.04 2.32 0.15
Slovak Republic 12 1993 2006 24.94 2.15
Slovenia 16 1991 2006 23.81 2.33
South Africa 13 1959 2000 53.95 5.91 2.85 0.26
Spain 22 1965 2006 32.22 3.69 2.33 0.16
Sri Lanka 13 1953 2002 44.28 7.06
Suriname 1 1999 1999 52.81
Swaziland 3 1974 2001 57.76 6.76
Sweden 56 1951 2006 34.83 14.24 2.84 0.54
Switzerland 8 1978 2002 32.97 2.23 1.92
Tajikistan 2 2003 2004 33.03 0.79
Tanzania 9 1967 2001 51.03 11.09 2.71 0.04
Thailand 19 1962 2002 49.79 7.15
Tunisia 7 1965 2000 44.27 4.70
Turkey 13 1952 2003 49.48 6.71
Uganda 5 1970 2002 45.76 7.77
Ukraine 12 1995 2006 40.87 5.47
United Kingdom 48 1954 2006 29.28 4.49 2.37 0.39
United States 54 1950 2004 41.36 3.56 2.15 0.36
Uruguay 24 1961 2005 42.40 2.36
Vietnam 2 2002 2004 35.98 2.23
Zambia 10 1970 2004 60.04 9.67
Zimbabwe 4 1968 1995 64.07 6.93
Grand Total 1761 1950 2006 39.66 11.43 2.47 0.53
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A.4 Summary of Trend Regressions For Gini Coefficients
Table A.6: Significance of time trend in predicting Gini Coefficient
Obs Mean Time Trend Const SE t
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of 4 27.82
Albania 12 31.18 1.02 -2013.31 6.19 0.16
Algeria 9 37.76 -0.72 1471.97 0.02 -43.89
American Samoa 2 0.00
Andorra 2 0.00
Angola 4 58.64
Antigua and Barbuda 2 0.00
Argentina 29 48.13 1.30 -2553.30 159.29 0.01
Armenia 17 35.40 -0.71 1458.46 5.04 -0.14
Aruba 2 0.00
Australia 8 33.05 3.85 -7572.72 7519.44 0.00
Austria 4 29.15
Azerbaijan 10 35.06 -1.51 3056.87 85.11 -0.02
Bahamas, The 2 0.00
Bahrain 2 0.00
Bangladesh 15 31.83 -0.93 1883.77 145.73 -0.01
Barbados 3 35.70
Belarus 19 27.76 1.00 -1962.99 27.18 0.04
Belgium 4 32.97
Belize 14 57.58 -0.60 1259.06 2.98 -0.20
Benin 4 38.62
Bermuda 2 0.00
Bhutan 9 42.45 -0.23 499.69 30.87 -0.01
Bolivia 18 56.45 0.53 -1006.82 19.44 0.03
Bosnia & Herzegovina 10 33.34 0.39 -740.15 13.06 0.03
Botswana 9 57.59 0.59 -1121.67 2.02 0.29
Brazil 33 58.67 -1.17 2393.37 99.19 -0.01
Brunei Darussalam 2 0.00
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Table A.7: Significance of time trend in predicting Gini Coefficient: 2
Obs Mean Time Trend Const SE t
Bulgaria 15 28.45 0.58 -1122.16 15.25 0.04
Burkina Faso 11 44.24 -0.82 1678.30 4.66 -0.18
Burundi 10 36.33 -0.08 193.07 27.34 0.00
Cambodia 11 40.59 0.61 -1187.35 15.36 0.04
Cameroon 10 40.00 -3.64 7332.52 367.44 -0.01
Canada 8 32.33 42.39 -83923.65 1365875.36 0.00
Cape Verde 4 50.52
Cayman Islands 2 0.00
Central African Republic 10 53.73 -0.28 616.74 69.20 0.00
Chad 4 39.78
Channel Islands 2 0.00
Chile 17 54.55 -3.61 7272.71 598.35 -0.01
China 16 34.95 1.26 -2485.99 25.64 0.05
Colombia 25 56.74 1.18 -2308.89 84.97 0.01
Comoros 4 64.30
Congo, Dem. Rep. 4 44.43
Congo, Rep. 4 47.32
Costa Rica 30 47.18 0.90 -1746.94 80.79 0.01
Cote d’Ivoire 16 40.49 0.91 -1765.51 39.41 0.02
Croatia 14 28.91 1.34 -2645.33 27.92 0.05
Cuba 2 0.00
Curacao 2 0.00
Cyprus 2 0.00
Czech Republic 10 23.94 0.61 -1181.69 4.44 0.14
Denmark 8 31.35 -1.35 2709.70 627.35 0.00
Djibouti 4 39.96
Dominica 2 0.00
Dominican Republic 23 49.95 0.12 -180.16 3.52 0.03
Ecuador 20 53.11 -0.31 679.80 12.25 -0.03
Egypt 12 31.56 -0.29 604.10 4.73 -0.06
El Salvador 21 50.41 -0.85 1758.37 95.90 -0.01
Equatorial Guinea 2 0.00
Eritrea 2 0.00
Estonia 16 34.74 0.60 -1159.29 15.10 0.04
Ethiopia 11 33.05 -0.43 899.59 29.66 -0.01
Faeroe Islands 2 0.00
Fiji 9 44.82 -0.75 1556.88 0.15 -5.12
Finland 4 26.88
France 4 32.74
French Polynesia 2 0.00
Gabon 4 41.45
Gambia, The 9 48.76 -0.85 1744.09 0.83 -1.02
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Table A.8: Significance of time trend in predicting Gini Coefficient: 3
Obs Mean Time Trend Const SE t
Georgia 19 40.25 0.88 -1729.72 10.92 0.08
Germany 4 28.31
Ghana 12 38.60 1.86 -3676.60 117.77 0.02
Greece 8 38.95 -2.08 4160.59 2577.14 0.00
Greenland 2 0.00
Grenada 2 0.00
Guam 2 0.00
Guatemala 15 56.70 -1.80 3657.06 132.29 -0.01
Guinea 11 42.84 -1.55 3146.37 65.48 -0.02
Guinea-Bissau 9 41.68 -0.37 771.29 40.79 -0.01
Guyana 9 48.05 -0.36 759.71 13.66 -0.03
Haiti 4 59.21
Honduras 28 56.33 1.25 -2434.09 56.55 0.02
Hong Kong SAR 4 43.44
Hungary 17 26.89 1.68 -3323.14 74.39 0.02
Iceland 2 0.00
India 12 32.53 -1.59 3178.50 549.30 0.00
Indonesia 15 30.29 1.86 -3677.73 166.77 0.01
Iran, Islamic Rep. 12 43.28 -1.60 3239.63 79.90 -0.02
Iraq 4 30.86
Ireland 4 34.28
Isle of Man 2 0.00
Israel 8 38.51 14.39 -28472.89 164914.46 0.00
Italy 4 36.03
Jamaica 14 42.80 0.72 -1393.83 15.45 0.05
Japan 4 24.85
Jordan 14 37.38 -1.04 2112.80 66.26 -0.02
Kazakhstan 18 32.35 0.05 -72.52 16.34 0.00
Kenya 11 47.70 -0.37 781.79 64.19 -0.01
Kiribati 2 0.00
Korea, Republic of 3 32.00
Korea 4 31.59
Kosovo 2 0.00
Kuwait 2 0.00
Kyrgyz Republic 17 36.72 -0.01 53.92 50.64 0.00
Lao PDR 11 33.68 1.49 -2939.64 66.94 0.02
Latvia 18 32.68 1.13 -2220.63 9.95 0.11
Lebanon 2 0.00
Lesotho 11 57.41 -0.44 938.57 18.00 -0.02
Liberia 4 38.16
Libya 2 0.00
Liechtenstein 2 0.00
Lithuania 16 32.06 1.04 -2048.96 13.26 0.08
Luxembourg 4 30.76
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Table A.9: Significance of time trend in predicting Gini Coefficient: 4
Obs Mean Time Trend Const SE t
Macao SAR, China 2 0.00
Macedonia, 16 38.71 0.60 -1164.27 9.29 0.06
Madagascar 14 44.68 -0.34 732.48 18.17 -0.02
Malawi 9 44.67 -0.27 576.37 47.00 -0.01
Malaysia 16 46.36 -1.07 2184.88 74.63 -0.01
Maldives 9 50.32 -0.12 282.10 317.65 0.00
Mali 11 40.65 -0.69 1417.67 8.63 -0.08
Malta 2 0.00
Marshall Islands 2 0.00
Mauritania 13 42.01 -0.63 1308.75 24.04 -0.03
Mauritius 2 0.00
Mexico 17 49.07 -0.20 440.96 5.97 -0.03
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 4 61.10
Moldova 22 35.41 0.54 -1047.60 16.41 0.03
Monaco 2 0.00
Mongolia 11 33.21 1.20 -2375.21 26.92 0.04
Montenegro 11 30.07 0.37 -706.40 0.47 0.79
Morocco 12 39.87 7.32 -14580.44 3921.77 0.00
Mozambique 10 45.75 1.62 -3199.84 83.60 0.02
Myanmar 2 0.00
Namibia 9 69.12 -0.53 1122.97 10.72 -0.05
Nepal 11 35.49 0.57 -1104.22 41.67 0.01
Netherlands 4 30.90
New Caledonia 2 0.00
New Zealand 8 47.94 -0.76 1561.83 8.04 -0.10
Nicaragua 11 44.80 -0.89 1827.97 0.38 -2.38
Niger 11 39.02 -0.04 118.78 19.53 0.00
Nigeria 12 44.38 1.42 -2801.14 123.95 0.01
Northern Mariana Islands 2 0.00
Norway 4 25.79
Oman 2 0.00
Pakistan 15 31.57 -1.62 3267.29 128.80 -0.01
Palau 2 0.00
Panama 21 55.55 -0.13 311.74 9.69 -0.01
Papua New Guinea 4 50.88
Paraguay 21 53.75 0.24 -421.34 18.32 0.01
Peru 23 50.85 -0.46 967.43 46.97 -0.01
Philippines 16 43.84 -0.51 1065.69 51.52 -0.01
Poland 24 31.90 1.83 -3628.11 115.79 0.02
Portugal 4 38.45
Puerto Rico 2 0.00
Qatar 4 41.10
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Table A.10: Significance of time trend in predicting Gini Coefficient: 5
Obs Mean Time Trend Const SE t
Romania 21 29.88 1.92 -3816.79 91.39 0.02
Russia 20 39.32 0.31 -576.68 32.41 0.01
Rwanda 11 46.08 0.67 -1286.38 32.17 0.02
Samoa 2 0.00
San Marino 2 0.00
Sao Tome and Principe 4 50.82
Saudi Arabia 2 0.00
Senegal 11 44.01 -0.55 1142.08 21.44 -0.03
Serbia 15 30.86 -0.82 1680.47 1.06 -0.78
Seychelles 9 54.25 0.15 -250.10 241.49 0.00
Sierra Leon 4 42.52
Singapore 4 42.48
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) 2 0.00
Slovak Republic 16 25.82 1.50 -2981.41 73.40 0.02
Slovenia 13 28.72 1.82 -3605.65 96.08 0.02
Solomon Islands 2 0.00
Somalia 2 0.00
South Africa 12 60.85 0.94 -1821.87 18.19 0.05
South Sudan 4 45.53
Spain 4 34.66
Sri Lanka 12 36.34 1.56 -3076.83 97.26 0.02
St. Kitts and Nevis 2 0.00
St. Lucia 4 42.58
St. Martin (French part) 2 0.00
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2 0.00
Sudan 4 35.29
Suriname 4 52.88
Swaziland 10 54.27 -0.69 1432.23 14.09 -0.05
Sweden 8 39.55 -0.67 1366.69 4.40 -0.15
Switzerland 4 33.68
Syrian Arab Republic 4 35.78
Tajikistan 12 31.72 0.65 -1265.21 6.04 0.11
Tanzania 10 35.34 2.37 -4699.98 254.06 0.01
Thailand 20 43.14 -2.78 5601.24 449.88 -0.01
Timor-Leste 9 35.73 -0.40 827.82 13.62 -0.03
Togo 4 34.41
Tonga 2 0.00
Trinidad and Tobago 9 41.44 -0.86 1749.59 0.61 -1.41
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Table A.11: Significance of time trend in predicting Gini Coefficient: 6
Obs Mean Time Trend Const SE t
Tunisia 12 43.09 -2.95 5909.76 1789.17 0.00
Turkey 16 41.67 -1.98 4004.39 161.95 -0.01
Turkmenistan 10 34.18 0.45 -870.88 25.28 0.02
Turks and Caicos Islands 2 0.00
Tuvalu 2 0.00
Uganda 14 42.84 0.47 -904.81 15.47 0.03
Ukraine 20 29.09 -0.10 229.09 16.64 -0.01
UAE 2 0.00
UK 8 30.74 1.81 -3562.39 1710.48 0.00
USA 8 42.40 -10.74 21245.14 56354.66 0.00
Uruguay 25 44.49 3.58 -7107.53 1571.27 0.00
Uzbekistan 11 35.38 0.39 -735.51 49.05 0.01
Vanuatu 2 0.00
Venezuela 20 48.01 -0.78 1603.32 32.59 -0.02
Vietnam 13 36.15 0.71 -1383.43 15.23 0.05
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 2 0.00
West Bank and Gaza 9 37.08 -0.32 674.54 3.16 -0.10
Yemen, Rep. 9 35.57 0.82 -1612.73 1.15 0.72
Zambia 13 50.55 -0.14 334.84 19.86 -0.01
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A.5 Gini Persistence
Table A.12: Analysing Persistence in predicting Gini Coefficient
Country Coefficient P=1 Country Coefficient P=1
Albania 1.04 0.18 Lithuania 1.05 0.36
Algeria 0.88 1.00 Macedonia, 1.04 0.14
Argentina 1.00 0.96 Madagascar 0.99 0.73
Armenia 0.95 0.14 Malawi 0.78 1.00
Australia 1.14 1.00 Malaysia 0.99 0.77
Azerbaijan 0.98 0.78 Maldives 0.59 1.00
Bangladesh 0.92 0.31 Mali 0.86 0.08
Belarus 1.01 0.78 Mauritania 0.97 0.73
Belize 0.98 0.14 Mexico 1.00 0.89
Bhutan 0.81 1.00 Moldova 1.01 0.65
Bolivia 1.02 0.49 Mongolia 1.03 0.64
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1.11 0.47 Montenegro 1.00 0.94
Botswana 1.12 1.00 Morocco 1.01 0.17
Brazil 1.00 0.72 Mozambique 1.01 0.82
Bulgaria 1.00 1.00 Namibia 0.86 1.00
Burkina Faso 0.92 0.15 Nepal 0.99 0.97
Burundi 0.97 0.91 New Zealand 0.61 1.00
Cambodia 0.99 0.91 Nicaragua 0.93 0.02
Cameroon 0.98 0.29 Niger 0.98 0.85
Canada 1.01 1.00 Nigeria 1.05 0.39
Central African Republic 0.91 0.76 Pakistan 0.98 0.61
Chile 0.99 0.20 Panama 1.00 0.88
China 1.05 0.04 Paraguay 1.01 0.72
Colombia 1.00 0.70 Peru 0.97 0.48
Costa Rica 1.00 0.87 Philippines 0.99 0.61
Cote d’Ivoire 1.00 0.91 Poland 1.01 0.24
Croatia 1.06 0.21 Romania 1.01 0.20
Czech Republic 1.11 0.62 Russia 1.01 0.89
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Table A.13: Analysing Persistence in predicting Gini Coefficient: 2
Denmark 0.65 1.00 Rwanda 1.10 0.64
Dominican Republic 1.00 0.89 Senegal 0.88 0.20
Ecuador 1.00 0.85 Serbia 0.98 0.23
Egypt 0.99 0.74 Seychelles 1.54 1.00
El Salvador 1.00 0.86 Slovak Republic 1.02 0.59
Estonia 1.02 0.83 Slovenia 1.05 0.30
Ethiopia 0.96 0.78 South Africa 1.01 0.83
Fiji 0.91 1.00 Sri Lanka 1.05 0.29
Gambia, The 0.94 1.00 Swaziland 0.91 0.42
Georgia 1.01 0.71 Sweden 0.46 1.00
Ghana 1.05 0.01 Tajikistan 1.01 0.78
Greece 0.79 1.00 Tanzania 1.06 0.22
Guatemala 0.99 0.73 Thailand 0.99 0.40
Guinea 0.94 0.09 Timor-Leste 0.81 1.00
Guinea-Bissau 0.74 1.00 Trinidad and Tobago 0.95 1.00
Guyana 0.86 1.00 Tunisia 0.95 0.21
Honduras 1.00 0.98 Turkey 0.99 0.20
Hungary 1.04 0.24 Turkmenistan 1.22 0.14
India 1.00 0.99 Uganda 1.00 0.92
Indonesia 1.02 0.58 Ukraine 1.00 0.92
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.95 0.20 UK 1.41 1.00
Israel 1.04 1.00 USA 0.97 0.42
Jamaica 1.00 0.92 Uruguay 1.01 0.43
Jordan 0.99 0.86 Uzbekistan 1.02 0.93
Kazakhstan 1.00 0.96 Venezuela 0.98 0.32
Kenya 0.98 0.84 Vietnam 1.00 0.95
Kyrgyz Republic 0.98 0.85 West Bank and Gaza 0.92 1.00
Lao PDR 1.06 0.45 Yemen, Rep. 1.13 1.00
Latvia 1.04 0.10 Zambia 1.00 0.99
Lesotho 0.97 0.78
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A.6 Countries in the World Top Incomes Database
Table A.14: Break Down of GFSR Countries by Region/Type
Advanced Economies 30
Emerging and Developing Economies 67
C&E Europe 21
Developing Asia 8
Middle East North Africa 8
Sub Saharan Africa 13
Western Hemisphere 16
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A.7 Ancillary Regression Results for Panel Data Study
Table A.15: Random Effects Model of Various Crises With Pareto Measure
Banking Currency Soverign Any Crisis
Pareto -0.0824 0.0109 -0.0583 -0.0402
0.42 0.472 0.709 0.292
GDP -2.17 1.16 -0.282 -1.04
2.78 3.31 4.92 2.22
CPI 1.46(*) 2.73(*) 0.104 1.85(**)
0.793 1.41 1.41 0.802
Exchange Rate -0.859 -0.437 0.685 0.628
2.05 2.77 3.72 1.64
Short Rate -9.07(***) -9.83(***) -2.76 -9.58(***)
2.58 2.98 4.29 2.1
Unemployment 1.25 -4.95(***) 0.206 -2.46(**)
1.02 1.36 1.82 0.992
Government Consumption 1.5(**) 1.82(*) 0.621 1.29(*)
0.732 1.01 1.26 0.641
Current Account 0.0417 -0.00122 -0.0155 0.00512
2.87E-02 3.98E-02 6.51E-02 2.48E-02
Equity 8.16E-01 -1.84E+00 -1.69E+00 -3.97E-01
1.24E+00 1.19E+00 2.17E+00 9.08E-01
Fiscal Position -1.52E-05 -3.60E-06 9.80E-06 -8.04E-06
1.64E-05 2.06E-05 3.03E-05 1.33E-05
Trade Balance -1.58E-03 -1.21E-03 -2.49E-04 -1.65E-03
1.88E-03 2.48E-03 2.86E-03 1.41E-03
M2/Res 9.98E-08 -5.58E-07 2.25E-06 1.21E-07
3.29E-06 4.55E-06 8.34E-06 2.77E-06
cons -2.07E-06 2.26E-06 3.93E-06 -6.93E-07
2.97E-06 5.12E-06 9.20E-06 2.60E-06
F-Test 3.57 4.24 0.67 5.56
A.8 Ancillary regressions for PCA Decomposition
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Table A.16: Odds Ratio for Pareto Measure Regressions
Banking Currency Soverign Any Crisis
pareto 0.921 1.011 0.943 0.961
ldgdp 0.114 3.196 0.754 0.355
lcpi 4.324 15.355 1.110 6.363
lshortr 0.424 0.646 1.984 1.874
dgdp 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.000
cpi 3.506 0.007 1.229 0.085
fx 4.469 6.180 1.862 3.616
unemp 1.043 0.999 0.985 1.005
govcons 2.261 0.158 0.184 0.673
curr 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
shares 0.998 0.999 1.000 0.998
fiscpos 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
trade 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
cash 0.992 1.005 0.998 0.996
Table A.17: Mean value of principal components by year and experience of a
crisis.
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 PC 6 PC 7 PC 8
C
ri
si
s
2005 -0.244 -0.523 1.489 0.159 -0.386 0.066 0.382 -0.825
2006 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2007 -0.28 -0.50 0.12 0.39 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.03
2008 -0.14 0.22 -0.38 -0.05 0.05 0.16 -0.11 0.23
2009 -0.13 0.49 -0.28 0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -0.13 0.25
2010 -0.33 0.28 -0.35 -0.18 0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.14
2011 0.02 -0.16 -0.57 0.00 0.21 0.15 -0.20 0.06
N
o
C
ri
si
s
2005 -0.08 -0.06 0.19 -0.10 -0.07 0.00 0.10 -0.09
2006 -0.10 -0.05 0.24 -0.12 -0.10 -0.04 0.06 -0.07
2007 -0.04 -0.13 0.20 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.08 -0.07
2008 0.11 -0.05 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.05
2009 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.15 -0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.04
2010 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.16 -0.09 0.13 -0.05 -0.03
2011 0.16 0.07 -0.51 0.22 0.12 0.01 -0.19 0.08
Chapter 4
Two Period Model
The grand aim of all science is to cover the greatest number of empirical
facts by logical deduction from the smallest number of hypotheses or axioms.
–Albert Einstein quoted in Nash (1963)
4.1 Introduction
The empirical section and literature review have established the following
stylised facts:
• The income share of the high earners may affect financial stability
• Borrowing premium is a good proxy for financial stability
In this chapter, a simple two period model will be used to study the
possible effects of inequality. Banks will intermediate between consumers
with varying income levels. The banks will charge a premium for borrowing
and this premium will be taken as indicative of the stability of the economy.
Section 4.2, Model Structure, will define the parameters of the model
and highlight important structural features of the proposed economy. Then
section 4.3, Inequality, will define what is meant by inequality in the con-
text of this model. The Household and Bank problems will then be consid-
ered in detail in sections 4.4 and 4.5 respectively, including several lemmas
demonstrating how borrowing changes with inequality. Section 4.6, Market
Clearing, will seek to show that all markets clear and equilibrium is possi-
ble given the proposed structure. Finally, the Borrowing Premium will be
further discussed in Section 4.8.
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These results are then shown numerically; the Computational Strategy
section (4.9) explains how the model is solved and the Data for Calibration
(4.10) provides a set of parameters for the model. Finally, the results section
(4.11) verifies the analytic results numerically.
4.2 Model Structure
In this model, a continuum of atomistic households receive endowments y0 in
Period 0. The households are heterogeneous in income. It will be assumed
that the income is bounded such that yi ∈ [ymin, ymax]. I will also assume
that all incomes are positive and none zero. Income shocks are assumed to
be independent, that is to say: E[y1 | y0] = E[y1]. This assumption is clearly
not born out in reality, there is clear empirical evidence of autocorrelation in
income levels (Rey and Montouri, 1999). The assumption will be maintained
for analytic tractability and possible extensions, relaxing the assumption
discussed later in this chapter.
There will be a subsistence level of consumption c¯ below which income
cannot fall and it is assumed that autarky is always possible, thus ymin > c¯.
It will be assumed that all households have the same preference structure
consisting of a concave utility function u and subjective discount factor β.
Assuming strict concavity of u leads to the following identities for all positive
c:
u′(c) > 0 (4.1)
u′′(c) < 0 (4.2)
u′′′(c) > 0 (4.3)
Households take the income received in period 0 and solve an optimal
choice problem given:
1. Their idiosyncratic first period income y0
2. The Market Interest Rates for loans RL and deposits RD
3. Distribution of Incomes Ψy
We will take the distribution of Ψy to be uniform for increased analytical
tractability. The result of the decision problem will be the optimal response
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functions for deposits (d0) and loans(l0), at least one of these must be zero
for a given y0
1:
d∗0 = d
∗(RD, RL, y0,Ψy) (4.4)
l∗0 = l
∗(RD, RL, y0,Ψy) (4.5)
The total loans issued by the banks must equal the total loans taken by
consumers, Loan and Deposit Market clearing, then implies:
D0 =
∫
d∗0(RD, RL, y0,Ψy)dΨy (4.6)
L0 =
∫
l∗0(RD, RL, y0,Ψy)dΨy (4.7)
Call the set of households H, then Borrowers are H− with l∗0 > 0, d
∗
0 = 0
and Savers are H+ with l∗0 = 0, d
∗
0 > 0. Because of the borrowing premium,
there exists a set of consumers who choose to neither borrow nor save and
they will be defined as H0. The sets H+, H− and H0 are determined in period
zero by the realisation of income. Therefore, we can define the threshold
incomes yB and yS such that:
1. For y0 < yB the consumer would be a borrower in H
−
2. For y0 > yS the consumer would be a saver in H
+
3. For yB < y0 < yS the consumer would live in autarky in H
0
Figure 4.2 shows the relative positions of these incomes on a stylised
scale. The ordering of these income levels is guaranteed if RL > RD, given
that defaults are never negative this holds almost surely.
0
0
2
c¯
3
ymin
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yD
7
yB
8
y¯
9
yS
13
ymax
Figure 4.1: Relative scales of income levels
Debts are assumed to be legally enforceable unless paying off the debt
would take consumption beneath c¯, in this case the bank can only reclaim
income in excess of c¯. This is comparable with fair recovery practices in the
1 This will be further discussed in the following sections.
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UK and will be discussed in more detail in the Data section. Therefore, in
Period 1, a household which has borrowed may be unable to repay all of their
debts if c¯ > y1−RLl∗0 this set of defaulters will be called Hq1 . It then follows
that H = H− ∪H+ ∪H0 and Hq1 ⊂ H−. Hq1 is only determined in Period 1.
To make the order of events clear, Figure 4.2 shows a time line. Before
any incomes are realised, at time -1, a continuum of banks know the dis-
tribution of incomes the households will receive and the preferences of the
households. Using this information, the banks are able to set their interest
rates in advance of the realisation of incomes in period 0. The banks inter-
mediate competitively between borrowers and lenders. The total loans and
deposits supplied by all banks will be denoted L0 and D0. Then the banks
have an aggregate Period 0 balance sheet constraint and by competitive mar-
kets a Period 1 zero profit condition.
L0 = D0 (4.8)
pi = RLL0 −RDD0 −Q = 0 (4.9)
Where Q is the value of loans defaulted on and RL and RD are the gross,
including capital, returns on loans and deposits. Then noting that L0 = D0
in equilibrium this yields:
RL = RD +
Q
L0
(4.10)
Therefore, the interest rate charged on loans is equal to the interest rate
paid on deposits plus the default premium, which will be denoted ς = Q
L0
.
−1
Bank Sets Prices
0
First Income
1
Second Income
Figure 4.2: Time Line for Decision Making
The measure of financial stability is the premium charged for borrowing.
This premium will then be determined by the response functions of the con-
sumers. These functions and their aggregates are unlikely to be of a closed
form. Even in the simplest case of quadratic utility the decision rules would
be straightforward, but the interest rates would be transcendental. The fol-
lowing section will establish some properties of these functions. Specifically,
it will be shown that the relative demand for borrowing is higher when in-
equality is higher, which then drives up the borrowing premium. This is
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shown in comparative statics but the general result is shown numerically in
the following sections.
4.3 Inequality
The Gini coefficient, discussed in Section 2.2, is a measure of inequality for a
given income distribution, a Gini of 0.0 means that income is evenly spread
out across an entire population, perfect equality, and a Gini of 1.0 suggests
income is concentrated with a single individual. This model will make great
use of the uniform distribution, while incomes are very clearly not uniformly
distributed this distribution provides a useful baseline. The simplicity of the
formulation allows for better intuition for the results and I will expand on
the effect of other distributions later in this chapter. it is therefore useful to
establish the parametric form of the above definitions for this distribution:
Ψ(y) =
y − ymin
ymax − ymin (4.11)
y = ymin + (ymax − ymin)Ψ(y) (4.12)
= ymin + (ymax − ymin)x (4.13)
L(Ψ(y)) =
y2 − y2min
y2max − y2min
(4.14)
=
x2(ymax − ymin)2 + 2yminx(ymax − ymin)
y2max − y2min
(4.15)
=
x(ymax − ymin)(xymax + (2 + x)ymin)
y2max − y2min
(4.16)
=
x2ymax + x(1 + x)ymin)
ymax + ymin
(4.17)
G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
L(x)dx (4.18)
= 1− 2
ymax + ymin
[
x3
3
(ymax + ymin) + x
2ymin]
1
0 (4.19)
=
1
3
− ymin
(ymax + ymin)
(4.20)
∂G
∂ymax
=
ymin
(ymax + ymin)2
(4.21)
ψ(y) =
1
ymax − ymin (4.22)
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Therefore, for a given ymin, the Gini coefficient is increasing in ymax up
to a limiting value of 1
3
. We can, in this case, take ymax as our measure
of inequality for a given ymin. Raising ymax while keeping ymin constant,
increases the mean value of income as well as the Gini coefficient. This is
consistent with recent observations in the UK and the US economies; where
rising average real income is significantly attributable to increases in high
incomes, as noted in Section 2.2.
4.4 Household Choices
This section will establish the first order conditions for the consumer along
with some useful partial derivatives. A possible mode by which inequality
could affect the borrowing premium will be presented.
The households consume in both periods, taking utility from consump-
tion. They may make deposits with the bank and receive a gross return
RD or take out consumption loans and repay at a gross rate of RL. The
households budget constraints are then:
c0 + w0 = y0 (4.23)
c1 = max(c¯, y1 +R1w0) (4.24)
(4.25)
Where:
R1 =
{
RD if w0 > 0,
RL if w0 < 0,
(4.26)
Here, a general term w0 = y0−c0 has been used to simplify the exposition
of the maximisation problem, which can be interpreted as ‘bank balance’.
Borrowing, w0 < 0, will be denoted l0 and saving, w0 > 0, will be denoted
d0. The decision problem is to find V = max[u(c0) + βu(c1)] subject to the
budget constraints:
c0 ∈ [c¯, y0 + (ymax − c¯)/RL] (4.27)
Given the choice of consumption in period zero, c0, consumption in period
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1 in then given by:
c1 =

y1 +RD(y0 − c0) if c0 < y0,
y1 −RL(c0 − y0) if c0 > y0 and y1 ≥ RL(c0 − y0) + c¯,
c¯ if c0 > y0 and y1 < RL(c0 − y0) + c¯.
(4.28)
Within this formulation is is clear that agents who save, c0 < y0, will
always consume more than y1 in period 1. Then agents who borrow, c0 > y0
may borrow so little that they will never default (group 2) or borrow sufficient
that they risk defaulting (group 3). We can then define a set of corresponding
lifetime value functions:
V (c0; y0) =
{
u(c0) + βE0[u(y1 +RD(y0 − c0))] if c0 < y0,
u(c0) + βE0[u(max[c¯, y1 +RL(y0 − c0)])] if c0 > y0
(4.29)
The first section of the piecewise representation of V (c0; y0) is very famil-
iar and we can trivially replace the expectation with an integral. However,
the second component, relating to borrowers, is more tricky. Here there will
be different consumption functions for different realisations of y1. Therefore,
I further break down this function in terms of y1:
V (c0; y0) =

u(c0) + β
∫ ymax
ymin
[u(y1 +RD(y0 − c0))]dΨy1
if c0 ∈ {c¯, y0},
u(c0) + β
∫ ymax
ymin
[u(y1 +RL(y0 − c0))]dΨy1
if c0 ∈ {c¯, y0 + (ymin + c¯)/RL},
u(c0) + β[
∫ RL(c0−y0)+c¯
ymin
[u(c¯)]dΨy1 +
∫ ymax
RL(c0−y0)+c¯[u(y1 +RD(y0 − c0))]dΨy1 ]
if c0 ∈ {y0 + (ymin + c¯)/RL, y0 + (ymax + c¯)/RL}
(4.30)
Then writing:
dU(c)
dc
= u(c) (4.31)
And noting that, for a uniform distribution, dΨy1 = (ymax − ymin)−1dy1
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We have:
V (c0; y0) =

u(c0) + β(ymax − ymin)−1[U(ymax +RD(y0 − c0))− U(ymin +RD(y0 − c0))]
if c0 ∈ {c¯, y0},
u(c0) + β(ymax − ymin)−1[U(ymax +RL(y0 − c0))− U(ymin +RL(y0 − c0))]
if c0 ∈ {c¯, y0 + (ymin + c¯)/RL},
u(c0) + β(ymax − ymin)−1[(RL(c0 − y0) + c¯− ymin)u(c¯)]+
U(ymax +RL(y0 − c0))− U(c¯)]
if c0 ∈ {y0 + (ymin + c¯)/RL, y0 + (ymax + c¯)/RL}
(4.32)
Now differentiating with respect to consumption:
∂V (c0; y0)
∂c0
=

u′(c0)− βRD(ymax − ymin)−1[u(ymax +RD(y0 − c0))− u(ymin +RD(y0 − c0))]
if c0 ∈ {c¯, y0},
u′(c0)− βRL(ymax − ymin)−1[u(ymax +RL(y0 − c0))− u(ymin +RL(y0 − c0))]
if c0 ∈ {c¯, y0 + (ymin + c¯)/RL},
u′(c0)− βRL(ymax − ymin)−1[
u(ymax +RL(y0 − c0))− u(c¯)]]
if c0 ∈ {y0 + (ymin + c¯)/RL, y0 + (ymax + c¯)/RL}
(4.33)
And setting these derivative equal to zero:
u′(c0) =

βRD(ymax − ymin)−1[u(ymax +RD(y0 − c0))− u(ymin +RD(y0 − c0))]
if c0 ∈ {c¯, y0},
βRL(ymax − ymin)−1[u(ymax +RL(y0 − c0))− u(ymin +RL(y0 − c0))]
if c0 ∈ {c¯, y0 + (ymin + c¯)/RL},
βRL(ymax − ymin)−1[
u(ymax +RL(y0 − c0))− u(c¯)]]
if c0 ∈ {y0 + (ymin + c¯)/RL, y0 + (ymax + c¯)/RL}
(4.34)
The following two sections will deal with the two analytical problems (1)
capital market imperfections and (2) default.
4.4.1 Borrow or Save?
The borrowing premium is the result of the ability of agents to default.
However, the resultant capital market failure requires careful treatment even
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before introducing the possibility of default. Therefore, this section will
ignore default and focus on the behaviour of agents due to the borrowing
spread alone.
The question is then which consumers, H, will be borrowers, H−, and
which will be savers, H+. Now, consider the two values of y0 for which
w = 0, denoted yB and yS, where yB is the level of income at which it would
be just optimal to not borrow or save respectively.
u′(yB) = βRLE0u′(y1) (4.35)
u′(yS) = βRDE0u′(y1) (4.36)
Lemma B.1.1 in Appendix B.1.1 states that if RL > RD then yB < yS and
households whose income falls between theses limits will neither deposit with
nor borrow from the bank. For these autarkic consumers in H0, it follows
that c0 = y0 and c1 = y1
The set of households, H, is then partitioned into borrowers, denoted H−,
and savers, H+, by the above relations, note H = H− ∪H+. It is interesting
to note that the threshold income yB is increasing in ymax as established by
Corollary B.1.2 in Appendix B.1.1.
The optimal response of a household in H− is then:
u′(y0 + l∗0) = βRLE0u
′(y1 −RLl∗0) (4.37)
And for a household in H+:
u′(y0 − d∗0) = βRDE0u′(y1 +RDd∗0) (4.38)
Optimal consumption will be denoted c∗, optimal borrowing l∗0 and saving
d∗0. The remainder of this section will now aim to establish the properties
of l∗0, which will in turn be used to establish the properties of the borrow-
ing premium. Two lemmas are now presented; the proofs can be found in
Appendix B.1.1
Lemma 4.4.1. Optimal borrowing for a given household is decreasing in y0
Corollary 4.4.2. The derivative ∂l
∗
∂y0
< 1.
Lemma 4.4.3. Optimal borrowing for a given household is increasing in
ymax
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Intuitively, Lemmas 4.4.1 and 4.4.3, result from the fact that the level of
borrowing is proportional to the expected increase in income between period
0 and period 1. That is to say that the motivation for borrowing is that the
income in period 0 is less than the expected level of income in period 1 and
therefore, the consumption can be smoothed by moving some of the deficit
into period 1.
4.4.2 Defaults
Although households are compelled by law to repay debts, following British
law (OFT, 2011), creditors cannot demand repayment of debt that reduces
consumption beneath a subsistence level c¯. A consumer who cannot afford to
repay their debts is allowed to consume c¯ but is still compelled to repay ev-
erything they can afford. Henceforth, households who have chosen to borrow
will default if:
c¯ > y1 −RLl∗0 (4.39)
This means where defaults are possible, Eu′(c1) = Eu′(max(c¯, y1−RLl∗)).
The first order condition must be adjusted to take into account the possi-
bility of default. Note that this does not imply ‘strategic default’, where
the borrower plans to default. Instead, this takes account of the possibility
of ‘bad’ states of nature. Thus, the appropriate first order condition in the
presence of default will be:
u′(y0 − l∗) = βRLE0u′(max(c¯, y1 −RLl∗)) (4.40)
No consumer will be allowed to borrow so much that they default with
certainty. The maximum that a consumer could possibly receive in period 1
is ymax, the maximum available to repay debts is then ymax − c¯. Therefore,
there is an implied borrowing limit of ymax−c¯
RL
i.e. l∗ ∈ [0, ymax−c¯
RL
].
The ability of agents to default increases the amount borrowed. This is
intuitively obvious. The proof requires a little investigation and is laid out
as the proof of Lemma 4.4.4 found in Appendix B.1.1.
Lemma 4.4.4. The amount borrowed by a consumer is higher when defaults
are permitted.
While this result is important, we need to establish the properties of the
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borrowing decision in the presence of default. The results are laid out in the
following set of lemmas and the proofs can be found in Appendix B.1.1. It
will be shown that borrowing is still increasing in ymax. Finally, it will be
shown there exists a threshold period 0 income yD above which an agent may
borrow, but will never default. These results will be used to establish the
properties of the default premium in the Banks Section.
Lemma 4.4.5. The level of borrowing l∗D is increasing in ymax.
Lemma 4.4.6. There exists a threshold yD ≤ yB below which households
borrow allowing for the possibility of default and above which they will never
default.
From 4.40 we can see that the demand for loans is only a function of
incomes greater than RLl
∗
D + c¯. Agents with relatively low incomes thus bor-
row based only on higher income and in the event that they receive a low
income in Period 1, they will simply default. It is important to note that
there is nothing irrational about this behaviour and neither is it strategic de-
fault. Agents are choosing borrowing based on the relevant legal framework,
however, the bank will consider this when setting interest rates.
4.4.3 Illustration of Decision Rules
Given the complexity of the decision rules, it is useful to consider a practical
example of what these decision rules look like. Figure 4.3 shows stylised
decision rules for agents over various y0.
Figure 4.3: Stylised Decision Rule
4. Two Period Model 85
In this example we can see four distinct regions discriminated by yD, yB
and yS. It is also possible to see clearly that, if this were a real decision
rule, the economy would not be in equilibrium. The area between the line
and the axis representing borrowing, y0 < yB, and deposits, y0 > ys, and
these quantities are clearly not equal. Figure 4.6 shows a more realistic rule
generated by the numerical methods outlined in later sections.
Figure 4.4: Optimal decision rules for log utility
In this diagram the actual decision rule is shown in purple. The other
lines are shown over the full range of incomes to demonstrate more clearly
the shapes of the curves for each of the three decision rules.
4.4.4 Concavity of the value function
The ability to default results in some possible breaches to the requirement for
the value function to be concave in choice variable. That is to say that there
may be a minima as well as a maxima in the value function, therefore solving
the first order conditions may not result in utility maximisation. Figure 4.5
shows an example value function with a minima near -1 and a maxima just
above zero. In numerical work it is important to ensure that we have not
found a minima and therefore, at each calculation of the decision rule I test
that the value function is decreasing at w± δ. If I find that the minima has,
in fact, been given then I resolve the problem by adjusting the limits of the
available range to exclude the minima.
4.5 Banks
In Period 0, the banking sector takes deposits D0 from households and lends
L0 to households. The Loan and Deposit markets must clear, that is to say
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Figure 4.5: Value function for various choices of w in period zero with
CRRA utility and γ = 1.25
that the supply of Loans/Deposits from the banks must equal the demand
for Loans/Deposits from the Households:
L0 =
∫
H−
l∗dΨy (4.41)
D0 =
∫
H+
d∗dΨy (4.42)
The aggregate behaviour of the Loans and Deposits follow the individual
choices. Lemma 4.5.1 establishes one of the key results; the proof of this
lemma can be found in B.2.
Lemma 4.5.1. For a given interest rate, RL, the aggregate demand for bor-
rowing is increasing in ymax if incomes are uniformly distributed .
The only resources available to the banks are the deposits from households
and the only investment opportunity is loans issued to households. Therefore,
for each of the atomistic continuum of banks i ∈ {0, 1}, we have a first period
balance sheet constrain of:
Li0 = D
i
0 (4.43)
Banks are assumed to be identical, atomistic and symmetrical and there-
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fore, it is reasonable to focus the analysis on the aggregates for the banking
system. We must be careful to ensure that Li0 and D
i
0 are measurable on the
set of banks. However, this is ensured by matching each pair of consumers
j ∈ H− and k ∈ H+ with a bank i ∈ {0, 1} which is equivalent of a map-
ping R ← R. Therefore, the banking sector has an aggregate balance sheet
constraint in period 0 which is:
L0 = D0 (4.44)
By the same argument, we are able to deal with the aggregate zero profit
condition. In Period 1, the banks repay the depositors, plus interest and
collect on debts where possible. The bank is only able to reclaim debts up
to the income received by households and may suffer defaults if the income
of the individual household falls below liabilities.
pi = RLL0 −RDD0 −Q (4.45)
This then yields:
RL = RD +
Q
L
(4.46)
= RD + ς (4.47)
The interest rate charged on loans is equal to the interest rate paid on
deposits plus the default premium ς. The borrowing premium is driven by
the level of defaults relative to the level of loans.
In Period 1 a household that has borrowing is unable to repay all of their
debts if c¯ > y1 − RLl∗0. Recall the set of Household is H, Borrowers are H−
with l > 0, d = 0, Savers are H+ with l = 0, d > 0 and those who may
default are Hq0 and those who do default H
q
1 with c¯ > y1 − RLl∗0. Note that
H = H− ∪H+ and Hq1 ∈ Hq0 ∈ H−.
The total liabilities of agents in Hq1 are RLl0. The loss suffered by a bank
is then the difference between the payment they expect to receive, RLl0, and
the funds available to repay the debt, income after subsistence expenditure
y1 − c¯:
q(l0) = RLl0 − (y1 − c¯)
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Taking expectations at period 0:
Eq(l0) = E[RLl0 − (y1 − c¯)]
=
RLl0+c¯∫
ymin
[RLl0 − (y1 − c¯)]dΨy1 (4.48)
Which for a uniform distribution gives:
Eq(l0) =
1
ymax − ymin
RLl0+c¯∫
ymin
[RLl0 − (y1 − c¯)]dy1
=
1
ymax − ymin [(RLl0 + c¯)y1 −
y21
2
]RLl0+c¯ymin
=
1
ymax − ymin [(RLl0 + c¯)(RLl0 + c¯)−
(RLl0 + c¯)
2
2
− (RLl0 + c¯)ymin + y
2
min
2
]
=
1
ymax − ymin [
(RLl0 + c¯)
2
2
− (RLl0 + c¯)ymin + y
2
min
2
]
=
1
2
1
ymax − ymin [RLl0 + c¯− ymin]
2
=
1
2
1
ymax − ymin [R
2
Ll
2
0 + 2RLl0(c¯− ymin) + (c¯− ymin)2] (4.49)
Then substituting back for Q:
Q =
yD∫
ymin
1
2
1
(ymax − ymin)2 [R
2
Ll
2
0 + 2RLl0(c¯− ymin) + (c¯− ymin)2]dy0 (4.50)
=
1
2
1
(ymax − ymin)2 [R
2
LL2 + 2RLL1(c¯− ymin) + (yD − ymin)(c¯− ymin)2](4.51)
Where:
L1 =
yD0∫
ymin
l0dy0 (4.52)
L2 =
yD0∫
ymin
l20dy0 (4.53)
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The borrowing premium is then:
ς =
Q
L
(4.54)
=
1
2
1
L
1
ymax − ymin [R
2
LL2 + 2RLL1(c¯− ymin) + (yD0 − ymin)(c¯− ymin)2]
The banks’ problem then gives two conditions with the equilibrium de-
fined as the RL,RD which solves:
D∗0(RD) = L
∗(RL, p) s.t. (4.55)
RL = RD − ς (4.56)
ς =
1
2
1
L
1
ymax − ymin [R
2
LL2 − 2RLL1(c¯− ymin) + (yD0 − ymin)(c¯− ymin)2](4.57)
4.6 Market Clearing
It is now important to establish that there is enough information within the
model to define all of the endogenous quantities. To demonstrate closure of
the model, we begin with the period zero household budget constraints for
borrowers, autarkic consumers and savers:
cB0 = y0 + l0 (4.58)
cA0 = y0 (4.59)
cS0 + d0 = y0 (4.60)
Integrating over Period 0 incomes:
yB∫
ymin
cB0 dΨy0 =
yB∫
ymin
l0dΨy0 +
yB∫
ymin
y0dΨy0 (4.61)
yS∫
yB
cA0 dΨy0 =
yS∫
yB
y0dΨy0 (4.62)
ymax∫
yS
cS0 dΨy0 +
ymax∫
yS
d0dΨy0 =
ymax∫
yS
y0dΨy0 (4.63)
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Denoting the partial aggregates as upper-case letters with the relevant
subscripts we can then write the resource constraints for each subgroup in
the model:
CB0 = L0 + Y
B
0 (4.64)
CA0 = Y
A
0 (4.65)
CS0 +D0 = Y
S
0 (4.66)
Where Y B0 , Y
A
0 and Y
S
0 are the total period 0 income received by borrow-
ers, autarkic consumers and savers respectively; this means Y0 = Y
B
0 +Y
A
0 +
Y A0 . Summing these constraints and writing the total Period 0 income as Y0
yields the period zero resource constraint:
CB0 + C
A
0 + C
S
0 +D0 = Y0 + L0 (4.67)
And since we know D0 = L0 this simply reduces to a constraint that all
income must be consumed in period 0 i.e.
CB0 + C
A
0 + C
S
0 = Y0 (4.68)
For Period 1, we are able to perform the same accounting exercise, al-
though we must be careful to properly account for the defaults:
cB1 = max(y1 −RLl0, c¯) (4.69)
cA1 = y1 (4.70)
cS1 = y1 +RDd0 (4.71)
We now note that in the case where y0 −RLl0 < c¯ the level of defaults q
is given by q = RLl0− (y0− c¯). Intuitively, debts are reduced by q such that
income does not fall below c¯ can therefore write equation (4.69) as:
cB1 = y0 −RLl0 + q (4.72)
Integrating over period 1 incomes requires that l0 and d0 are both y0 and
y1 measurable. Put simply, those who borrow in period 0 are still borrowers
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in period 1. We can therefore write:2
ymax∫
ymin
cB1 dΨy1 =
ymax∫
ymin
y0 −RLl0 + qdΨy1∀y0 ∈ [ymin, yB] (4.73)
ymax∫
ymin
cA1 dΨy1 =
ymax∫
ymin
y1dΨy1∀y0 ∈ [yB, yS] (4.74)
ymax∫
ymin
cS1 dΨy1 =
ymax∫
ymin
y1 +RDd0dΨy1∀y0 ∈ [yS, ymax] (4.75)
And writing in partial aggregates, where the state of the agent is deter-
mined by their period zero income:
CB1 = Y
B
1 −RLL0 +Q (4.76)
CA1 = Y
A
1 (4.77)
CS1 = Y
S
1 +RDD0 (4.78)
Where Y B1 , Y
A
1 and Y
S
1 are the total income received in period 1 by agents
who were borrowers, autocratic consumers and savers in period 0; this means
Y1 = Y
B
1 + Y
A
1 + Y
A
1 . And once again summing gives:
CB1 +RLL0 + C
A
1 + C
S
1 = Y1 +RDD0 +Q (4.79)
Furthermore, all resources available must be consumed in each period and
hence market clearing must ensure that:
CB0 + C
A
0 + C
S
0 = Y0 (4.80)
CB1 + C
A
1 + C
S
1 = Y1 (4.81)
Subtracting the market clearing (Equations 4.80 and 4.81) from the re-
source constraints (Equations 4.67 and 4.79) yields the banking sectors’ bal-
ance sheet and zero profit conditions:
2 This requirement simply means that there exists a mapping from the distribution of
agents in H− from period 0 to period 1. Strictly speaking, the notation here is an abuse
of the term dΨy1 , which refers to the distribution of both y and l0 on y1 which are not
the same. However, under the uniform distribution there is a simple factor of yB − ymin
difference and therefore, the aggregate relationship still holds.
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L0 = D0 (4.82)
RDD0 = RLL0 −Q (4.83)
The equilibrium is then defined CB0 , C
A
0 , C
S
0 , C
B
1 , C
A
1 , C
S
1 , L0, D0, RD and
RL defined by the first period clearing conditions Equations 4.64 to 4.66,
second period clearing Equations 4.76 to 4.77, the bank conditions Equations
4.82 and 4.83 and the resource constraints 4.67 and 4.79. This yields eight
aggregates and two prices in 10 equations and therefore, the model is well
defined.
However, it has been demonstrated above that the equilibrium can actu-
ally be defined as RL,RD which solves:
D∗0(RD) = L
∗(RL) (4.84)
RL = RD + ς (4.85)
ς =
1
2
1
L
1
ymax − ymin [R
2
LL2 − 2RLL1(c¯− ymin) + (yD0 − ymin)(c¯− ymin)2](4.86)
This is effectively a statement of Walras Law, that is, the financial market
clears then the goods market must also clear when there are only two markets.
4.7 Definition of Equilibrium
For the purpose of clarity, I bring together the equations that define the
equilibrium of the system in this section. The exogenous state of the system
is given as: (1) the income levels ymax > ymin > c¯ > 0, the discount rate
β ∈ (0, 1) and the concave utility function u(.). The equilibrium is then
defined by: (1) the pair of prices RL and RD; (2) the threshold incomes yd <
yB < ys; (3) the loan demand function for borrowers who may default y0 ∈
[ymin, yD] 7→ l∗D(y0, RL; ymax; (4) the loan demand function for borrowers
who will never default y0 ∈ [yD, yB] 7→ l∗ND(y0, RL; ymax; a deposit function
for savers y0 ∈ [yS, ymax] 7→ d∗D(y0, RD; ymax; (5) the aggregate loan function
L(RL; ymax; (6) the aggregate deposit function D(RD; ymax and the aggregate
defaults Q(RL; ymax. These quantities are related by the set of equations:
1. First Order Conditions
• for y0 ∈ [ymin, yD], u′(c0) = βRL(ymax− ymin)−1[u(ymax +RL(y0−
c0))− u(c¯)]]
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• for y0 ∈ [yB, yB], u′(c0) = βRL(ymax − ymin)−1[u(ymax + RL(y0 −
c0))− u(ymin +RL(y0 − c0))]
• for y0 ∈ [yS, ymax], u′(c0) = βRD(ymax−ymin)−1[u(ymax+RD(y0−
c0))− u(ymin +RD(y0 − c0))]
2. Income Thresholds
• yD such that u′(yD+(ymin−c¯)/RL) = βRL(ymax−ymin)−1[u(ymax+
(ymin − c¯)− u(c¯)]
• yB such that, u′(yB) = βRL(ymax − ymin)−1[u(ymax)− u(ymin)]
• for yS such that, u′(yS) = βRD(ymax − ymin)−1[u(ymax)− u(ymin)]
3. Aggregates
• L(RL, ymax) = 1ymax−ymin
yD∫
ymin
l∗Ddy0 +
1
ymax−ymin
yB∫
yD
l∗NDdy0
• D(RD, ymax) = 1ymax−ymin
ymax∫
yS
d∗dy0
• Q(RL, ymax) = 12 1(ymax−ymin)2
yD∫
ymin
[R2Ll
2
0 + 2RLl0(c¯ − ymin) + (c¯ −
ymin)
2]dy0
4. Market Clearing
• L(RL, ymax) = D(RD, ymax)
• RLL(RL, ymax)−Q(RL, ymax) = RDD(RD, ymax)
Consumers with y0 ∈ [yB, yS] have c0 = y0, that is to say they neither
borrow nor save.
In choosing this definition I assume that the solution is interior for all
consumers.
4.8 Defaults and Borrowing Premium
We have previously analysed the effect of an ability to default on individual
consumers. It has already been shown that where defaults are possible, the
level of borrowing for each y0 is higher and the derivative of l0 with respect
to ymax is positive irrespective of the ability to default. This section will
establish the effect on aggregates and borrowing premium.
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As has been stated, households that have chosen to borrow will default
if:
c¯ > y1 −RLl∗0 (4.87)
The funds available for repayment of debt in this period are: y1 − c¯ and
in this case the amount of debt upon which each household defaults will be:
q = RLl
∗
0 − (y1 − c¯)
= RLl
∗
0 − y1 + c¯ (4.88)
This value will always be positive, strictly speaking and the loss through
default to the intermediating banks is max {q, 0}.
Lemma 4.8.1. Eq is increasing in l∗0.
Proof. Note that ∀ y1 > RLl∗0 + c¯, q = 0 then from 4.88
Eq =
RLl
∗
0+c¯∫
ymin
RLl
∗
0 − y1 + c¯dΨy1 (4.89)
=
1
ymax − ymin [(RLl
∗
0 + c¯)(RLl
∗
0 + c¯− ymin)−
1
2
(RLl
∗
0 + c¯)
2 +
1
2
y2min](4.90)
Then taking derivatives:
∂Eq
∂E0y1
=
1
ymax − ymin [RLl
∗
0(2 + 2c¯− ymin)−RL(RLl∗0 + c¯)] (4.91)
We know that c¯ − ymin > 0 and that therefore the derivative is positive
if:
l∗0(2 + c¯) > RLl
∗
0 + c¯ (4.92)
l∗0(2−RL) + c¯) > 0 (4.93)
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This hold true as long as interest rates are less than 100% which seems
like a reasonable assumption.
The total amount of borrowing by households in this economy, L0, is then
the sum of the borrowing which may result in default and that which will
not L0 = L
D
0 + L
ND
0 where:
LD0 =
yD∫
ymin
l∗DdΨy (4.94)
LND0 =
yB∫
yD
l∗NDdΨy (4.95)
If default was not an option then yD = ymin and so the total amount of
borrowing, LND0 , would simply be:
LND0 =
yB∫
ymin
l∗NDdΨy (4.96)
The total demand for borrowing in an economy where defaults are possible
is greater than one in which defaults are not possible. Disaggregating 4.96
yields:
LND0 =
yD∫
ymin
l∗NDdΨy +
yB∫
yD
l∗NDdΨy (4.97)
It is then clear by Lemma 4.4.4 that:
yD∫
ymin
l∗NDdΨy <
yD∫
ymin
l∗DdΨy (4.98)
It then follows directly that LD0 > L
ND
0 .
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These results show that the propensity for borrowing increases when de-
faults are possible and, for a given ymin, increases with ymax. However, given
the complex nature of the interaction in equilibrium it is not possible to pro-
ceed further analytically, therefore I present numerical results in the following
sections.
4.9 Computational Strategy
The parametrisation of the model outlined above, results in a non-linear set
of simultaneous equations. The model was shown to clear, if and only if the
market clearing and zero profit conditions hold:
yB∫
ymin
l∗0dy0 =
ymax∫
yS
d∗0dy0 (4.99)
RL = RD + ς (4.100)
The challenge is to find the set of interest rates {RL, RD} that satisfy this
relationship.
Substituting for a Log Utility function, let:
u(c) = ln(c) (4.101)
u′(c) = c−1 (4.102)
Substituting for a Log Utility function, let:
u(c) =
c(1− γ)
1− γ (4.103)
u′(c) = c−γ (4.104)
The choice of utility function is a balance between tractability and re-
alism. Both Log and CRRA have some empirical support and are no more
computationally difficult to implement than quadratic utility. The high level
strategy is then:
1. For a given {RL, RD} calculate the decision rules, l∗0, d∗0 for each y0,
noting that this implies cS∗0 , c
B∗
0 , c
A∗
0
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2. Integrate to calculate L0, D0 and Q
3. Test if equilibrium is achieved and, if not, evolve {RL, RD}
These three steps are not necessarily trivial to implement, the decision
rules do not have closed form solutions for realistic utility functions and the
integral must therefore be calculated numerically. We then have multiple
levels of numerical calculation and so the root finding algorithm is likely to
be inhibited by numerical noise. Finding the solution of these equations must
then require a robust numerical approach. To begin with define X and Y as
deviations from the equilibrium:
X =
yB∫
ymin
l∗0dy0 −
ymax∫
yS
d∗0dy0 (4.105)
Y = RL −RD − ς (4.106)
The numerical strategy is to use a Vector Newton-Raphson style approach
to find the roots of X, Y . However, such algorithms may not converge, given
the absence of established regularity conditions and therefore, it is useful to
specify an alternative objective function:
F = X2 + Y 2 (4.107)
If the vector method is found to not converge to a root, we can instead
use a Non-Linear Least Squares approach to find a root. While this may be
seen as not reaching an equilibrium, one must remember that floating point
operations using 32bit doubles are only accurate to 16 significant figures and
therefore, minimising a function to within 10−26 is equivalent to finding a
root. Moreover, in both cases above this objective function is not necessarily
smooth. That is to say for a given set of model parameters the function may
have multiple local minima for given values of {RL, RD}.
The algorithm for calculating the solution is then:
1. For a given parameter set and functional specification {c¯, ymin, ymax, u, β}
evaluate X and Y
(a) Calculate policy functions using Newton-Raphson if necessary
(b) Calculate aggregates using an adaptive quadrature
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(c) Calculate X and Y
2. Check the stopping criteria
3. Evolve the system and repeat
This process has been stated using a general evolution step. This is due
to difficulties encountered minimising the functions in practice and so a com-
bination of a Newtwon/Broyden type Vector Methods and a Shuﬄed Com-
plex Evolution Procedure was used to ensure convergence. These methods
are implemented in C++ and the code used can be found in Appendix B.3
along with detailed comments about platform specific implementation. An
overview of the code is presented along with descriptions of the algorithms
in Appendix B.4.
4.10 Data for Calibration
The parameters required as inputs of the model are summarised in Table 4.1:
Table 4.1: Parameter inputs for the two period model and sources
Parameter Value Source
ymin 0.3825 Office for National Statistics (2012, pp. 57)
ymax 1.0000
c¯ 0.3187 Davis et al. (2011)
β 0.98 Epstein and Hynes (1983)
The value of β will be taken as 0.98 as is current in the literature. The
other three parameters are novel to this model and require a little attention.
There is also the problem of scale, the model is not homogeneous in the
income level and we need to be careful to calculate a realistic level of income
available for consumption.
The nominal value of ymin is relatively easy to find, taking 2010 UK data
the minimum wage is £ 5.80 per hour (copyright, 2012) and the average
number of hours worked is 33.4 hours per week. This gives rise to a weekly
minimum wage of £ 193.72 or an annual £ 10,101. However, this does not
take into account the effects of tax and benefits delivered by the state. The
ONS estimates that the average income of the poorest fifth of households
is £15,242 and £61,376 for the richest after taking into account direct and
indirect taxes. Dividing by the GDP deflator (Office for National Statistics,
2012, 56) yields 148.28 and 597.04 in consumption units.
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Using the uniform distribution the average income, Y¯ , between the upper
and lower limits on income, H and L respectively, is given by:
H∫
L
ydΨy = Y¯
H + L = 2Y¯ (4.108)
To maintain the levels of upper and lower quartiles to match the above
level we require that:
2ymin +
1
5
(ymax − ymin) = 2× 148.28
ymax + ymin +
4
5
(ymax − ymin) = 2× 597.04 (4.109)
So for the upper and lower quartiles to match the above level we require
that:
ymin = 18.434
ymax = 130.63
(4.110)
We note that the Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010 was £1,136,596
million at market prices (Office for National Statistics, 2012, pp. 57). The
population will be taken to be 62,262,000, this does include those under
the age of 16. This gives an income per capita of £18,255 or 177.58 in
consumption units. The total per capita income implied by the values of ymin
and ymax is only 74.531, less than half of that reflected in the data. However,
this simply reflects the fact that the uniform distribution is not capturing
the significant proportion of national income taken by the wealthy.
Rather than matching the average for the upper and lower quartiles, it
is possible to match the minimum wage and total income. This would yield
ymin = 98.26 and ymax = 256.90.
The minimum level of consumption, c¯, is somewhat more subjective. The
OFT (2011, pp. 20) states that in the process of debt collection companies
must refrain from:
i. Pressurising debtors to pay more than they can reasonably
afford32 without experiencing undue difficulty.33 As and when the
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debtor has been located/identified or to pay within an unreason-
ably short period.
32 For example, pressurising a debtor to make unreasonably
large repayments or to pay off his debts in full in a single (or very
few) repayment(s), when to do so would have an adverse impact
on the debtor’s financial circumstances.
33 The OFT would regard ‘without undue difficulty’ in this
context as meaning the debtor being able to make repayments
while also meeting other debt repayments and other normal/rea-
sonable outgoings and without having to borrow further to meet
these repayments.
What this means in practice, is that a company providing credit can only
recover debts in excess of an individual’s living expenses. This will clearly
vary between individuals and depends critically on individual circumstances.
Two base lines will be considered both based on the weekly consumption of
households composed of a single working individual: (1) the national average
of £290.30 taken from ONS (2011, pp. 127, Table A23) and (2) a minimum of
£227.97 established by Davis et al. (2011, pp. 19). Removing ‘discretionary
spending’ e.g. social, cultural, alcohol and non-work related travel, yields
figures of £108.9 and £161.40, respectively. Converting to consumption units
per year, 55.237 and 81.86, this would seem to suggest that the Minimum
Wage and GDP methodology is more appropriate to calculate ymin and ymax.
There is, however, still a problem of scale. The traditional solution is
to match ratios of the real economy to the calibrated model. For this pur-
pose the values of ymin, C¯ and ymax will be taken as 0.3825, 0.3187 and
1.000 respectively. This corresponds to the higher estimate of the c¯ and the
corresponding estimate of ymin and ymax.
4.11 Results
This section will present the results of the calibration along with a demon-
stration of how the model solution works.
4.11.1 Decision Rule
The values of ymin, C¯ and ymax are taken from Table 4.1, I then use either log
or CRRA Utility and explore the space of γ. To begin I look at the decision
rule, in Figure 4.6, this graph shows the overall decision rule, W , and the
sub curves which contributed to the decision rule. The decision rule function
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exists over the entire space of Y0 but the consumer will only ever make a
choice based on W .
Figure 4.6: Optimal Choice when γ = 2.1 Looking at Non-Defaulter
Transition
On Figure 4.1 we see the three transitions clearly, from defaulter to non-
defaulter (0.5), borrower to autarkic consumer (0.675) and finally saver (0.7).
4.11.2 Objective Function and Solution
The solution to the model is given as the {RL, RD}, that solves the zero profit
condition and the market clearing condition. Figure 4.7 shows the error in
the zero profit condition for various combinations of {RL, RD}. It is useful,
such that the solution is unique, for the function to have exactly one zero in
RL for each value of RD. This is equivalent to saying the the function crosses
the 0 plane only once; Figure 4.7 demonstrates that this is the case. 3
The market clearing condition must also be satisfied in equilibrium. Once
again I show that the error in this condition is zero along a single plane
crossing the zero plane. Figure 4.8 shows the function evaluated over various
values of {RL, RD}
The overall objective function is shown in Figure 4.9, however, it is dif-
ficult to see precisely the position this function is at zero. Therefore, it is
3 More generally this was found to be true for CRRA utility with values of γ between
1 and 3.
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Figure 4.7: Error in the zero profit condition using Log Utility
easier to consider the slices where the two separate components are zero.
Turning to Figure 4.10 we see that for the base case there is exactly one
value of {RL, RD} that satisfies both the zero profit condition and the mar-
ket clearing condition. For this base economy, we find that the interest rates
{RL, RD} = {1.01, 0.86}, that is a borrowing spread of 15%. This may seem
high relative to the UK however, given the current very low level of deposit
rates and high cost of unsecured credit, this number is not unreasonably
high.
The SCE algorithm employed is also robust enough to conclude that if it is
unable to find a zero within the bounds specified, no such zero exists. That is
not to say that there may not be a pair (RL, RD) which solves the model but
it does mean that the only solution is outside of the bounds [0.5, 2.0]. While
there is some evidence of economies with negative real interest rates or indeed
rates over 100%, neither of these cases would be considered economically
stable.
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Figure 4.8: Error in the market clearing condition using Log Utility
4.11.3 Effect of Inequality
Inequality in this model is measured by ymax and so the question is: what
happens to the borrowing premium when this upper limit is increased. Figure
4.11 shows how the borrowing premium changes for various values of ymax
using both log utility and various CRRA functions. Beyond the range 1 ≤
γ ≤ 1.8 the result did not hold and equilibrium were difficult to find.
Clearly, inequality serves to increase the borrowing premium in this case,
moreover no feasible solution was found when ymax exceeded this level thus
suggesting no reasonable equilibrium exists. Specifically, in the cases pre-
sented on the graph the residual value of F was less then 10−10 and this
value increased rapidly for ymax > 2.1. The result was also found to be
robust to changes in c¯, γ, and ymin.
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Figure 4.9: Objective function using Log Utility
4.12 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a model of how inequality can precipitate through
an economy and result in a higher borrowing premium. Specifically we find
that for a calibration of the model with log utility and data from the UK a
borrowing premium of 15% is predicted. If the highest incomes were to rise
by 20%, I would predict that the borrowing premium would rise to over 20%.
The key results are found numerically, however, they are supported by
instructive analytical results. Specifically, I have shown that when defaults
are permitted the desire for borrowing is increasing in ymax. I propose that
this result is due to the fact that agents are unbound by the fear of debt
repayments in low income states of the world, due to the ability to default.
This increased propensity to borrow tells a very similar to story to Kumhof
and Rancie`re (2010) in that inequality leads to a credit bubble.
The results of the theoretical work are not true universally, that is for
certain levels of income borrowing premium does not rise. However, this
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Figure 4.10: The values of {RL, RD} that satisfy the zero profit and
market clearing conditions
may not be as problematic to the hypothesis as it fist appears. If one were
to consider Japan in the late 1980s or the USA in the 2005 one could argue
that borrowing costs were too low promoting excessive risk taking. In this
sense the model provides a rich framework for future analysis. It would be
interesting to study these affects in more detail, ideally in the context of a
dynamic generalisation of this model.
There are many additional extensions to this model which may provide
a richer environment for study. For example, I did not consider the issue of
collateral or securitisation; the ability of banks to reposes mortgaged houses
will certainly alter the expected pay off of a distressed loan. This issue could
be further investigated using this model if I were to include an asset market
in both periods. Finally, the model specifies a capital market imperfection,
namely a borrowing premium, it would be possible to alter this premium to
be a function of the level of borrowing or the perceived riskiness of the loan. I
do not expect any of these additions to significantly alter the core conclusion
that inequality does interact with financial stability.
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Figure 4.11: The effect of inequality on borrowing premium
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Chapter B
Two Period Model Appendices
B.1 Proof of Lemmas
B.1.1 Borrow or Save
Properties of the Threshold Incomes
Lemma B.1.1. If RL > RD then yB < yS and households whose income
falls between these limits will neither deposit with nor borrow from the bank.
Proof. By concavity of u and independence of E0[y1] the result follows di-
rectly.
Corollary B.1.2. The threshold income where borrowing becomes the opti-
mal strategy is increasing in ymax
Proof. Noting that for the uniform distribution:
u′(yB) = βRLEu′(y1) (B.1)
= βRL
ymax∫
ymin
u′(y1)dΨy1 (B.2)
=
βRL
ymax − ymin
ymax∫
ymin
u′(y1)dy1 (B.3)
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Then taking the derivative with respect to ymax using Leibniz Rule to
differentiate under the integral sign:
∂yB
∂ymax
u′′(yB) =
−βRL
(ymax − ymin)2
ymax∫
ymin
u′(y1)dy1 +
βRL
ymax − yminu
′(ymax) (B.4)
Now, u′′(yB) < 0∀yB the problem is to prove that the LHS is negative
which can be achieved by concavity of u:
βRL
(ymax − ymin)2
ymax∫
ymin
u′(y1)dy1 >
βRL
ymax − yminu
′(ymax) (B.5)
u(ymax)− u(ymin) > [ymax − ymin]u′(ymax) (B.6)
htb
Properties of l0
Lemma 4.4.1. Optimal borrowing for a given household is decreasing in y0
Proof. Taking the derivative of equation (4.37) with respect to y0 yields:
u′′(y0 + l∗)[1 +
∂l∗
∂y0
] = −βR2LE0u′′(y1 −RLl∗)
∂l∗
∂y0
(B.7)
Then solving for ∂l
∗
∂y0
yields:
∂l∗
∂y0
= − u
′′(y0 + l∗)
u′′(y0 + l∗) + βR2LE0u′′(y1 −RLl∗)
(B.8)
Then noting u′′(c) < 0 ∀ c the derivative is negative and so l∗ is strictly
decreasing in y0.
Corollary 4.4.2. | ∂l∗
∂y0
| < 1
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Proof. Noting that βRL > 1 the result follows directly from equation. B.8.
Lemma 4.4.3. Optimal borrowing for a given household is increasing in ymax
Proof. Follows directly as per Proof of Corollary B.1.2. Nothing that the
derivative of l0 with respect to ymax is:
∂l∗ND
∂ymax
=
βRL[u(ymin −RLl∗)− u(ymax −RLl∗) + ((ymax − ymin))u′(ymax −RLl∗)]
(ymax − ymin){(ymax − ymin)u′′(y0 + l∗) + βR2L[u′(ymax −RLl∗)− u′(ymin −RLl∗)]}
(B.9)
The denominator is clearly negative as u′′ < 0 and u′(ymax − RLl∗) <
u′(ymin − RLl∗) and so the proof requires that the square brackets on the
numerator is also negative, that is:
u(ymin −RLl∗) + ((ymax − ymin))u′(ymax −RLl∗) < u(ymax −RLl∗) (B.10)
This result must then be true by concavity of u.
Default
Lemma 4.4.4. The amount borrowed by a consumer is higher when defaults
are permitted.
Proof. The general first order condition is then:
u′(y0 + l∗) = βRL
ymax∫
ymin
[u′(y1 −RLl∗)]dΨy1 (B.11)
The two cases are then (i) no defaults with loan size l∗ND iff ∀ y1 ∈
[ymin, ymax], y1 − RLl∗ND ≥ c¯ and (ii) possibility of defaults with loan size
l∗D iff ∃ y1 ∈ [ymin, ymax] s.t. y1 −RLl∗D < c¯ with first order conditions:
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u′(y0 + l∗ND) = βRL
ymax∫
ymin
[u′(y1 −RLl∗ND)]dΨy (B.12)
=
βRL
ymax − ymin [u(ymax −RLl
∗
ND)− u(yymin −RLl∗ND)] (B.13)
u′(y0 + l∗D) = βRL[u
′(c¯)
RLl
∗
D+c¯∫
ymin
dΨy1 +
ymax∫
RLl
∗
D+c¯
[u′(y1 −RLl∗D)]dΨy] (B.14)
=
βRL
ymax − ymin [u
′(c¯)(RLl∗D + c¯− ymin) + u(ymax −RLl∗D)− u(c¯)](B.15)
Now if the lemma is true and l∗D > l
∗
ND∀y0 < yD then by strict concavity
of u and assuming ymin −RLl∗D 6= c¯ we have :
u(c¯) + u′(c¯).(ymin −RLl∗D − c¯ > u(ymin −RLl∗D) (B.16)
Then by B.15 we have:
u′(y0 + l∗D) <
βRL
ymax − ymin [u(ymax −RLl
∗
D)− u(ymin −RLl∗D)] (B.17)
Subtracting from B.14 and rearranging yields:
u′(y0 + l∗ND)−
βRL
ymax − ymin [u(ymax −RLl
∗
ND)− u(ymin −RLl∗ND)] <(B.18)
u′(y0 + l∗D)−
βRL
ymax − ymin [u(ymax −RLl
∗
D)− u(ymin −RLl∗D)] (B.19)
Now define g(x) as: Subtracting from B.14 and rearranging yields:
g(x) ≡ u′(y0 + x)− βRL
ymax − ymin [u(ymax −RLx)− u(ymin −RLx)] (B.20)
Then by B.19 we have g(l∗ND) > g(l
∗
D) which implies l
∗
D < l
∗
ND because
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g(x) is decreasing in x, not the derivative:
g′(x) = u′′(y0 + x)− βR
2
L
ymax − ymin [u
′(ymax −RLx)− u′(ymin −RLx)] (B.21)
< 0 (B.22)
Lemma 4.4.5. The level of borrowing l∗D is increasing in ymax.
Proof. Taking the derivative of 4.40 and applying Leibniz Rule to differenti-
ate under the integral taking into account the limits:
u′′(y0 + l∗D)
∂l∗D
∂ymax
= βRL[
RL
ymax − ymin
∂l∗D
∂ymax
u′(c¯)− (RLl
∗
D + c¯− ymin)
(ymax − ymin)2 u
′(c¯)
− RL
ymax − ymin
ymax∫
RLl
∗
D+c¯
u′′(y1 −RLl∗D)
∂l∗D
∂ymax
dy1
+
1
ymax − yminu
′(ymax −RLl∗D)−
RL
ymax − ymin
∂l∗D
∂ymax
u′(c¯)
− 1
(ymax − ymin)2
ymax∫
RLl
∗
D+c¯
[u′(y1 −RLl∗D)]dy1]
u′′(y0 + l∗D)
∂l∗D
∂ymax
=
βRL
(ymax − ymin)2 [−(RLl
∗
D + c¯− ymin)u′(c¯)
−(ymax − ymin)RL
ymax∫
RLl
∗
D+c¯
u′′(y1 −RLl∗D)
∂l∗D
∂ymax
dy1
+(ymax − ymin)u′(ymax +RLl∗D)−
ymax∫
RLl
∗
D+c¯
[u′(y1 −RLl∗D)]dy1]
(ymax − ymin) ∂l
∗
D
∂ymax
=
βRL[−(RLl∗D + c¯− ymin)u′(c¯) + (ymax − ymin)u′(ymax −RLl∗D)−
ymax∫
RLl
∗
D+c¯
[u′(y1 −RLl∗D)]dy1]
(ymax − ymin)u′′(y0 + l∗D) + βR2L
ymax∫
RLl
∗
D+c¯
u′′(y1 −RLl∗D)dy1
(B.23)
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Clearly the denominator of this fraction is negative and therefore in order
fro the derivative to be positive the numerator must also be negative. If this
is the case then it must follow that:
−(RLl∗D + c¯− ymin)u′(c¯) + (ymax − ymin)u′(ymax −RLl∗D) <
ymax∫
RLl
∗
D+c¯
[u′(y1 −RLl∗D)]dy1 (B.24)
Integrating:
u(c¯) + (ymax − ymin)u′(ymax −RLl∗D) < u(ymax −RLl∗D) + (RLl∗D + c¯− ymin)u′(c¯)(B.25)
Now noting that u(c¯) < u(ymax − RLlmaxD ) ∀ l∗D the inequality must hold
for maximum borrowing given that RLl
∗
D + c¯ = ymax because::
(ymax − ymin)u′(ymax −RLl∗D) < (RLl∗D + c¯− ymin)u′(c¯) (B.26)
However for the minimum borrowing potential default state we have that
RLl
min
D + c¯ = ymin which gives:
u(c¯) + (ymax − ymin)u′(ymax −RLl∗D) < u(ymax −RLl∗D) (B.27)
This result must then hold by concavity of u.
Lemma 4.4.6. There exists a threshold yD ≤ yB below which households
borrow allowing for the possibility of default and above which they will never
default.
Proof. A consumer will never default if their debts are such that they can
repay them even if they receive the minimum income in period 1. That is if
c¯ ≤ y1 −RLl∗ ∀ y1. This would imply that:
lD ≤ ymin − c¯
RL
(B.28)
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The level of income for which this is the optimal response is then given
by:
u′(yD + lD) = βRLE0u′(y1 −RLlD)
u′(yD +
ymin − c¯
RL
) = βRLE0u
′(y1 − ymin + c¯) (B.29)
The value of yD is therefore uniquely defined. Then noting that ymin ≤ c¯
we have:
E0u
′(y1 − ymin + c¯) ≥ E0u′(y1) (B.30)
And so:
u′(yD +
ymin − c¯
RL
) ≥ u′(yB) (B.31)
Then by convexity of u′:
yD +
ymin − c¯
RL
≤ yB (B.32)
yD ≤ yB − ymin − c¯
RL
(B.33)
And again noting ymin ≤ c¯ it follows that yD ≤ yB. Therefore ∀y0 ≤ yD a
consumer may default and ∀yD < y0 ≤ yB a consumer will borrow but never
default.
B.2 Banks
Lemma 4.5.1. For a given interest rate RL the aggregate demand for bor-
rowing is increasing in ymax if incomes are uniformly distributed .
Proof. Clearly for a given distribution [ymin, ymax] an increase in ymax rep-
resents an increase in E(y1). Therefore by Corollary 4.4.1 we note l
∗
0 is
increasing in ymax. Also noting that by Corollary B.1.2 H
− is expanding,
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in other words the upper bound on the integral is increasing. Therefore the
integrand and limits of the integral in equation (4.41) are increasing in ymax
and so L0 is increasing in ymax.
B.3 Two Period Algorithms
B.3.1 Solving the Policy Function
Each of the three first order conditions must be solved for each value of y0:
u′(y0 + lND) = βRL
ymax∫
ymin
u′(y1 −RLlND)dΨ(y1) (B.34)
u′(y0 + lD) = βRL
ymax∫
ymin
u′(max(c¯, y1 −RLlD))dΨ(y1) (B.35)
u′(y0 − d0) = βRD
ymax∫
ymin
u′(y1 +RDd0)dΨ(y1) (B.36)
Then calculating the integrals yields:
u′(y0 + lND) = βRL
1
ymax − ymin [u(ymax −RLlND)− u(ymin −RLlND)] (B.37)
u′(y0 + lD) = βRL
1
ymax − ymin [
RLlD+c¯∫
ymin
u′(c¯)dy1 +
ymax∫
RLlD+c¯
u′(y1 −RLlD)dy1]
= βRL
1
ymax − ymin [u
′(c¯)(RLlD + c¯− ymin) + u(ymax)− u(c¯)](B.38)
u′(y0 − d0) = βRD 1
ymax − ymin [u(ymax +RDd0)− u(ymin +RDd0)] (B.39)
Clearly, in all three cases the solutions are likely to be transcendental, as
shown below even in the case of Quadratic Utility the solution to the possi-
ble default equation is very complicated and requires a numerical solution.
Then define three new functions as the deviation from the solutions of these
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equations:
FLND = u
′(y0 + lND)− βRL 1
ymax − ymin [u(ymax −RLlND)− u(ymin −RLlND)] (B.40)
FLD = u
′(y0 + lD)− βRL 1
ymax − ymin [u
′(c¯)(RLlD + c¯− ymin) + u(ymax)− u(c¯)](B.41)
FD = u
′(y0 − d0)− βRD 1
ymax − ymin [u(ymax +RDd0)− u(ymin +RDd0)] (B.42)
The solutions are then the zeros of the equations B.40 to B.42, applying
the Newton-Raphson method the general iteration in all cases is:
xk+1 = xk − f(xk)
f ′(xk)
(B.43)
It is also useful to note that in each case we can specify the range of the
decision variable robustly, you cannot borrow more than the implied limit and
you cannot save more than your current income. In the implimention fuctions
are created which return the decision variable for a given y0 to allow for
exact integration. For the sake of robustness against failure of N-R method
a secondary Secant Method is applied if N-R converges to value which is not
a root. Thus each value of y0 gives a rise to a value of lND, lD and d0.
Integrals
For the aggregate values we require the integrals of lD, lD l
2
ND, l
2
D and d0.
Within the literature it is common to discretise the space and apply Simp-
son’s Rule to calculate the integral, however, this method is only accurate un-
der very restrictive regularity conditions. The most robust method would be
using an Adaptive Simpsons (quadrature) method, in this method the space
is discretised as in Simpsons Rule and then each dicretised unit is subdivided
repeatedly until an exact area is calculated. In general, the reduction of the
size of the discretised units is done linearly and this is potentially very com-
putationally expensive, one can specify a maximum recurrence depth but in
general the number of computations required for a desired level of accuracy
in unknown. Therefore, we will employ a Double Exponential Method, in
principle this method exploits knowledge about the function to significantly
increase convergence.
First, the variable to be integrated is transformed such that we have an
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integral over the entire real line, using:
x = tanh(
1
2
pi sinh t) (B.44)
Then the integral is given by:
1∫
−1
f(x)dx ≈
∞∑
k=−∞
wkf(xk) (B.45)
Where the abscissas and weights are given by:
xk = tanh(
1
2
pi sinh(kh)) (B.46)
wk =
1
2
hpi cosh(kh)
cosh2(1
2
pisinh(kh))
(B.47)
These abscissas functions are not calculated in the process but are rather
stored as constants within the code to maximise computational efficiency.
So, where as a general quadrature reduces the height of sections, linearly
this method reduces as a double exponential function. It is important to note
that this method only converges if the function being integrated is analytic.
This is true almost surely between the appropriate limits however within the
calculations it is important to check for any possible discontinuities.
Multidimensional Newtons Method
The first attempt at a solution to the overall problem will use a Vector
Newton method, effectively path of steepest decent from a given starting
point. For a given vector valued function Z = f(P) = f(x, y) we define the
Jacobian as:
J(X) =
(
∂f1(x,y)
∂x
∂f1(x,y)
∂y
∂f2(x,y)
∂x
∂f2(x,y)
∂y
)
(B.48)
The root of the system is then given by iterating:
Appendix B. Two Period Model Appendices 118
Pi+1 = Pi − (J(Pi))−1f(Pi) (B.49)
As the system is non-linear a smoothing technique is used, such that:
Pi+1 = Pi − 0.75√
i+ 1
(Ji(Pi))
−1f(Pi) (B.50)
Ji+1 = Ji +
0.999√
i+ 1
J¯i+1 (B.51)
Where J¯i+1 is the finite element approximation of the gradient at Pi.
This smoothing improves the convergence behaviour of the algorithm at the
cost of rate of convergence. However, the more robust behaviour far out ways
the computational cost Press et al. (2007, pp. 477).
So to solve the model we are looking for the point P = {RD, RL} for
which Z = {0, 0} in the code presented the two components of Z are tabled
P and Q.
Shuﬄed Complex Evolution
Shuﬄed Complex Evolution is a hybrid genetic algorithm Duan et al. (1993),
the method combines the following concepts:
• Probabilistic and deterministic approach
• Clustering
• Systematic Evolution of complex of points spanning the space
• Competitive Evolution
The principle of the algorithm is to begin with a set of points spanning
the feasible space, the low points of this set are used to generate clusters of
new points until a global minimum is found. The algorithm is outlines below,
adapted from Duan et al. (1993):
1. Create Population:Using a uniform distribution and for each point
RD, RL calculate the value of F for each point.
2. Sort the points in increasing order of F
3. Partition the population into complexes
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4. Evolve Complexes
5. Shuﬄe complexes
6. Check fo Convergence
The Competitive Complex Evolution step involves the random selection
of a subset of points, weighted such that lowest F values are more likely,
and a series of transformations of these points which attempts to find a new
minimum. The transformations attempted are as follows:
1. Reflection across the high point (By a factor of -1)
2. Further Reflection (By a factor of -2)
3. One Dimensional Contraction (By a factor of -0.5)
4. Contraction about the lowest point
The transformations are attempted in order and the best result trans-
ferred back to the complex, the complex is evolved several times until being
replaced into the population. In this way, the space is explored as fully as
possible. A detailed set of code is given in the appendix along with comments
explaining each step. Convergence is deemed to have occurred if either of
following are met:
1. The difference between the best and worst function is less than a given
tolerance
2. The change in points i less than a given tolerance
B.4 Two Period Code
B.4.1 Utility
The Utility base class holds up to two parameters, a and b, and virtual func-
tions for Utility, First and Second Derivatives and the inverse first derivative.
1 c l a s s Ut i l i t y{
2 pub l i c :
3 Ut i l i t y(doub l e A, doub l e B){
4 a=A;
5 b=B;
6 }
7 Ut i l i t y ( ) { }
8 v i r tua l doub l e U(doub l e c) { r e turn 0 . 0 ; }
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9 v i r tua l doub l e Ud i f f i nv(doub l e c) { r e turn 0 . 0 ; }
10 v i r tua l doub l e Ud i f f ( doub l e c) { r e turn 0 . 0 ; }
11 v i r tua l doub l e Ud i f f 2 ( doub l e c) { r e turn 0 . 0 ; }
12
13 doub l e a ;
14 doub l e b ;
15 } ;
There are then two versions of the derived class for Log and CRRA:
1 c l a s s CRRA: pub l i c Ut i l i t y{
2 pub l i c :
3 CRRA(doub l e A, doub l e B) :Ut i l i t y(A,B){
4 }
5 doub l e U(doub l e c)
6 {
7 doub l e u ;
8 i f ( c <=0)
9 { u = −99999999999.999+ c∗999999 ;
10 }e l s e{
11 u=pow(c ,(1− a) ) /(1−a) ;
12 }
13 r e turn u ;
14 }
15 doub l e Ud i f f i nv(doub l e c)
16 {
17 doub l e ud i f f i n v ;
18 i f ( c<=0){
19 ud i f f i nv = −99999999999.999+ c∗999999 ;
20 }e l s e{
21 ud i f f i nv=pow( c ,(1/(−1.0∗ a) ) ) ;
22 }
23 r e turn ud i f f i n v ;
24 }
25 doub l e Ud i f f ( doub l e c)
26 {
27 doub l e ud i f f ;
28 i f ( c<=0){
29 ud i f f = 99999999999.999− c∗999999 ;
30 }e l s e{
31 ud i f f=pow(c ,(−1.0∗ a) ) ;
32 }
33 r e turn ud i f f ;
34 }
35 doub l e Ud i f f 2 ( doub l e c)
36 {
37 doub l e ud i f f 2 ;
38 i f ( c<=0){
39 ud i f f 2 = −99999999999.999+ c∗999999 ;
40 }e l s e{
41 ud i f f2=−1.0∗ a∗(pow(c ,(−1.0∗ a−1.0) ) ) ;
42 }
43 r e turn ud i f f 2 ;
44 }
45 } ;
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46
47 c l a s s LOG: pub l i c Ut i l i t y{
48 pub l i c :
49 LOG(doub l e A, doub l e B) :Ut i l i t y(A,B){
50 }
51 doub l e U(doub l e c)
52 {
53 doub l e u ;
54 i f ( c <=0)
55 {
56 u = −9999999.99999999;
57 }e l s e{
58 u=l o g( c) ;
59 }
60 r e turn u ;
61 }
62 doub l e Ud i f f i nv(doub l e c)
63 {
64 doub l e ud i f f i n v ;
65 i f ( c<=0){
66 ud i f f i nv = 99999999999.999+ c∗999999 ;
67 }e l s e{
68 ud i f f i nv=1.0/ c ;
69 }
70 r e turn ud i f f i n v ;
71 }
72 doub l e Ud i f f ( doub l e c)
73 {
74 doub l e ud i f f ;
75 i f ( c<=0){
76 ud i f f = 99999999999.999− c∗999999 ;
77 }e l s e{
78 ud i f f=1.0/ c ;
79 }
80 r e turn ud i f f ;
81 }
82 doub l e Ud i f f 2 ( doub l e c)
83 {
84 r e turn −1.0/( c∗ c) ;
85 }
86 } ;
B.4.2 First Order Conditions
First define the base class for the generic first order condition containing
appropriate data members:
1
2 c l a s s FOC{
3 pr o t e c t e d :
4
5 //
6 //Pa r ame t e r s
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7 //
8
9 doub l e y0 ;
10 doub l e RF;
11 doub l e RL;
12 doub l e RD;
13 doub l e yma x ;
14 doub l e ymi n ;
15 doub l e c ;
16 doub l e be t a ;
17 Ut i l i t y &Ut ;
18
19 //
20 //Tr ans f o rm r e su l t t o ge t r i d o f I n f i n i t y and NANs
21 //
22 doub l e No tNAN(doub l e W)
23 {
24 boo l Va l=1;
25 doub l e ad j=0 .01 ;
26 doub l e R [ 2 ] ;
27 i n t x=0;
28 doub l e RET;
29 i f (y0<W){
30 R[0]= th i s−>va l u e( y0∗0 .999) ;
31 R[1]= th i s−>va l u e( y0∗0 .998) ;
32 // cout << ‘ ‘1: ‘ ‘ << R[0 ] <<‘‘\ t” << R[1 ] << end l ;
33 RET= R[0]+(( R[1]−R[0 ] ) /0 .001) ∗(y0−W);
34 }e l s e i f ( ymax+RF∗W<0){
35 R[0]= th i s−>va l ue(−0.999∗ymi n/RF) ;
36 R[1]= th i s−>va l ue(−0.998∗ymi n/RF) ;
37 // cout << ‘ ‘2: ‘ ‘ << R[0 ] <<‘‘\ t” << R[1 ] << end l ;
38 RET= R[0]−(( R[1]−R[0 ] ) /0 .001) ∗(y0−W);
39 }e l s e{
40 R[0]= th i s−>va l ue(−0.999∗ymi n/RF) ;
41 R[1]= th i s−>va l ue(−0.998∗ymi n/RF) ;
42 // cout << ‘ ‘3: ‘ ‘ << R[0 ] <<‘‘\ t” << R[1 ] << end l ;
43 RET= R[0]−(( R[1]−R[0 ] ) /0 .001) ∗(y0−W);
44 }
45 i f (RET!=RET){
46 // cout <<‘‘ f aaa i i i l l l l l ” << end l ;
47 RET = 999999999999 .99 ;
48 }e l s e i f (RET>DBL MAX){
49 RET = DBL MAX−1.0;
50 }e l s e i f (RET<−DBL MAX){
51 RET = −DBL MAX+1.0;
52 }
53 // cout <<‘‘RET NAN:‘‘<< RET <<‘‘ a t : ‘ ‘ << th i s−> i d() << end l ;
54 r e turn RET;
55
56 }
57 doub l e No tNANDF(doub l e W)
58 {
59 boo l Va l=1;
60 doub l e ad j=0 .01 ;
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61 doub l e R [ 2 ] ;
62 i n t x=0;
63 doub l e RET;
64 i f (y0<W){
65 R[0]= th i s−>va l ue d f ( y0∗0 .999) ;
66 R[1]= th i s−>va l ue d f ( y0∗0 .998) ;
67 RET = R[0]+(( R[1]−R[0 ] ) /0 .001) ∗(y0−W);
68 }e l s e i f ( ymax+RF∗W<0){
69 R[0]= th i s−>va l ue d f(−0.999∗ymi n/RF) ;
70 R[1]= th i s−>va l ue d f(−0.998∗ymi n/RF) ;
71 RET = R[0]+(( R[1]−R[0 ] ) /0 .001) ∗(y0−W);
72 }e l s e{
73 R[0]= th i s−>va l ue d f(−0.999∗ymi n/RF) ;
74 R[1]= th i s−>va l ue d f(−0.998∗ymi n/RF) ;
75 RET = R[0]+(( R[1]−R[0 ] ) /0 .001) ∗(y0−W);
76 }
77
78 i f (RET!=RET){
79 // cout <<‘‘dea t h” << end l ;
80 RET = −999999999999.99;
81 }e l s e i f (RET>DBL MAX){
82 RET = DBL MAX−1.0;
83 }e l s e i f (RET<−DBL MAX){
84 RET = −DBL MAX+1.0;
85 }
86 r e turn RET;
87 }
88 pub l i c :
89 //
90 // I n i t i a l i s e r out i ne s
91 //
92 FOC(Ut i l i t y &u) :Ut ( u) {}
93 FOC(doub l e Y0, doub l e r l , doub l e r d , doub l e Yma x , doub l e Ymi n ,
doub l e C, doub l e Be t a , Ut i l i t y &u) :Ut ( u)
94 {
95 y0=Y0;
96 RL=r l ;
97 RD=r d;
98 ymax=Yma x ;
99 ymin=Ymi n;
100 c=C;
101 be ta=Be t a ;
102
103 }
104
105 //
106 // Vi r tua l Func t i ons t o be ove r r i dden by spe c i f i c imp l ement a t i
ons
107 //
108 v i r tua l doub l e dY(){ r e turn (0 ) ; }
109
110 v i r tua l doub l e va l u e( doub l e W){ r e turn (0 ) ; }
111
112 v i r tua l doub l e va l ue d f ( doub l e W){ r e turn (0 ) ; }
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113
114 v i r tua l i n t i d() { r e turn (0 ) ; }
115
116 //
117 //Ope r a t o r s
118 //
119
120 doub l e d f ( doub l e W){
121 doub l e RET=va l ue d f (W);
122 i f ( (RET!=RET) | | ( RET>DBL MAX) | | ( RET<−DBL MAX)) {
123 r e turn No tNANDF(W);
124 }e l s e{
125 r e turn RET;
126 }
127 }
128
129 v i r tua l doub l e ope r a t o r ( ) (doub l e W){
130 doub l e RET=th i s−>va l u e(W);
131 // cout << th i s−> i d() <<‘‘\ t” << W <<‘‘\ t” << RET << end l ;
132 i f ( (RET!=RET) | | ( RET>DBL MAX) | | ( RET<−DBL MAX)) {
133 r e turn No tNAN(W);
134 }e l s e{
135 r e turn RET;
136 }
137 }
138
139 //Ensur e De s t ruc t o r i s co r r e c t l y ca l l ed
140 v i r tua l ˜FOC(){}
141 } ;
Each First Order Condition contains a parameter set and reference to
a utility function, the function id is used for robustness testing. The three
version of the function then return the evaluation [operator()] and derivative
[df] of the function at W for the three equations B.40 to B.42.The operator ()
actually calls the routine value which is overloaded depending on the specific
type of FOC in use. If the result of this operator is infinite or undefined the
routine calls NotNAN (or NotNANDF) which extrapolates continuously to
ensure Newton-Raphson convergence.
The three specific first order conditions are then:
1 c l a s s F l D: pub l i c FOC
2 {
3 pub l i c :
4 F lD (doub l e Y0, doub l e r l , doub l e r d , doub l e Yma x , doub l e Ymi
n , doub l e C, doub l e Be t a , Ut i l i t y &u) :FOC( Y0, r l , r d , Yma
x , Ymi n , C, Be t a , u){RF=r l ; }
5
6 doub l e va l u e( doub l e W){
7 r e turn Ut .Ud i f f ( y0−W)−be t a∗RL∗(1/(ymax−ymi n) ) ∗ ( (Ut .Ud i f f ( c ) )
∗(−1.0∗RL∗W+c−ymi n)+(Ut . U(ymax+RL∗W))−(Ut . U( c) ) ) ;
8 }
9
10 doub l e va l ue d f ( doub l e W){
Appendix B. Two Period Model Appendices 125
11 r e turn −1.0∗(Ut .Ud i f f 2 ( ( y0−W)) )−be t a∗RL∗(1/(ymax−ymi n) )
∗(−1.0∗RL∗(Ut .Ud i f f ( c ) )+RL∗(Ut .Ud i f f ( ymax+RL∗W)) ) ;
12 }
13
14 i nt i d() {
15 r e turn −1;
16 }
17 } ;
18
19 c l a s s F lND: pub l i c FOC
20 {
21 pub l i c :
22 F lND (doub l e Y0, doub l e r l , doub l e r d , doub l e Yma x , doub l e Ymi
n , doub l e C, doub l e Be t a ,Ut i l i t y &u) :FOC( Y0, r l , r d , Yma
x , Ymi n , C, Be t a , u){RF=r l ; }
23
24 doub l e va l u e( doub l e W){
25 r e turn (Ut .Ud i f f ( ( y0−W)) )−be t a∗RL∗(1/(ymax−ymi n) ) ∗ ( (Ut . U(yma
x+RL∗W))−(Ut . U(ymin+RL∗W)) ) ;
26 }
27
28 doub l e va l ue d f ( doub l e W){
29 r e turn −1∗(Ut .Ud i f f 2 ( ( y0−W)) )−be t a∗RL∗(1/(ymax−ymi n) ) ∗RL∗((U
t .Ud i f f ( ymax+RL∗W))−(Ut .Ud i f f ( ymin+RL∗W)) ) ;
30 }
31 i nt i d() {
32 r e turn −2;
33 }
34 } ;
35
36 c l a s s Fd : pub l i c FOC
37 {
38 pub l i c :
39 Fd (doub l e Y0, doub l e r l , doub l e r d , doub l e Yma x , doub l e Ymi n ,
doub l e C, doub l e Be t a , Ut i l i t y &u) :FOC( Y0, r l , r d , Yma x ,
Ymi n , C, Be t a , u){RF=r d;}
40
41 doub l e va l ue (doub l e W){
42 r e turn (Ut .Ud i f f ( ( y0−W)) )−be t a∗RD∗(1/(ymax−ymi n) ) ∗ ( (Ut . U(yma
x+RD∗W))−(Ut . U(ymin+RD∗W)) ) ;
43 }
44
45 doub l e va l ue d f ( doub l e W){
46 r e turn −1∗(Ut .Ud i f f 2 ( ( y0−W)) )−be t a∗RD∗(1/(ymax−ymi n) ) ∗RD∗((U
t .Ud i f f ( ymax+RD∗W))−(Ut .Ud i f f ( ymin+RD∗W)) ) ;
47 }
48 i nt i d() {
49 r e turn −3;
50 }
51 } ;
Each FOC overloads the pure virtual functions value and valuedf .
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B.4.3 General W Function
The General W function takes the same parameters as the First Order Con-
dition functions but using the input Y0 generates the optimal response W
taking in to account which of the three FOC’s applies. Note that when a
Wopt object is created using the FOC parameter set it generates the three
Y0 cut off points: YB, YS, and YD0 using the function FindZeros. When the
Wopt object is passed the value Y0 it returns to the solution for the relevant
FOC, for each evaluation the function checks for the feasibility and returns
an extreme value.
1 c l a s s Wop t : pub l i c FOC
2 {
3 pub l i c :
4 //
5 //Pl ac e Ho l de r s f o r Y0 L imi t s e t c
6 //
7 doub l e YB;
8 doub l e YS;
9 doub l e YD0;
10 doub l e L1;
11
12 //
13 //Cons t ruc t o r ca l cu l a t e s Y0 L imi t s
14 //
15 Wopt (doub l e r l , doub l e r d , doub l e Yma x , doub l e Ymi n , doub l e
C, doub l e Be t a , Ut i l i t y &u) :FOC( 0 . 0 , r l , r d , Yma x , Ymi n ,
C, Be t a , u){
16 F i ndZe r o s ( ) ;
17 L1=−9999999;
18 }
19
20 //
21 //Take s an I nput Y0 and g i ve s the opt ima l Output W
22 //
23 doub l e ope r a t o r ( ) (doub l e Y0){
24 doub l e RES;
25 doub l e w=−1;
26 doub l e l b , u b ;
27 doub l e xac c = FUNTOL;
28 FOC∗ f ;
29 doub l e DY = 1 . 0 / ( ymax−ymi n) ;
30 i n t j i c=0;
31
32 //de c i de wha t t ype o f consume r th i s i s
33
34 i f (Y0 < YB){
35 l b=−((ymax−c) /RL) ; //Max Bo r r owi ng equa l s max consu
me r cou l d r epay
36 ub=0.0; //As Y0 < YB we know W<0;
37 i f (Y0<YD0){ // Che ck i s consume r may de f au l t
38 f= new Fl D(Y0, RL , RD, yma x , ymi n , c , be t a ,Ut ) ; //As s i g
n De f au l t FOC
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39 j i c=1;
40 }e l s e{
41 f= new FlND(Y0, RL , RD, yma x , ymi n , c , be t a , Ut ) ; //A
s s i gn NO De f au l t FOC
42 j i c=2;
43 }
44 }e l s e i f (Y0 > YS){ // I s Consume r i s Save r?
45 l b=0.0; //As Y0 ?> YS we know W>0;
46 ub=Y0∗0.9999999; //As s i gn max c l o s e t o a l l endowmen
t , no t equa l a s th i s wou l d caus e c=0
47 f= new Fd( Y0, RL , RD, yma x , ymi n , c , be t a , Ut ) ; //As s i gn
Depo s i t o r FOC
48 j i c=3;
49 }e l s e{
50 r e turn 0 . 0 ; //No t bo r r owe r o r s ave r then do no th i ng
51 }
52
53 doub l e t e s t h , t e s t l ;
54 doub l e t e s td f ;
55
56 // f i nd de c i s i on ru l e
57 i f ( j i c>0){
58 w=r t s a f e ( f , l b ,ub ,xac c) ; //Ca l l the r obus t Newt on−Raphs on M
e thod
59 RES=DY∗w;
60 // s e e i f we have a co rne r s o l u t i on
61 i f ( w==999.99) // I f N−R Fa i l s we may have a co rne r s o l u t i o
n
62 {
63 t e s th = f−>ope r a t o r ( ) (ub) ;
64 t e s t l = f−>ope r a t o r ( ) ( l b) ;
65 t e s tdf= f−>d f ( l b) ;
66 swi t ch ( j i c )
67 {
68 ca s e 1 :
69 i f ( ( ( t e s th<0)&&(t e s tdf<0) ) | | ( ( t e s th>0)&&(t e s tdf>0) ) ) {
70 RES= DY∗ l b ;
71 br ea k ;
72 }e l s e{
73 de l e t e f ;
74 f= new FlND(Y0, RL , RD, yma x , ymi n , c , be t a , Ut ) ;
75 w=r t s a f e ( f , l b ,ub ,xac c) ;
76 RES=w;
77 br ea k ;
78 }
79
80 ca s e 2 :
81 i f ( ( ( t e s t l<0)&&(t e s tdf<0) ) | | ( ( t e s t l>0)&&(t e s tdf>0) ) ) {
82 RES= DY∗ l b ;
83 br ea k ;
84 }e l s e{
85 RES= 0 . 0 ;
86 br ea k ;
87 }
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88
89 ca s e 3 :
90 i f ( ( ( t e s th>0)&&(t e s tdf<0) ) | | ( ( t e s th<0)&&(t e s tdf>0) ) ) {
91 RES= DY∗Y0;
92 br ea k ;
93 }e l s e{
94 RES= 0 . 0 ;
95 br ea k ;
96 }
97 de f au l t :
98 cout <<‘‘ s omth i ng ve r y wr on g ! ” << end l ;
99 RES= 0 . 0 ;
100 br ea k ;
101 }
102 }
103 }e l s e{
104 RES= 0 . 0 ;
105 }
106 //Make Sur e Re s ex i s t s
107 i f (RES!=RES){
108 cout <<‘‘ f aaa i i i l l l l l ” << end l ;
109 }e l s e i f (RES>DBL MAX){
110 RES = DBL MAX∗0.9 ;
111 }e l s e i f (RES<−DBL MAX){
112 RES = −DBL MAX∗0.9 ;
113 }
114 de l e t e f ;
115 r e turn RES;
116 }
117
118 doub l e dY()
119 {
120 r e turn ymax−ymi n ;
121 }
122
123 doub l e TEST() { r e turn YB;}
124
125 //
126 // Ca l cu l a t e Agg r ega t e I nt eg r a l s
127 //
128
129 v i r tua l doub l e D(){
130 doub l e d=DEI nt eg r a t or<Wopt> : : I n t eg r a t e(∗ th i s ,YS ,yma x ,QuadTo
l ) ;
131 r e turn d ;
132 }
133
134 v i r tua l doub l e L(){
135 doub l e l ;
136 doub l e l b ;
137 i f (L1==−9999999){
138 L1= DEI nt eg r a t or<Wopt> : : I n t eg r a t e(∗ th i s , ymi n ,YD0,QuadTo l ) ;
139 }
140
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141 i f (YB>YD0){
142 lb=DEI nt eg r a t or<Wopt> : : I n t eg r a t e(∗ th i s ,YD0, YB,QuadTo l ) ;
143 l = L1+l b ;
144 }e l s e{
145 l = L1;
146 }
147 r e turn l ;
148 }
149
150 v i r tua l doub l e L1 ( ) {
151 i f (L1==−9999999){
152 L1= DEI nt eg r a t or<Wopt> : : I n t eg r a t e(∗ th i s , ymi n ,YD0,QuadTo l ) ;
153 }
154 r e turn L1;
155 }
156
157 v i r tua l doub l e L2 ( ) {
158 Wopt2 W2(∗th i s ) ;
159 doub l e l2=DEI nt eg r a t or<Wopt2> : : I n t eg r a t e(W2,ymi n , YD0,QuadTo
l ) ;
160 r e turn l 2 ;
161 }
162
163 pr i va t e :
164 i nt F i ndZe r o s ( )
165 {
166 i f ( (RD<1.0) | | ( RL<1.0) | | ( RL!=RL) | | ( RD!=RD))
167 cout << RD <<‘‘\ t ” << RL << end l ;
168 doub l e EU1=(1/(ymax−ymi n) ) ∗(Ut . U(yma x)−Ut . U(ymi n) ) ;
169 YB=Ut .Ud i f f i nv(be t a∗RL∗EU1) ;
170 YS=Ut .Ud i f f i nv(be t a∗RD∗EU1) ;
171 doub l e lD=(ymin−c) /RL;
172 doub l e EU2=(1/(ymax−ymi n) ) ∗(Ut . U(ymax−RL∗ l D)−Ut . U(ymin−RL∗ l
D)) ;
173 YD0 = Ut .Ud i f f i nv(be t a∗RL∗EU2)− l D;
174 i f (YD0<ymi n){ YD0=ymi n;}
175 i f ( ymax<YB){
176 YB=yma x ;
177 YS=yma x ;
178 YD0=yma x ;
179 }
180 i f (YD0>YB){
181 YD0=YB;
182 }
183 r e turn 0 ;
184 } ;
185
186 } ;
B.4.4 Newtons Method Implementation
A Robust Newtons method is implemented, it checks the root is bounded and
then applies the method discussed in the main text. However, as the method
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does not necessarily converge a backup Secant method is implemented.
1 t emp l a t e <c l a s s T>
2 doub l e r t s a f e ( T &f unc d , cons t doub l e x1 , cons t doub l e x2 , cons t
doub l e xac c) {
3 doub l e xh , x l ;
4 doub l e f l= f uncd−>ope r a t o r ( ) ( x1) ;
5 doub l e fh=f uncd−>ope r a t o r ( ) ( x2) ;
6 doub l e fmi d , xmi d , fmi do , xmi d o ;
7 fmi do=999999999;
8 xmi do=999999999;
9 i f ( ( f l>0.0 && f h>0.0) | | ( f l<0.0 && f h<0.0) ) {
10 r e turn 9 9 9 . 9 9 ;
11 }
12 i f ( f l==0.0) r e turn x1 ;
13 i f ( f h==0.0) r e turn x2 ;
14 i f ( f l<0.0) {
15 xl= x1 ;
16 xh=x2 ;
17 }e l s e{
18 xh=x1 ;
19 xl= x2 ;
20 }
21
22 doub l e r t s=0.5∗(x1+x2) ;
23 doub l e dxo ld=ab s (x2−x1) ;
24 doub l e dx=dxo l d ;
25 doub l e f= f uncd−>ope r a t o r ( ) ( r t s ) ;
26 doub l e df= f uncd−>d f ( r t s ) ;
27
28 f o r ( i n t j=0; j< MAXI T;j++){
29 i f ( ( ( ( r ts−xh)∗df− f ) ∗ ( ( r ts−x l ) ∗df− f ) >0.0) | | ( ab s ( 2 . 0∗ f )>ab s ( d
xo l d∗d f ) ) ) {
30 dxo ld=d x ;
31 dx=0.5∗(xh−x l ) ;
32 r ts=xl+d x ;
33 i f ( xl==r t s ) j=MAXI T;
34 }e l s e{
35 dxo ld=d x ;
36 dx=f/ d f ;
37 doub l e t emp=r t s ;
38 r t s −= d x;
39 i f ( t emp==r t s ) j=MAXI T;
40 }
41
42 i f ( ab s ( dx)<xac c) j=MAXI T;
43 f= f uncd−>ope r a t o r ( ) ( r t s ) ;
44 df= f uncd−>d f ( r t s ) ;
45 i f ( f<0.0) {
46 xl= r t s ;
47 }e l s e{
48 xh=r t s ;
49 }
50 }
51
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52
53 i f ( ab s ( f )<=xac c) {
54 r e turn r t s ;
55 }e l s e{
56
57 //Newt on f a i l a t t empt i ng s e cant
58
59 f o r ( i n t j=0; j< 25 ; j++){
60 xmi d=(xh+x l ) / 2 . 0 ;
61 f l= f uncd−>ope r a t o r ( ) ( x l ) ;
62 fh=f uncd−>ope r a t o r ( ) ( xh) ;
63 fmi d = f uncd−>ope r a t o r ( ) ( xmi d) ;
64 // cout << f l <<‘‘\ t” << fmi d <<‘‘\ t” << f h << end l ;
65 i f ( f h>0){
66 i f ( fmi d>0){
67 xh=xmi d ;
68 }e l s e i f ( fmi d<0){
69 xl=xmi d ;
70 }e l s e{
71 r e turn xmi d ;
72 }
73 }e l s e i f ( f h<0){
74 i f ( fmi d<0){
75 xh=xmi d ;
76 }e l s e i f ( fmi d>0){
77 xl=xmi d ;
78 }e l s e{
79 r e turn xmi d ;
80 }
81 }e l s e{
82 r e turn x h ;
83 }
84 i f ( ( ab s ( fmid− fmi do)<xac c∗xac c) | | ( ab s ( xmid−xmi do)<xac c∗xac c)
) {
85 i f ( ab s ( fmi d)<1e−10){
86 r e turn xmi d ;
87 }
88 }e l s e{
89 xmi do=xmi d ;
90 fmi do=fmi d ;
91 }
92
93 }
94 }
95 // cout <<‘‘Max I t t e r r eached i n r t s a f e” << end l ;
96 r e turn xmi d ;
97 }
B.4.5 Multidimensional Newtons Method
A hybrid Newtons Method/pseudo-Broydens method is implemented, for a
given X0 the Jacobian is calculated and a new point developed. The the
estimate of both the point and Jacobian is smoothed with a factor of e√
k+1
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where k is the iteration number.
1 t emp l a t e <c l a s s T>
2 c l a s s Br oyden
3 {
4 pub l i c :
5 i n t i t e r ;
6 Br oyde n(T &FUNK, ve c t or<doub l e> X0, ve c t or<doub l e> LB, ve c t or<
doub l e> UB){
7 doub l e d ;
8 i n t i , k ;
9 i n t n = ( i n t ) X0. s i z e ( ) ;
10 f0=new ve c t or<doub l e>(n) ;
11 x0=new ve c t or<doub l e>(n) ;
12 ∗x0=X0;
13 Ma t r i x<doub l e> A(n , n) ;
14 Ma t r i x<doub l e> B(n , n) ;
15 ve c t or<doub l e> x1 , f 1 , s , s1 , f d , f t ;
16 doub l e e=0.999;
17 ve c t or<doub l e> xd = X0;
18 // Al l oca t e t empo r a r y memo r y
19 x1 . r e s i z e ( n) ;
20 f 1 . r e s i z e ( n) ;
21 s . r e s i z e ( n) ;
22 i n t v i ab l e ;
23 doub l e f ac t ;
24 cons t uns i gned PSMAX=5;
25 // Cr ea t e i dent i t y ma t r i x f o r s t a r tup ( cons i de r Jacob i an a l t e r
na t i v e)
26 i f (n==2){
27 A=Ja c(FUNK,∗x0) ;
28 }e l s e{
29 A.Make I ( ) ;
30 }
31
32 // Ma i n l oop
33 f o r ( k=0;k< MAX ITER;k++){
34 f t =FUNK−>ope r a t o r [ ] ( ∗ x0) ;
35 ∗ f0= f t ;
36 // cout <<”f t : ‘ ‘ << f t [ 0 ] << end l ;
37 i f ( A.de t ( )>0){
38 B=A. I nve r s e ( ) ∗ (0 .75/ s q r t ( ( doub l e) k+1.0) ) ;
39 }e l s e{
40 B.Make I ( ) ;
41 B=B∗(0.75/ s q r t ( ( doub l e) k+1.0) ) ;
42 }
43 s1=Mu l tVe ( (∗ f 0 ) ,−1.0) ;
44 s=B∗ s 1 ;
45 d = 0 . 0 ;
46 f o r ( i=0; i<n; i++) {
47 x1 [ i ] = (∗ x0) [ i ] − s [ i ] ;
48 d += s [ i ] ∗ s [ i ] ;
49 }
50 i f (d <= f ab s ( ep s ) ) br ea k ;
51 v i ab l e =10;
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52 wh i l e ( v i ab l e!=0) {
53 v i ab l e=0;
54 f o r ( i n t q=0;q<n;q++){
55 f act= ( ( doub l e ) r an d() ) / ( ( doub l e) RAND MAX) ;
56 i f ( x1 [ q]<LB[ q ] ) {
57 x1 [ q]=( f ac t∗ x1 [ q]+(1− f a c t ) ∗UB[ q ] ) ;
58 v i ab l e++;
59 }e l s e i f ( x1 [ q]>UB[ q ] ) {
60 x1 [ q]=( f ac t∗ x1 [ q]+(1− f a c t ) ∗LB[ q ] ) ;
61 v i ab l e++;
62 }
63 i f ( x1 [ q] != x1 [ q ] ) x1 [ q]=( f ac t∗LB[q]+(1− f a c t ) ∗UB[ q ] ) ;
64 }
65 }
66 f1=FUNK−>ope r a t o r [ ] ( x1) ;
67 // Upda t e A
68 B=Ja c(FUNK,x1) ∗(1−( e/ s q r t ( ( doub l e ) k+1.0) ) ) ;
69 A=A∗( e/ s q r t ( ( doub l e) k+1.0) ) ;
70 A=A+B;
71
72 // cout << k << end l ;
73 ∗ f 0 = f 1 ;
74 ∗x0 = x1 ;
75 }
76 i t e r = k ;
77
78 }
79
80 ve c t or<doub l e> ope r a t o r ( ) ( ) {
81 r e turn ∗ x0 ;
82 }
83 ve c t or<doub l e> RES() {
84 r e turn ∗ f 0 ;
85 }
86 pr i va t e :
87 ve c t or<doub l e>∗ x0 ;
88 ve c t or<doub l e>∗ f 0 ;
89 ve c t or<doub l e> Mu l tVe( cons t ve c t or<doub l e> V, doub l e D){
90 i nt n = ( i n t ) V. s i z e ( ) ;
91 ve c t or<doub l e> VR(n) ;
92 f o r ( i n t i=0; i<n; i++){
93 VR[ i ]=D∗V[ i ] ;
94 }
95 i f (VR!=VR) cout <<‘‘mo r e pa i n . . . ” << end l ;
96 r e turn VR;
97 }
98
99 Ma t r i x<doub l e> Ja c(T &FUNK, ve c t or<doub l e> X0){
100 i nt n = ( i n t ) X0. s i z e ( ) ;
101 Ma t r i x<doub l e> A(n , n) ;
102 ve c t or<doub l e> f 0 a(2) ;
103 ve c t or<doub l e> f d ;
104 doub l e e=1e−6;
105 ve c t or<doub l e> xd = X0;
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106 f0a=FUNK−>ope r a t o r [ ] ( X0) ;
107 xd[0]+= e ;
108 fd=FUNK−>ope r a t o r [ ] ( xd) ;
109 A. s e tVa l u e ( 0 , 0 , ( f 0 a[0]− f d [ 0 ] ) / e) ;
110 A. s e tVa l u e ( 0 , 1 , ( f 0 a[1]− f d [ 1 ] ) / e) ;
111 xd=X0;
112 xd[1]+= e ;
113 fd=FUNK−>ope r a t o r [ ] ( xd) ;
114 A. s e tVa l u e ( 1 , 0 , ( f 0 a[0]− f d [ 0 ] ) / e) ;
115 A. s e tVa l u e ( 1 , 1 , ( f 0 a[1]− f d [ 1 ] ) / e) ;
116 doub l e che ck =A.de t ( ) ;
117 i f ( ( che ck==0.0) | | che ck!=che c k){ A.Make I ( ) ;}
118 r e turn A;
119 }
120 } ;
B.4.6 SCE Algorithm
Shuﬄed Complex Evolution is a hybrid genetic algorithm, the code used is
presented below.
1 t emp l a t e <c l a s s T>
2 c l a s s POPULATION
3 {
4 pub l i c :
5 POPULATION(T &F, ve c t or<doub l e> X0, ve c t or<doub l e> l b , ve c t o
r<doub l e> ub , i n t n) : f ( F){
6 // t r a sn f e r t o c l a s s va l s
7 doub l e va l ;
8 ve c t or<ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > > POINTS2;
9 ve c t or< i nt> o rde r e d ;
10 nPOINTS=n;
11 x0=X0;
12 LB=l b ;
13 UB=u b;
14 i nt NDIM=(i n t ) x0 . s i z e ( ) ;
15
16 //Cr ea t e r Ho l de r s f o r po i nt s and f i tne s s
17 POINTS. r e s i z e (MAX ITER+1) ;
18 FITNES S. r e s i z e (MAX ITER+1) ;
19 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i<MAX ITER+1; i++){
20 POINTS[ i ] . r e s i z e ( nPOINTS) ;
21 FITNES S[ i ] . r e s i z e ( nPOINTS) ;
22 f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j<nPOINTS; j++){
23 POINTS[ i ] [ j ] . r e s i z e (NDIM) ;
24 }
25 }
26 // c r ea t e i n i t i a l popu l a t i on
27 f o r ( i n t i=0; i<nPOINTS; i++){
28 i f ( i == 0) {
29 POINTS [ 0 ] [ i ] = x0 ;
30 }e l s e{
31 f o r ( i n t j=0; j<NDIM;j++){
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32 va l=((doub l e) r and() ) / ( ( doub l e )RAND MAX) ;
33 POINTS [ 0 ] [ i ] [ j ] = LB[ j ]+ va l ∗ (UB[ j]−LB[ j ] ) ;
34 }
35 }
36 }
37
38 // ca l cu l a t e co s t f o r each po i nt i n i n i t i a l popu l a t i on
39 FITNES S [ 0 ] = makeFI T(0) ;
40
41 // s o r t po i nt s
42 So r tPo i nt s ( 0 ) ;
43
44 //Copy 0 th t o 1 s t i t t
45 FITNESS[1]=FITNES S [ 0 ] ;
46 POINTS[1]=POINTS [ 0 ] ;
47
48 }
49
50 ve c t or<doub l e>Ge tPo i n t ( i n t i t t , i n t p t ) { r e turn POINTS[ i t t ] [
p t ] ; }
51 doub l e Ge tF i t ( i n t i t t , i n t p t ) { r e turn FITNES S[ i t t ] [ p t ] ; }
52
53 i nt NewI t t e r a t i on( i n t i t t ) {
54 POINTS[ i t t+1]=POINTS[ i t t ] ;
55 FITNES S[ i t t+1]=FITNES S[ i t t ] ;
56 r e turn 0 ;
57 }
58
59 i nt Rep l ac ePo i n t ( i n t i t t , i n t p t , ve c t or<doub l e> po i n t , doub
l e f i t ) {
60 POINTS[ i t t ] [ pt]=po i n t ;
61 FITNES S[ i t t ] [ pt]= f i t ;
62 r e turn 0 ;
63 }
64
65 i nt So r tPo i nt s ( i n t i t t )
66 {
67 p l ac e s o rde r e d(FITNES S[ i t t ] ) ;
68 ve c t or<ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > > POINTS2;
69 ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > FITNES S2;
70 //So r t the popu l a t i on i nt o
71 o rde r ed=p l ac e s (FITNES S[ i t t ] ) ;
72
73 POINTS2=POINTS;
74 FITNESS2=FITNES S;
75 f o r ( i n t i=0; i<nPOINTS; i++){
76 POINTS2[ i t t ] [ i ] = POINTS[ i t t ] [ o rde r e d [ i ] ] ;
77 FITNESS2[ i t t ] [ i ] = FITNES S[ i t t ] [ o rde r e d [ i ] ] ;
78 }
79 FITNESS=FITNES S2;
80 POINTS=POINTS2;
81 r e turn 0 ;
82 }
83
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84 doub l e To lFun( i nt i t t ) {
85 doub l e A;
86 doub l e B;
87 i nt z ;
88 z=( i n t )FITNES S[ i t t ] . s i z e ( ) −1;
89 A=FITNES S[ i t t ] [ 0 ] ;
90 B=FITNES S[ i t t ] [ z ] ;
91
92 r e turn B−A;
93 }
94
95 doub l e Di f f ( i n t i t t ) {
96 i nt nPOINTS=( i n t )POINTS [ 0 ] . s i z e ( ) ;
97 i n t NDIM=(i n t )POINT S [ 0 ] [ 0 ] . s i z e ( ) ;
98 ve c t or<doub l e> DIFF(nPOINTS∗NDIM);
99 doub l e va l ;
100 f o r ( i n t i=0; i<nPOINTS; i++){
101 f o r ( i n t m=0;m<NDIM;m++){
102 val=POINTS[ i t t−1] [ i ] [ m]−POINTS[ i t t ] [ i ] [ m];
103 DIFF[m∗nPOINTS+ i ] =va l∗ va l ;
104 }
105 }
106
107 s o r t (DIFF.beg i n() ,DIFF. en d() ) ;
108
109 r e turn s q r t (DIFF[nPOINTS∗NDI M−1]) ;
110 }
111
112
113
114 pr i va t e :
115 ve c t or<ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > > POINTS;
116 ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > FITNES S;
117 T &f ;
118 ve c t or<doub l e> x0 ;
119 ve c t or<doub l e> LB;
120 ve c t or<doub l e> UB;
121 i nt nPOINTS;
122
123 ve c t or<doub l e> makeFI T(T &F, ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > PTRY,
ve c t or<doub l e> l b , ve c t or<doub l e> ub)
124 {
125 i nt pd im = ( i n t ) PTRY. s i z e ( ) ;
126 ve c t or<doub l e> f i t ( pd i m) ;
127 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i<nPOINTS; i++)
128 {
129 f i t [ i ] = CALCULATE COST(F ,PTRY[ i ] , l b ,ub) ;
130 }
131
132 r e turn f i t ;
133 }
134
135 ve c t or<doub l e> makeFI T( i nt i t t )
136 {
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137 i nt pd im = ( i n t ) POINTS [ 0 ] . s i z e ( ) ;
138 ve c t or<doub l e> f i t ( pd i m) ;
139 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i<pd i m; i++)
140 {
141 f i t [ i ] = CALCULATE COST( f ,POINTS[ i t t ] [ i ] , LB,UB) ;
142 }
143 r e turn f i t ;
144 }
145
146 // ========================================
147 // COST FUNCTION EVALUATION
148 // −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
149
150 doub l e CALCULATE COST(T &FUN, ve c t or<doub l e> PTRY, ve c t or<do
ub l e> LB, ve c t or<doub l e> UB)
151 {
152 doub l e b i g = 1000000000000;
153 doub l e YTRY;
154 i nt NDIM = ( i n t ) PTRY. s i z e ( ) ;
155 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i<NDIM; i++)
156 {
157 // che ck l owe r bounds
158 i f (PTRY[ i ] < LB[ i ] )
159 {
160 YTRY = b i g+(LB[ i]−PTRY[ i ] ) ∗b i g/100 ;
161 r e turn YTRY;
162 }
163 // che ck uppe r bounds
164 i f (PTRY[ i ] > UB[ i ] )
165 {
166 YTRY = b i g+(PTRY[ i]−UB[ i ] ) ∗b i g/100 ;
167 r e turn YTRY;
168 }
169 }
170 YTRY=FUN−>ope r a t o r ( ) (PTRY) ;
171 // ca l cu l a t e co s t a s s oc i a t ed wi th PTRY
172 r e turn YTRY;
173 }
174 } ;
175
176 t emp l a t e <c l a s s T>
177 c l a s s SCEMa i n{
178 pub l i c :
179 SCEMa i n() {}
180
181 ve c t or<doub l e> ope r a t o r ( ) (T &f , ve c t or<doub l e> x0 , ve c t or<doub l
e> LB, ve c t or<doub l e> UB)
182 {
183 i f ( x0 . s i z e ( ) != LB. s i z e ( ) ) {cout <<‘‘LB and X0 have i ncompa t i b
l e d imens i ons i n SCE” << end l ; }
184 i f ( x0 . s i z e ( ) != UB. s i z e ( ) ) {cout <<‘‘UB and X0 have i ncompa t i b
l e d imens i ons i n SCE” << end l ; }
185
186 /∗ i n i t i a l i z e r andom s e e d : ∗/
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187 s r an d(( i n t ) t ime(NULL) ) ;
188
189 // s e t EXITFLAG t o de f au l t va l ue
190 i nt EXITFLAG = −2;
191 i nt NDIM = ( i n t ) x0 . s i z e ( ) ;
192 i nt nPOINTS COMPLEX = 2∗NDIM+2;
193 i nt nPOINTS S IMPLEX = NDIM+2;
194 i nt nPOINTS = nCOMPLEXES ∗ nPOINTS COMPLEX;
195
196 POPULATION<T> POP( f , x0 , LB,UB,nPOINTS) ;
197
198 ve c t or<doub l e> X(NDIM) ;
199
200 ve c t or<doub l e> t emp(NDIM) ;
201 ve c t or<doub l e> t emp2(nPOINTS) ;
202 ve c t or<doub l e> t emp3(nPOINTS COMPLEX) ;
203 ve c t or< i nt> o rde r e d(nPOINTS) ;
204 ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > COMPLEX(nPOINTS COMPLEX, ve c t or<doub l
e>(NDIM)) ;
205 ve c t or<doub l e> COMPLEX FITNESS(nPOINTS COMPLEX) ;
206 ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > COMPLEX2(nPOINTS COMPLEX, ve c t or<doub l
e>(NDIM)) ;
207 ve c t or<doub l e> COMPLEX FITNESS2(nPOINTS COMPLEX) ;
208 ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > S IMPLEX(nPOINTS S IMPLEX, ve c t or<doub l
e>(NDIM)) ;
209 ve c t or<doub l e> S IMPLEX FITNESS(nPOINTS S IMPLEX) ;
210 ve c t or<ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > > RES REF;
211
212 //va r i ab l e f o r f o r i t t e r a t i ons
213 ve c t or< i nt> k1(nPOINTS COMPLEX) ;
214 ve c t or< i nt> k2(nPOINTS COMPLEX) ;
215 ve c t or< i nt> LOCATION(nPOINTS S IMPLEX) ;
216
217 // i n i t i a l i z e count e r s
218 i nt n ITERATIONS = 0 ;
219 i nt nFUN EVALS = 0 ;
220
221 i nt i t t v=0;
222
223 f o r ( i n t i t t=1; i t t<MAX ITER−2; i t t++){
224 i t t v++;
225 // The popu l a t i on ma t r i x POPULATION wi l l now be r ea r r anged i
nt o so−ca l l ed comp l exe s .
226 // Fo r each comp l ex . . .
227
228 f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j<nCOMPLEXES; j++)
229 {
230 // cons t ruc t j− th comp l ex f r om POPULATION
231 f o r ( i n t k = 0 ; k<nPOINTS COMPLEX; k++){
232 k1 [ k]= k ;
233 k2 [ k ] = k1 [ k ]∗nCOMPLEXES + j ;
234 COMPLEX[ k1 [ k ] ] = POP.Ge tPo i n t ( i t t , k2 [ k ] ) ;
235 COMPLEX FITNES S[ k1 [ k ] ] = POP.Ge tF i t ( i t t , k2 [ k ] ) ;
236 }
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237 }
238
239 // Each comp l ex evo l ve s a numbe r o f s t eps ac co rd i ng t o t
he compe t i t i ve
240 // comp l ex evo l ut i on (CCE) a l go r i thm a s de s c r i bed i n Dua
n e t a l . (1992) .
241 // The r e f o r e , a numbe r o f ‘pa r ent s ’ a r e s e l e c t ed f r om ea
ch comp l ex wh i ch
242 // f o rm a s imp l e x . The s e l e c t i on o f the pa r ent s i s done
s o tha t the be t t e r
243 // po i nt s i n the comp l ex have a h i ghe r pr obab i l i t y t o be
s e l e c t ed a s a
244 // pa r en t . The pape r o f Duan e t a l . (1992) de s c r i be s how
a t r ape zo i da l
245 // pr obab i l i t y d i s t r i but i on can be us ed f o r th i s purpo s
e . The imp l ement a t i on
246 // f ound on the i nt e rne t ( imp l ement ed by Duan h ims e l f ) h
oweve r us ed a
247 // s omewha t d i f f e r ent pr obab i l i t y d i s t r i but i on wh i ch i s
us ed he r e a s we l l .
248
249 f o r ( i n t k = 0 ; k < n ITER INNER LOOP;k++){
250 // cout << ‘ ‘1 . . .” << end l ;
251 // s e l e c t s imp l ex by s amp l i ng the comp l ex
252 LOCATION=S impSamp(nPOINTS COMPLEX,nPOINTS S IMPLEX) ;
253 // cout << ‘ ‘2 . . .” << end l ;
254 // cons t ruc t the s imp l ex
255 f o r ( i n t m=0;m<nPOINTS S IMPLEX;m++)
256 {
257 S IMPLEX[m] = COMPLEX[LOCATION[ m ] ] ;
258 S IMPLEX FITNES S[ m] = COMPLEX FITNES S[LOCATION[ m ] ] ;
259 }
260
261 // gene r a t e new po i nt f o r s imp l ex
262 // f i r s t ex t r apo l a t e by a f ac t o r −1 thr ough the f ac e
o f the s imp l ex
263 // ac r o s s f r om the h i gh po i n t , i . e . , r e f l e c t the s imp l
ex f r om the h i gh po i nt
264
265
266 RES REF=EVOLVE( f , S IMPLEX, S IMPLEX FITNESS , LB, UB) ;
267 S IMPLEX FITNESS=RES RE F [ 0 ] [ 0 ] ;
268 f o r ( i n t i=0; i<nPOINTS S IMPLEX;i++){
269 S IMPLEX[ i ]=RES REF [ 1 ] [ i ] ;
270 }
271
272 // r ep l ac e the s imp l ex i nt o the comp l ex
273 f o r ( i n t i=1; i<nPOINTS S IMPLEX;i++){
274 COMPLEX[LOCATION[ i ] ] = S IMPLEX[ i ] ;
275 COMPLEX FITNES S[LOCATION[ i ] ] = S IMPLEX FITNES S[ i ] ;
276 }
277
278 // s o r t the comp l e x ;
279 p l ac e s o rde r e d(COMPLEX FITNESS) ;
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280 COMPLEX2=COMPLEX;
281 COMPLEX FITNESS2=COMPLEX FITNES S;
282 f o r ( i n t m=0; m<nPOINTS COMPLEX;m++){
283 COMPLEX[m]=COMPLEX2[o rde r e d [ m ] ] ;
284 COMPLEX FITNES S[m]=COMPLEX FITNES S2[ o rde r e d [ m ] ] ;
285 }
286
287 }// i nne r l oop
288
289 // r ep l ac e the comp l ex back i nt o the popu l a t i on
290
291 f o r ( i n t k=0;k<nPOINTS COMPLEX;k++){
292 POP.Rep l ac ePo i n t ( i t t , k2 [ k ] ,COMPLEX[ k1 [ k ] ] ,COMPLEX FITNES S[
k1 [ k ] ] ) ;
293 }
294
295
296 // At th i s po i n t , the popu l a t i on wa s d i v i ded i n s eve r a l comp
l exe s , each o f wh i ch
297 // unde rwent a numbe r o f i t e r a t i on o f the s imp l ex (Me t r opo l i
s ) a l go r i thm. Now,
298 // the po i nt s i n the popu l a t i on a r e s o r t e d , the t e rmi na t i on
c r i t e r i a a r e che cked
299 // and output i s g i ven on the s c r e en i f r eque s t e d .
300
301 // s o r t the popu l a t i on
302 POP.So r tPo i nt s ( i t t ) ;
303
304
305 // end the opt imi za t i on i f one o f the s t opp i ng c r i t e r i a i s m
e t
306 // 1 . d i f f e r enc e be twe en be s t and wo r s t f unc t i on eva l ua t i on
i n popu l a t i on i s sma l l e r than TOLFUN
307 // 2 . max imum d i f f e r enc e be twe en the coo rd i na t e s o f the ve r t
i c e s i n s imp l ex i s l e s s than TOLX
308 // 3 . no conve r genc e , but max imum numbe r o f i t e r a t i ons ha s be
en r eached
309 // 4 . no conve r genc e , but max imum t ime ha s be en r eached
310
311 i f (POP.To lFun( i t t ) < TOLFUN){
312 EXITFLAG = 1 ;
313 }e l s e{
314 i f (POP.Di f f ( i t t )< TOLX){
315 EXITFLAG = 2 ;
316 }e l s e{
317 i f ( i t t>MAX ITER){
318 EXITFLAG=0;
319 }
320 }
321 }
322
323 // i f a t e rmi na t i on c r i t e r i um wa s me t , the va l ue o f EXITFLAG
shou l d have changed
324 // f r om i t s de f au l t va l ue o f −2 t o −1, 0 , 1 o r 2
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325 // cout << i t t <<‘‘\ t” << POP.Ge tF i t ( i t t , 0 ) <<‘‘\ t” << POP.Ge
tPo i n t ( i t t , 0 ) [0]<< ‘ ‘\ t” << POP.Ge tPo i n t ( i t t , 0 ) [ 1 ] <<‘‘\
t” << POP.Ge tF i t ( i t t , nPOINTS−1) << end l ;
326 X=POP.Ge tPo i n t ( i t t , 0 ) ;
327
328 i f (EXITFLAG != −2) {
329 i t t = MAX ITER;
330 }e l s e{
331 POP.NewI t t e r a t i on( i t t ) ;
332 }
333 }
334
335 // cout << EXITFLAG << end l ;
336 X. r e s i z e (NDIM+1) ;
337 X[NDIM]=POP.Ge tF i t ( i t t v ,0) ;
338 r e turn X;
339 }
340
341 pr i va t e :
342
343 // ======================================
344 // COST FUNCTION EVALUATION
345 // −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
346
347 doub l e CALCULATE COST(T &FUN, ve c t or<doub l e> PTRY, ve c t or<doub l
e> LB, ve c t or<doub l e> UB)
348 {
349 doub l e b i g = 1000000000000 .0 ;
350 doub l e b i g2 = 1000000 .0 ;
351 doub l e YTRY=0.0;
352 i nt NDIM = ( i n t ) PTRY. s i z e ( ) ;
353 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i<NDIM; i++)
354 {
355 // che ck l owe r bounds
356 i f (PTRY[ i ] < LB[ i ] )
357 {
358 YTRY = b i g+(LB[ i]−PTRY[ i ] ) ∗b i g2 ;
359 }
360 // che ck uppe r bounds
361 i f (PTRY[ i ] > UB[ i ] )
362 {
363 YTRY = b i g+(PTRY[ i]−UB[ i ] ) ∗b i g2 ;
364 }
365 }
366 i f (YTRY==0.0){
367 YTRY=FUN−>ope r a t o r ( ) (PTRY) ;
368 }
369 // ca l cu l a t e co s t a s s oc i a t ed wi th PTRY
370
371 r e turn YTRY;
372 }
373
374 s t a t i c ve c t or< i nt> S impSamp( i nt nPOINTS COMPLEX, i nt nPOINTS S IMP
LEX)
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375 {
376 ve c t or< i nt> LOCATION(nPOINTS S IMPLEX) ;
377 boo l ALREADY PARENT;
378 i nt DUMMY;
379 doub l e va l ;
380
381 LOCATION[0 ] = 0 ; // the LOCATION o f the s e l e c t ed po i nt i n the
comp l ex
382
383 f o r ( i n t l = 1 ; l<nPOINTS S IMPLEX;l++){
384 ALREADY PARENT = 0 ;
385 wh i l e (ALREADY PARENT==0)
386 {
387 va l = ( (doub l e) nPOINTS COMPLEX+0.5) ∗( (doub l e) nPOINTS C
OMPLEX+0.5) − (doub l e ) nPOINTS COMPLEX ∗( (doub l e ) nPO
INTS COMPLEX + 1.0 ) ∗ ( ( doub l e) r an d() / ( ( doub l e)RAND M
AX)) ;
388 va l = (doub l e ) nPOINTS COMPLEX + 0.5 − s q r t ( va l ) ;
389 DUMMY = ( i n t ) f l oo r ( va l ) ;
390 //va l = ( 1 . 0 / 3 . 0 ) ∗ ( ( doub l e) nPOINTS COMPLEX) ∗ ( ( ( doub l e) r an
d() / ( ( doub l e)RAND MAX)) +((doub l e) r an d() / ( ( doub l e)RAN
D MAX)) +((doub l e) r an d() / ( ( doub l e)RAND MAX)) ) ;
391 //DUMMY=( i n t ) f l oo r ( va l ) ;
392 i f (DUMMY<nPOINTS COMPLEX){
393 f o r ( i n t m=0;m<nPOINTS S IMPLEX;m++)
394 {
395 ALREADY PARENT=1;
396 i f (LOCATION[m] == DUMMY){
397 ALREADY PARENT = 0 ;
398 m=nPOINTS S IMPLEX;
399 }
400 }
401 }
402 }
403 LOCATION[ l ] = DUMMY;
404 }
405
406 s o r t (LOCATION.beg i n() ,LOCATION.en d() ) ;
407 r e turn LOCATION;
408 }
409
410 ve c t or<ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > > EVOLVE(T &f , ve c t or<ve c t or<doub
l e> > S IMPLEX, ve c t or<doub l e> S IMPLEX FITNESS ,ve c t or<doub l e>
LB,ve c t or<doub l e> UB)
411 {
412
413 i nt PDIM =( i n t ) S IMPLEX. s i z e ( ) ;
414 i nt nPOINTS S IMPLEX = PDIM;
415 i nt NDIM =( i n t ) S IMPLEX [ 0 ] . s i z e ( ) ;
416 //Re su l t
417 ve c t or<ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > >RES(2) ;
418 RE S [ 0 ] . r e s i z e (1 ) ;
419 RE S [ 1 ] . r e s i z e (PDIM) ;
420
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421 RE S [ 0 ] [ 0 ] . r e s i z e (PDIM) ;
422 RES [ 0 ] [ 0 ] = S IMPLEX FITNES S;
423 f o r ( i n t i=0; i<PDIM; i++){
424 RE S [ 1 ] [ i ] . r e s i z e (NDIM) ;
425 RE S [ 1 ] [ i ]= S IMPLEX[ i ] ;
426 }
427 ve c t or< i nt> o rde r e d ;
428 ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > RES REF;
429 ve c t or<doub l e> SORTED FITNES S;
430 SORTED FITNESS=S IMPLEX FITNES S;
431 s o r t ( SORTED FITNES S. beg i n() ,SORTED FITNES S. end() ) ;
432 doub l e SFTRY;
433 ve c t or<doub l e> SXTRY(NDIM) ;
434 doub l e SFTRYEXP;
435 ve c t or<doub l e> SXTRYEXP(NDIM) ;
436 doub l e SFTRYCONTR;
437 ve c t or<doub l e> SXTRYCONTR(NDIM) ;
438 s t r i ng ALGOSTEP;
439
440 RES REF = AMOTRY( f , S IMPLEX ,−1.0 ,LB,UB) ;
441
442 // t r ans f e r r e su l t t o ve c t o r s
443 SFTRY=RES RE F [ 0 ] [ 0 ] ;
444 SXTRY=RES REF [ 1 ] ;
445 i f (SFTRY <= SORTED FITNES S [ 0 ] ) {
446 // g i ve s a r e su l t be t t e r than the be s t po i n t , s o t r y an add i t
i ona l
447 // ex t r apo l a t i on by a f ac t o r 2
448 RES REF = AMOTRY( f , S IMPLEX ,−2.0 ,LB,UB) ;
449
450 // t r ans f e r r e su l t t o ve c t o r s
451 SFTRYEXP=RES RE F [ 0 ] [ 0 ] ;
452 SXTRYEXP=RES REF [ 1 ] ;
453 // che ck r e su l t
454 i f (SFTRYEXP <= SFTRY){
455 RE S [ 1 ] [ PDIM−1] = SXTRYEXP;
456 RE S [ 0 ] [ 0 ] [ PDIM−1] = SFTRYEXP;
457 ALGOSTEP = ‘ ‘ r e f l e c t i on and expans i on” ;
458 }e l s e{
459 RE S [ 1 ] [ PDIM−1] = SXTRY;
460 RE S [ 0 ] [ 0 ] [ PDIM−1] = SFTRY;
461 ALGOSTEP = ‘ ‘ r e f l e c t i on” ;
462 }
463 }e l s e i f ( SFTRY>=SORTED FITNES S[PDI M−1]){
464 // the r e f l e c t ed po i nt i s wo r s e than the s e cond−h i ghe s t ,
s o l ook
465 // f o r an i nt e rmed i a t e l owe r po i n t , i . e . , do a one−d imen
s i ona l
466 // cont r ac t i on
467 RES REF = AMOTRY( f , S IMPLEX ,−0.5 ,LB,UB) ;
468
469 SFTRYCONTR=RES RE F [ 0 ] [ 0 ] ;
470 SXTRYCONTR=RES REF [ 1 ] ;
471 // che ck r e su l t
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472 i f (SFTRYCONTR < SORTED FITNES S [ 0 ] ) {
473 RE S [ 1 ] [ PDIM−1] = SXTRYCONTR;
474 RE S [ 0 ] [ 0 ] [ PDIM−1] = SFTRYCONTR;
475 ALGOSTEP = ‘ ‘one d imens i ona l cont r ac t i on” ;
476 }e l s e{
477 // ca n ’ t s e em t o ge t r i d o f tha t h i gh po i n t , s o be t t
e r cont r ac t
478 // a r ound the l owe s t (be s t ) po i nt
479 f o r ( i n t i=1; i<nPOINTS S IMPLEX;i++){
480 f o r ( i n t m=0;m<NDIM;m++){
481 RE S [ 1 ] [ i ] [ m] = 0 . 5∗ ( S IMPLEX[ i ] [ m]+S IMPLEX [ 0 ] [ m]) ;
482 }
483 RE S [ 0 ] [ 0 ] [ i ] = CALCULATE COST( f ,RE S [ 1 ] [ i ] , LB,UB) ;
484 }
485 ALGOSTEP = ‘ ‘mu l t i p l e cont r ac t i on” ;
486 }
487 }e l s e{
488 // i f y t r y be t t e r than s e cond−h i ghe s t po i n t , us e th i s po
i nt
489 f o r ( i n t i=1; i<nPOINTS S IMPLEX;i++){
490 RE S [ 1 ] [ PDIM−1] = SXTRY;
491 RE S [ 0 ] [ 0 ] [ PDIM−1] = SFTRY;
492 }
493 ALGOSTEP = ‘ ‘ r e f l e c t i on” ;
494 }
495 // cout << ALGOSTEP. c s t r ( ) << end l ;
496 r e turn RES;
497
498 }
499
500 // =================================
501 // AMOTRY FUNCTION
502 // −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
503
504 ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > AMOTRY(T &FUN, ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> >
P,doub l e FAC,ve c t or<doub l e> LB,ve c t or<doub l e> UB)
505 {
506 //Ex t r apo l a t e s by a f ac t o r FAC thr ough the f ac e o f the s imp l ex
ac r o s s f r om
507 // the h i gh po i n t , t r i e s i t , and r ep l ac e s the h i gh po i nt i f th
e new po i nt i s
508 // be t t e r .
509
510 i nt NDIM = ( i n t ) P [ 0 ] . s i z e ( ) ;
511 i nt PDIM = ( i n t ) P. s i z e ( ) ;
512 ve c t or<doub l e> PSUM(NDIM) ;
513 ve c t or<doub l e> PTRY(NDIM) ;
514
515 //Re su l t s Ve c t o r
516 ve c t or<ve c t or<doub l e> > RES(2) ;
517 RE S [ 0 ] . r e s i z e ( 1 ) ;
518 RE S [ 1 ] . r e s i z e (NDIM) ;
519
520 // ca l cu l a t e coo rd i na t e s o f new ve r t ex
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521 f o r ( i n t i=0; i<NDIM; i++)
522 {
523 PSUM[ i ] = 0 . 0 ;
524 f o r ( i n t j=0; j<NDIM; j++){
525 PSUM[ i ] += P[ i ] [ j ] / ( ( doub l e) NDIM) ;
526 }
527
528 PTRY[ i ] = PSUM[ i ]∗ (1 . 0 −FAC)+P[PDI M−1][ i ] ∗FAC;
529 }
530
531 // eva l ua t e the f unc t i on a t the t r i a l po i n t .
532 RES [ 0 ] [ 0 ] = CALCULATE COST(FUN,PTRY,LB,UB) ;
533 RES[1]= PTRY;
534
535 r e turn RES;
536 }
537 } ;
Chapter 5
Conclusion
If all economists were laid end to end, they would not reach a conclusion
–Gorge Bernard Shaw quoted in Mankiw (2011)
This research has presented empirical and theoretical arguments that in-
equality causes increased financial instability.
The empirical aspects of this research, discussed in Chapter 3, applied
standard logistic regression methods to ascertain in the probability of a crisis
is increased by higher levels of inequality. I find that the relationship is
consistent with the hypothesis. However, the coefficient in the regression
model is not significant at the 5% level and so would be discarded by standard
econometric techniques. I argue that this is not a fair test of the model given
the available data. Specifically, the lack of accurate and lengthy time series
on inequality makes inference more difficult.
Looking more closely at the interaction between inequality and financial
stability before and after the 2007 Crisis. I find that inequality is a good
predictor of and positively correlated with the level of large financial risks
in which the banking system is engaged. This result is found using a princi-
pal component decomposition of financial stability indicators on the IMF’s
Financial Stability Indicators.
I conclude that these two empirical results combined suggest that even if
inequality is not a first order driver of financial crises it is an important factor
to consider. This is especially true given current trends of rising intra-country
inequality.
A theoretical model was presented, in Chapter 4, in which inequality
causes an increased propensity to borrow due to the ability of consumers to
default. This excess demand for loans increases the wedge between borrow-
ing and deposit rates that results from defaults on loans. I find that for a
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calibration to the UK economy in 2010, a borrowing spread of 15% is pre-
dicted. Moreover, the model is solved numerically and I demonstrate that if
the level of high incomes rise the borrowing premium also rises.
The results of the theoretical work are not true universally, that is for
certain levels of income borrowing premium does not rise. However, this
may not be as problematic to the hypothesis as it fist appears. If one were
to consider Japan in the late 1980s or the USA in the 2005 one could argue
that borrowing costs were too low, thus promoting excessive risk taking. In
this sense the model provides a rich framework for future analysis. I also
did not consider the issue of collateral or securitisation, the ability of banks
to reposes mortgaged houses will certainly alter the expected pay off of a
distressed loan. This issue could be further investigated using this model if I
were to include an asset market in both periods. Finally, the model specifies
a capital market imperfection, namely a borrowing premium, it would be
possible to alter this premium to be a function of the level of borrowing or
the perceived riskiness of the loan. I do not expect any of these additions
to significantly alter the core conclusion that inequality does interact with
financial stability.
The culmination of this work is to suggest that inequality may pose risks
to future financial stability. These results support the hypothesis of Rajan
(2011). However, I find that the results are not conclusive in a robust sta-
tistical sense, and this is consistent with the work by Atkinson and Morelli
(2011b). The lack of firm results is always disappointing but must be seen
within the context of available data. Moreover, further work refining mea-
sures of inequality may help to better understand the roles inequality plays
within the financial system.
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